



A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN INDONESIA

HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA



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OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA**

THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

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FOREWORD FROM THE SPEAKER OF THE INDONESIAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR RI) IN "A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN INDONESIA"



"NEVER, ever, forget history," Indonesia's first president, Soekarno, once said. He explained, "Hold tight to your history, never leave your own history! Protect whatever we have today, for it is the accumulation of our struggle in the past. Never abandon the history of your past, o, my people, for if you abandon the history of your past, you will find yourself standing in a vacuum, and then you will become confused, and your struggle will, at the most, be just mere running amok! Running amok, like monkey in the dark!"

The statement shows that President Soekarno kept reminding our nation about how vital the history is for the development of a nation, that a history is not merely a series of past events that fade over time. Yet, history can be a source of learning and inspiration to make us step forward as a nation.

Thus, the occurrence of "A Century of Parliamentary Life in Indonesia" history book becomes necessary. It emphasizes the strategic role and significant position of Indonesian parliament in working together to bring Indonesia move forward.

This compendium of pentalogy reveals the active roles of Indonesian parliament in various important events that shaped our nation's history. Starting from Volksraad (People's Council) which held its first session on May 21, 1918, then Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), Old Order, New Order, to the reformation and post-reformation era.

Hopefully, this book can give great lessons for all of us and create a better Indonesia in the future, with a strong parliament, to realize the dream of the Indonesian independence.

Happy reading.

Dr. (H.C.) Puan Maharani, S.Sos

FOREWORD FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA



ALL praises to God almighty for we have managed to publish a new, abridged version of “A Century of Parliamentary Life in Indonesia”, a history book that was originally published in 2019. Published by the office of the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, the original version was packaged as a series of five books totaling more than 2,000 pages. The series feature the dynamics of parliamentary life in Indonesia, starting from Volksraad in the 18th century to the post-reformation era. Therefore, compared to any other history book that highlighted only particular periods, “A Century of Parliamentary Life in Indonesia” offers a more comprehensive history of the parliament.

The book recounts the century-old journey of the Indonesian parliament in chronological order and in great detail.

Alas, a good book without readers is meaningless. Therefore, we have long wished to republish “A Century of Parliamentary Life in Indonesia” in a more concise format, with just a little more than 250 pages. The new book was meant to complement the original version so readers can choose whichever they wish to read and to attract readers to dive deeper into the history of parliament in the original series after reading this new version.

I admit that it is no easy feat to rewrite five books into one while still offering a flowing narrative that fully and proportionally represents all periods in the history of our parliament. Hence, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude to the Matair Rumah Kreatif team, who has been working diligently to ensure that this book remains interesting and pleasant to read.

“Never, ever, forget history,” Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno, once said. I sincerely hope you will find reading the history of our parliament in this book to be enjoyable. I also hope that this book can deepen the love of all Indonesians, including the younger generation, for our nation and ignite interest in collecting parliamentary books.

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A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE
IN INDONESIA

PREFACE



*A great nation
is a nation that values
its history.*



Illustration that portrayed position handover from Governor General De Jonge (left side) handed to Van Starckenborgh Stachouwer.

(Source: Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 16 September 1936)

To date, we have been familiar with this quote delivered by President Soekarno: “A great nation is a nation that values its history.” However, that was not what he said precisely. Instead, he said, “Only a nation able to learn from its past can truly be a great nation.”

One of the requirements for becoming a great nation is the ability to learn from its history. This context then demands a new phrase: a great nation is a nation that has a narrative about its identity.

In telling its narrative, one can observe a nation through its journey across time, space, and life — all of which form a particular identity. Peter Munz explained why it is in people’s interest to know about the past:

First, it is for the sake of knowledge or simply because the past has an exotic charm.

Second, there is a wish to learn from other people’s experiences.

Third, the past is believed to be an asset to strengthen a sense of community and form an identity.



The writing of this book is part of an effort to facilitate the Indonesian people, especially its youth, to understand the long journey this nation went through to set up its political life through a respectable parliament. Readers seeking historical details can still find them in the pentalogy.



Although an understanding of identity is fluid, in the sense that internal and external factors continuously form it, identity can generally be understood as the character of a particular community. On the conceptual level, every nation has an identity as the identity is attached to the nation instinctively, as stated by Hegel.

As the parliamentary institution of a nation that gained its independence through a long fight for freedom from colonialism, the People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) has a long history that can be traced back, at least to the beginning of the 20th century. Political ethics essentially encouraged the creation of new life in the colonized land once called the Dutch East Indies.

However, until the end of 2019, no book had comprehensively covered the history of the Indonesian parliament. Some of the available ones merely offered a chronology, episodes, or snippets of the history. Hence, it is imminent for a country with a long history, expansive territory, and diverse peoples and cultures to reconstruct its history, including the journey of its parliament, which, in this case, is the legislative body or a people's representative council.

That was why the Office of the Secretary-General of the Republic of Indonesia commissioned a pentalogy of DPR-RI's history to celebrate the centenary of the Indonesian parliament. The books were written between 2018–2019 — a long writing process indeed.

A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN INDONESIA

The pentalogy was structured to describe the Indonesian parliament experience, specifically of championing the oppressed's aspirations and attaining independence from foreign colonialism. The pentalogy discusses the connection of the nation's struggles seen through the eyes of public figures, organizations, and movement activists in parliament from the colonial era to independence and the periods afterward. The books ended by discussing the parliamentary life of today.

The writing of this book is part of an effort to facilitate the Indonesian people, especially its youth, to understand the long journey this nation went through to set up its political life through a respectable parliament. Readers seeking historical details can still find them in the pentalogy.

The layout of this book follows the pattern found in the pentalogy. The first book tells how the Indonesian people came up with a representative body representing their interests as citizens in the early 20th century before Indonesia became an independent country.

That part shows the exchange between Indonesians, represented by their educated figures and local leaders, to determine what it means to be Indonesian. It also tells the struggle for a free country, beginning from Dutch colonialism, the arrival of the Japanese, and then to the early period of Indonesia's independence.


The second book deals with internal struggles post-independence: arguments over the laws, constitution, government system, to the model for people representation. The third book shows a quarreling nation trying to find independence.

The fourth book describes the end of the internal political struggle and more stable social and political life. The fifth book tells a maturing Indonesian political life in the reformation era.

In this book, every book in the pentalogy is summarized as chapters. Meanwhile, subchapters in the pentalogy are presented as subheadlines with some parts merged as subsections.

Some details, such as arguments in the parliament, are left out as readers will find the details in the pentalogy. The consideration to leave out some details was also due to paging technicalities. Last but not least, this book is put together to facilitate readers to understand the history of the Indonesian parliament. Readers might not find every detail in this book. Still, the hope is that this book can become a starting point to learn about the Indonesian parliament, the Indonesian people's identity, and Indonesia in general.

Last but not least, this book is put together to facilitate readers to understand the history of the Indonesian parliament. Readers might not find every detail in this book. Still, the hope is that this book can become a starting point to learn about the Indonesian parliament, the Indonesian people's identity, and Indonesia in general.



A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE
IN INDONESIA

FROM VOLKSRAAD TO THE CENTRAL INDONESIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE (1917-1949)



The formation of the Volksraad in the Dutch East Indies was not a mere consequence of the government system in the Netherlands.




Illustration that portrayed the end of the debate about education budget in Volksraad.

(Source: Bataviaasch nieuwsblad, 21 August 1937)

***Volksraad* (1918–1931)**

The formation of the *Volksraad* in the Dutch East Indies was due to the situation and condition of the people colonized by the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government at the time. The foundation of the government system was designed by Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels (1808–1811).

Established in 1918, the *Volksraad* can be considered the precursor of the people’s representative council in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). *Volksraad* is Dutch for people’s council or parliament.



Two Dutch colonies had the *Volksraad*: the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* (the South African Republic) and the Dutch East Indies. In South Africa, the *Volksraad* had existed since the mid-19th century up until 1902. This body had initially been unicameral with members as many as 24 people, but in 1890 it became bicameral.

What about in the Dutch East Indies? The *Volksraad* in the Dutch East Indies was not merely a consequence of the government system in the Netherlands. According to *Regerings Reglement* (RR) 1854, the Dutch government’s regulations, leadership in the Dutch East Indies was held by a governor-general (*gouverneur generaal*). He must be Dutch and answered to the Dutch King/Queen and parliament. According to the RR, the Dutch East Indies was a *wingewest*, or profitable territory to the Kingdom of Netherlands.



Volksraad assembly kick-off
situation in 1918.

(Source: KITLV 4513)

As the RR gave so much power to the governor-general, power dynamics in the Dutch East Indies became unbalanced, disadvantageous particularly for the *bumiputra* (indigenous population). The power imbalance was acknowledged by a small portion of the elite population in the Netherlands. They then proposed several regulatory and systematic changes be applied in the Dutch East Indies. The change proposal was meant to counterweigh the governor general's power. In 1894, through Minister of Colonial Affairs Willem van De dem, there had been a plan to form a representative body alongside the governor-general and a Raad van Indie or an East Indies council as advisors to the governor-general.

As an update to the RR, *Decentralisatie Wetgeving* or the Laws of Decentralization was released on July 23, 1903. The *Staten Generaal* in the Netherlands had passed the law. The *Staten Generaal* is the bicameral supreme legislature of the Netherlands with state budget rights in all Dutch colonies, including the Dutch East Indies, until 1942. The laws, published on the *Nederlandsche Staatsblad* number 219.10, opened up the prospect of decentralization in the government, making way for autonomous regions, including *gewest* (region) and *gedeelte van gewest* (part of region).

Decentralization was the main aim of the Political Ethics supporters, who sought distribution of power from Den Haag to Batavia, from Batavia to other regions, and from the Dutch to the *bumiputra*. The decentralization implementation would be followed by forming councils in the local regions.

April 1, 1905:

City councils were established in three cities in West Java, including Gemeente Batavia, Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara), and Buitenzorg (Bogor).

April 1, 1905: City councils were established in three cities in West Java, including *Gemeente* Batavia, Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara), and Buitenzorg (Bogor).

On the *gewest* level, a *gewestelijk raad* or a residency council was formed; in the *gewest* regions, a *plaatselijke raad* was formed, while in European dominated regions, a *gemeenteraad* was formed. Further, in 1905, the formation of those councils was managed under *Locale Raden Odonantie*, as recorded in the *Indische Staatsblad* number 18.

On April 1, 1905, city councils were established in three cities in West Java, including *Gemeente* Batavia, Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara), and Buitenzorg (Bogor). Then, following the three cities, 12 more city councils were established in the Dutch East Indies, including *Gemeente* Surabaya in 1906 and others outside Java. After 1907, residency councils were established on the entire Java.

However, the decentralization laws were believed to have given pseudo autonomy to regencies and *gemeente* (city council) in the Dutch East Indies. The update seemingly gave way to *bumiputra* to participate in colonial governance.


Residency council and city *gemeente* (*haminte*) were formed with the rule that every 500 *bumiputra* could select a *keesman* or an electorate. Then, the electorate would have the right to elect some regency council members; some others would be elected by the governor as recommended by the

regent. Effectively, every province had a provincial council whose members would be selected by the regency council and the city *gemeente* in the respective province.

Europeans were the majority members of the city councils. Some city council members were elected by the governor-general, while others were selected because they were regents and vice-regents. By definition, this system could not be called a regional autonomy.

However, the colonial government had attempted a decentralized government at the very least. Until 1939, there had been at least 32 city councils, 19 of them on Java, whereby mayors were chairmen.

There had been at least 32 city councils, 19 of them on Java, whereby mayors were chairmen.



All members went through an election process, although elected members were predominantly Dutch. The Dutch domination was due to election rules that required members to be literate and have an income tax of at least 300 guilders. Only a few *bumiputra* fulfilled the requirements. Furthermore, council members must be able to speak Dutch.

An executive board ran activities at the city councils. Local councils were also formed in every regency (76 regencies in Java), where some members were council officials with the regent as chairman. Outside Java, there were 10 councils, except in East Sumatra, in which all council members were *bumiputra*.

**The opening of Volksraad meeting
by Governor General Van Limburg
Stirum on 18 May 1918.**

(Collection of Tropen Museum
Amsterdam)

A WISH FOR PARLIAMENT

THE *bumiputra* elites of the Dutch East Indies had expressed the people's wish for a representative government long before the formation of the *Volksraad*. For example, Indonesia's founding fathers proclaimed the idea for representation at the beginning of the 20th century through political organizations and writings.

Such organization was the *Indische Partij* (the Indies Party), the first political party in the Dutch East Indies. The party was established in Bandung on September 6, 1912 by E. F. E. Douwes Dekker (1879–1950), a radical journalist who sought to raise awareness on the importance of equality among nations.

The organization's goal was "to awaken patriotism among the Indies people of the Indies that had provided them with a livelihood, to urge them to work together on equal political standing which brings about development in the Indies, and prepares the people for independence."

Most of the *Indische Partij* members were of mixed heritage. A few *bumiputra* among them included Cipto Mangunkusumo (1886-1943), an alumnus of *School Tot Opleiding Indische Artsen* (STOVIA) or the Javanese Medical School, and Suwardi Suryaningrat, who would later be known as Ki Hajar Dewantara (1889-1959), a Paku Alam royalty who had been a student at STOVIA but later became a journalist.

A year after its establishment, the *Indische Partij* still did not receive a permit from the colonial government to be acknowledged as an official political party. According to the Dutch East Indies government, the party had gone too far in its propaganda to oppose racial discrimination and promote an independent Indies free from the Netherlands.

On March 4, 1913, Governor General A. W. F. Idenburg issued a letter to *Indische Partij*. The letter contained a rejection to recognize *Indische Partij* as a legal, political organization (*rechtspersoon*).

Indische Partij had reapplied for legality but again received a rejection. The Dutch East Indies believed that *Indische Partij* was too dangerous an organization for the continuity of the colonial government. As a result, almost each of their meetings was guarded and monitored by the police and prosecutors.

All government employees who were members of *Indische Partij* received a warning. A few companies even discharged employees for being a member of the party. Due to the colonial government's attitude towards the party, party members declined to about 700 from 4,000 in one to two years. The declining membership happened although members joined the party secretly.

Although *Indische Partij* was not recognized as an official organization, Douwes Dekker and his comrades continued to voice their ideas and critiques towards the government. For example, when the Dutch East Indies Government planned to celebrate the Netherlands' centennial freedom from France in 1913, a committee was formed in Bandung under the name *Comite Boemi Putra*. Cipto Mangunkusumo chaired the committee with Suwardi Suryaningrat as secretary. Abdul Muis and A. Wignyadisastira were members.

The committee's goals included revoking Article 111 of the *Regerings Reglement* on the prohibition on gatherings or trials discussing government/political matters in the Dutch East Indies, forming an effective parliament/people representative council, and allowing freedom of speech in the colony.

As an outcome of the committee's formation, Cipto Mangunkusumo, Suwardi Suryaningrat, Abdul Muis, and Wignyadisastira were detained. They were charged for insulting the Dutch East Indies Government and inciting unrest. However, they persisted. Suwardi reaffirmed matters regarding the formation of parliament in his defense record after he was detained.

Other than *Indische Partij*, the wish for parliament was also expressed by Cokroaminoto, a figure from *Sarekat Islam*. Cokroaminoto expressed this longing during the *Sarekat Islam* National Congress I in Bandung on June 17-24, 1916. He stated the need for decentralization, *zelfbestuur*, and autonomy in various regions in the Dutch East Indies.

The idea to establish a parliament in the colonies also arose in the Netherlands. A few years approaching World War I in 1914, the colonial government had begun realizing the possibility of a military attack from the outside in the event of a war. As a result, they began to consider the need for additional ground troops to defend the expansive Dutch East Indies and to, of course, protect the Dutch citizens in the Dutch East Indies.



Abdul Muis, c. 1916.

(Source: KITLV 7814)

However, additional troops would mean the Netherlands must allocate a more significant budget. Hence, in 1912, a suggestion was made to recruit an indigenous militia. This event became known as the *Indie Weerbaar* or the Resistant Indies movement.

The Dutch East Indies Government rejected the idea at first. However, when World War I broke out in September 1914, the colonial government's views shifted. Although the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies were not directly involved in World War I, the threat of war was felt by Dutch settlers in the colony, especially from Germany's ally in Asia, Japan.

The *Indie Weerbaar* idea was reconsidered. Many members of *Budi Utomo*, a youth organization, who were mainly Javanese, decided to become troops of the colonial army and campaign to form the militia.

Budi Utomo's central administration sent Commissioner Dwijosewoyo and Sastrowiyono in a campaign all over Java to support the plan.

Other than *Budi Utomo*, *Sarekat Islam* also participated in the *Indie Weerbaar* campaign and acknowledged the importance of this idea. *Sarekat Islam* even demanded another matter: the need for a *bumiputra* representation in the Dutch East Indies Government.

In a *Sarekat Islam* meeting in Surabaya, a vote to support the militia was prepared but did not take place. The vote, which Cokroaminoto proposed, was instead used as collateral to ensure the formation of *volks vertegenwoordiging* or a people's representation. In other words, Cokroaminoto demanded an official body where the people of the Dutch East Indies could have freedom of speech before they could discuss an indigenous militia.

In 1915, *Budi Utomo* supported *Sarekat Islam's* demand, and eventually, the *Indie Weerbaar* campaign turned into a movement for people's representation. Dutch East Indies Governor-General Van Limburg Stirum gave hope to a discussion on matters surrounding the defense of the Indies by the indigenous organization.

In July 1916, *Comite Indie Weerbaar* (the Indies Defense Committee) was formed with members consisting of representatives from *Budi Utomo*, *Centrale Sarekat Islam* (CSI), *Regenten Bond* (Regents Association), and associations from four royal territories, including Narpowandowo (the Susuhunan area in Surakarta), Prinsen Bond Mataram (the Sultan area



Mas Dwidjosuwojo, c. 1920.

(Source: KITLV 7268)

in Yogyakarta), Mangkunegaran (the duchy of Mangkunegaran), Abdi Dalem Wargo Pakualam (the duchy of Pakualaman). Meanwhile, the *In-sulinde* and the socialist factions were not interested in joining the committee.

The committee meeting on August 31, 1916 produced a proposal to send delegations to the Netherlands. The delegations would deliver the vote to the Queen of the Netherlands, Wilhelmina, and the Dutch Minister of Colonial and Parliamentary Affairs.

The delegations consisted of six members, including Prince Ario Kusumodiningrat as a representative of the Mataram Prinsen Bond, Magelang Regent Raden Tumenggung Danu Sugondo as a representative of the *Regenten Bond*, Mas Ngabehi Dwijosewoyo as a representative of *Budi Utomo*, Abdul Muis as a representative of *Sarekat Islam*, Frist Laoh as a representative of the Minahasa Union, and W. V. Rhemrev. They were accompanied by Dirk van Hinloopen Labberton, the President of the Theosophical Society and a supporter of Political Ethics, who was appointed as the delegation chairman.

In the Netherlands, some of the delegation members actively participated in different discussions. Two who were particularly active were Abdul Muis and Dwijosewoyo. Dwijosewoyo made an effort to build as many connections as possible while in the Netherlands. On the 1919 Verslag Boedi Oetomo, Dwijosewoyo reportedly extended his network to all social circles in the Netherlands, even receiving an audience with the Queen. He also attended a lower house session. Here he meant to accomplish *Budi Utomo's* aspirations to realize the indigenous militia mission in exchange for the people's representation rights in the Dutch East Indies.

Dwijosewoyo delivered speeches in various cities in the Netherlands, discussing the two main issues that drove the delegations to the Netherlands in the first place: militia and parliament. He asserted that a representative body with legislative authority was an urgent need in the Dutch East Indies at the time.

Dwijosewoyo delivered speeches in various cities in the Netherlands, discussing the two main issues that drove the delegations to the Netherlands in the first place: militia and parliament.

And that matters regarding the militia were not essential and were not the delegation's primary goal. The indigenous people's main goal was to establish laws that would ensure the formation of an independent parliament.

The Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies was also very concerned about this issue, as shown on the letters he addressed to the Colonial Affairs Minister, urging prompt resolution on the laws. The correspondences took place from July until the laws were finally passed in December 1916.

The laws of establishing parliament in the Dutch East Indies had been discussed in the preceding periods due to autonomy in the Dutch East Indies. The implementation of such freedom took the form of preparation to establish a People's Representative Council.

In 1907, Colony Affairs Minister Dirk Fock (1858–1941) proposed expanding the Council of the Indies. In 1913, Fock's successor, Jan Hendrik de Waal Malefijt, proposed establishing a *Koloniale Raad* (Colonial Council) with 29 members. Among the Colonial Council members were members of the Council of the Indies. Among the 11 members elected by the Local Council, some represented the Netherlands' interests while others represented the indigenous people's interests.

Movement activists could not accept the *Koloniale Raad* (Colonial Council); hence the name *Volksraad* (People's Council) was used. Based on an amendment from Dirk Fock et al on September 20, 1916, the name "*Koloniale Raad*" was replaced with "*Volksraad voor Nederlandsch-Indie*" as stated in Article 131. The name change from was also discussed during the *Tweede Kamer* session on October 3, 1916.

Meanwhile, Article 132 stated that members of *Koloniale Raad*, which later became *Volksraad*, consisted of at least 39 members. Members were selected according to these rules:

1. The chairman shall be selected by the Queen;
2. Nineteen members shall be selected by the Regional Council and the City Council; 10 shall be indigenous, and nine others shall be Europeans.

On the formation of the *Volksraad* at the time, J. J. Schrieke, Deputy Clerk of the *Batavia Raad van Justitie* (Council of Justice), wrote a note in Malay for the *priyayi* (nobles of the robe). He stressed the connection between

the formation of the *Volksraad* with the equal rights under Political Ethics. He showed that government employees could dominate local councils in the future where the *Volksraad* candidates would take their place and that it should be changed. If officials controlled the *Volksraad*, then the *Volksraad* would fail its purpose to represent.



News that the *Staten Generaal* had ratified the law supporting the establishment of the *Volksraad* had reached the Dutch East Indies before the delegation returned from the Netherlands. News that caught the indigenous people's attention was that, in the new parliament, 15 members would be indigenous people, with 10 members being elected and five members being appointed, from a total of 38 members.

Budi Utomo immediately took the initiative to form a National Committee with members consisting of the leaders of various indigenous organiza-

Volksraad Assembly, c. 1924/1925.

(Source: KITLV 116908)

*Elected members were officially inducted to the Volksraad on **Mei 18, 1918**, with the first session being opened by Governor-General Mr. **Johan Paul Graaf van Limburg Stirum**.*

tions. The goal was to discuss matters regarding the *Volksraad* and prepare for the election. Organizations that participated in the committee included *Budi Utomo* with two representatives, four royal organizations with six representatives, the Regent Association with two representatives, CSI with one representative, and two representatives from the Teachers Association of the Dutch East Indies (PGHB). Of all organizations, PGHB was the only organization not being assigned to leave for the Netherlands.

Approaching the election for *Volksraad*, the Dutch settlers in the Dutch East Indies simultaneously formed political parties. Conservative groups consisting of Dutch government officials were represented by *Vereeniging van Ambtenaren bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur* (VABB) or Association of Civil Servants at the Interior Administration, formed in 1911.

The elites, Dutch officials or otherwise, formed *Nederlandsch-Indische Vrijzinnige Bond* (NIVB) or the Dutch East Indies Liberal Association in 1916. This party was managed flexibly, with membership open to all indigenous populations.

Christians also formed their parties, such as the Protestants who established *Christelijke Ethische Partij* (CEP) or the Ethical Christian Party in September 1917. After the *Volksraad* became official, the Roman Catholics established *Indische Katholieke Partij* (IKP) in 1918. Before that, driven by *Budi Utomo*'s initiative, the Chinese held a meeting on October 7, 1917 to select candidates for the *Volksraad*.

The election was believed to have taken place in January 1918. Governor-General Van Limburg Stirum presented the voting results to Colonial Minister Pleijte on January 21, 1918.

Elected members were officially inducted to the *Volksraad* on May 18, 1918, with the first session being opened by Governor-General Mr. Johan Paul Graaf van Limburg Stirum. In his speech, he touched briefly on the colonial government's effort in establishing an advisory body since the 19th century. Furthermore, he expressed his optimism for the success of this body in the future.



Volksraad Chairman J. C. Koningsberger, the second speaker, hoped that the Volksraad would be satisfactory for the indigenous population, albeit not yet perfect. He also voiced his optimism for the future, seeing the will to work hard for the Dutch East Indies and the trust towards collaboration with the government.

Under colonial governance, May 18, 1918 was a historical day as it commemorated the 25th anniversary of the plans to form a colonial council. In such a council, settlers and functional groups could listen to each other's opinions on colonial policies. Such a milestone began with a plan to establish the first Colonial Council in 1893, which led to the *Volksraad's* establishment in 1916.

**The opening of Volksraad meeting
in 1928.**

(Source: Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad,
19 May 1928)

1918-1921:

FROM 'NOVEMBER PROMISE' TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The first *Volksraad* meeting was held on May 21, 1918, opened at nine o'clock in the morning by its Chair Koningsberger. Present members, including the chair, numbered 30 people.

IN contrast to the enthusiasm shown by the leaders of the indigenous organizations, Europeans were indifferent about the *Volksraad*. On the streets of Batavia on May 18, 1918, the day of the council's opening, there had been only one flag flying along the route to the meeting venue. The public seemed to be still resting following a big party at the Botanical Garden (*Planten-en Dierentuin*) and avoiding the Hertogspark where the *Volksraad* building was located.

Seen from its membership, the *Volksraad* did not reflect a true representation. From its 39 members, 20, including the chair, were Europeans, followed by 15 *bumiputra*, and then three were from the *Vreem de Oosterlingen* (Oriental) group. Half of the members were chosen by local councils.

In the first sessions, the tribunes dedicated to the public were often empty. Still, the sessions were warm and exciting after the *bumiputra* representatives threw different critiques that spurred the European representatives' attention. Many of the Europeans reacted or mocked the *bumiputra* who were outspoken.

Communists, the *Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging* (ISDV) members, and the leftist leaders of *Sarekat Islam* had resisted the formation of the council. They believed the council was a "puppet show" or a "farce", mockeries they often used to refer to the *Volksraad*. The number of nationalists questioning the council's effectiveness increased rapidly in the 1920s.

Despite being at the center of critiques from the leftists and facing many other issues, the *Volksraad* still worked effectively and had three *afdeling* (divisions). In its first months, *Volksraad* members addressed a controversial topic regarding its official language.

In that regard, on May 25, 1918, during the second day of its sessions, representatives of Budi Utomo along with other *Volksraad* members proposed several motions, among which demanding that the use of the Malay language not be sidelined. Unlike Jayadiningrat, Van Hinloopen Labberton did not specifically mention the Malay language but proposed that the council use one of the indigenous languages.


The rationale for Jayadiningrat and Van Hinloopen Labberton's motion lay in the practicality of statement delivery before the council. If the indigenous representatives could have an equal opportunity to express their opinions before the *Volksraad*, they must feel free to discuss their issues in their mother tongue.

Nevertheless, the Dutch denied the motion. J. E. Stokvis, a Dutch socialist figure who always supported the *bumiputra* cause, stated that using a different language would cause severe communication chaos.

Until 1927, *Volksraad's* only job was to provide recommendations, not create the laws or provide initiatives. The government could ask for recommendations only as needed, although, in some cases, recommendations were required. Such recommendations included preparing a budget for the Dutch East Indies and establishing general ordinances, including conscription, high-level ordinances, and an ordinance regarding the *Volksraad* election.

The *Volksraad* held two sessions every year, but the council could have additional sessions in some cases. All session records were submitted to *Handelingen van den Volksraad*. The council operated the same way

De Opening van den Volksraad.



De Gouverneur-generaal tijdens het voorlezen van de openingsrede.

Volksraad Assembly Kick-Off in 1929.

(Source: Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad,
15 June 1929)

the *Tweede Kamer* (Lower Council) did in the Netherlands. The members would debate in the first and second terms, then propose a motion and an amendment.

Meanwhile, towards the end of World War I, socialists in the Netherlands urged the government to make a democratic change, including regarding the colonies in the Dutch East Indies. For example, P. J. Troelstra (1860-1930), a politician who actively supported the socialist labor movement, wished to propel a revolution. Although he failed, the Dutch Government had sent news to the Dutch East Indies about the situation in the mother country.

The news was delivered in the *Volksraad* meeting on November 18, 1918. Mr. Dr. D. Talma as the Government's Representative for General Affairs (*Regering Gemachtigde voor Algemeene Zaken*) read the November-*verklaring* (November Statement). The statement contained a new guideline used by the government in its politics. He stated that the government would revoke ineffective rules in the *Volksraad*. This event was more popularly known as the November-*belofte* (November Promise).

Responding to the November-*verklaring*, members of the Radical Concentration — Cokroaminoto, Sastrowiyono, Dwijosewoyo, Cramer, Rajiman Wedyodiningrat, Cipto Mangunkusumo, Teeuwen, Abdul Muis, and Thayeb — proposed a motion to the *Volksraad* on November 25, 1918. The motion was known as the "Cokroaminoto Motion".

The motion was born out of unclarity in the draft of the guideline created by the Dutch East Indies Government. Unclear issues included guideline restrictions and the kind of changes that would take place.

On December 2, 1918, the government responded without answering the questions posed by the motion. The government did not want to be



NA ZIJN OPENINGSREDE ter gelegenheid van de eerste zitting van den nieuwen Volksraad te Batavia verlaat Gouverneur-Generaal jhr. mr. A.C.D. de Graeff het gebouw, in gezelschap van Koesoemo Oetoyo.

Volksraad member, Kusumo Utoyo (left side), along with Governor General de Graeff after Volksraad Assembly Kick-Off in 1931.

(Source: De Sumatra Post, 29 July 1931)

perceived as overstepping the formed commission's work. Moreover, the government's explanation about November-*verklaring* had raised suspicion that November-*verklaring* or November-*belofte* was made out of concerns that the chaos that occurred internationally at the time would ensue in the Netherlands too.

In one of its first sessions in 1918, the *Volksraad* made a *voorstellen* (proposal). According to the historical records, the *Volksraad* had made 13 proposals, nine of which came from the *bumiputra* members.

Other than proposals, members of the *Volksraad* could also request an amendment. In 1918, there were at least 50 amendments, while in 1919, there were 13. Between 1918–1919, there were 22 motions with various issues raised by the members of the *Volksraad*. The problems varied, from farming, taxation, government-owned companies, *heeren diensten* (mandatory work), immigrant issues, voting rights, education, government regulation, transportation to healthcare.

For example, Achmad Jayadiningrat, who represented the Regents Association, and Labberton proposed to use the Malay language alongside Dutch as an official language. After the Governor-General approved and the majority voted for the Jayadiningrat Motion, Malay would be used during the *Volksraad* sessions alongside Dutch.

On December 17, 1918, members of *Herziening-commissie* (Review Committee) were appointed. Chaired by Prof. Carpentier Alting, the members included H. Agus Salim, D. M. G. Koch, Kusumo Utoyo, Darwis Datuk Majolelo, H. H. Kan, and Cramer. Unfortunately, neither the Cokroaminoto Motion nor the Jayadiningrat Motion could be addressed directly in the *Volksraad* as they kept getting postponed. The government's answer regarding both motions was to wait for the *Herziening-commissie's* report.

Herziening-commissie issued a report containing the amendment drafts, one of which was regarding the path towards an autonomous Dutch East Indies by establishing a parliament that would have the right to manage

Other than proposals, members of the Volksraad could also request an amendment. In 1918, there were at least 50 amendments while in 1919, there were 13.



Volksraad Building in Batavia,
c.1935.

(Source: KITLV 4226)

internal affairs under the name of *Landstaten* to replace *Volksraad*, which could only provide recommendations.

Later on June 30, 1920, the *Herzieningscommissie* report was submitted to the government. In the report, amendments regarding the *Volksraad* were proposed. The content of the draft included joint rights to determine budgets, the right to propose amendments in drawing up laws, the right to defend the Dutch East Indies' interests in the Netherlands by sending delegations to the country, the right to participate in appointing a member of the *Raad van Indie*, the right to propose to the government a candidate for *Rekenkamer* chairman (Auditing Council), interpellation rights, and polling rights.

Between 1918–1921, the *Volksraad* was composed of parties such as *Nederlandsch-Indische Vrijzinnige Bond* (NIVB), *Christelijke Ethische Partij* (CEP), *Indische Katholieke Partij* (IKP), and *Indische Sociaal-Democratische Partij* (ISDP) with multiracial members. Representatives from NIVB, which included five Europeans and five Indonesians, became the



most powerful group in the Volksraad. CEP had three representatives, followed by IKP and ISDP, each had one representative.

Several other representatives came from *Vereeniging van Ambtenaren van het Binnenlandsch Bestuur* (VABB) with one representative, *Budi Utomo* with four representatives, the Sumatra Union with one representative, and *Sarekat Islam* with two representatives. Some independent members did not represent any political party or organization. They included eight Europeans, five Indonesians, and three Orientals.

Volksraad members , c. 1935.
Some of them were M.H. Thamrin
(standing , 13th from right side),
Soangkupon (standing, 7th from
right side), and Kusumo Utoyo
(siting, 4th from right side).

(Source: KITLV 2641)

1921-1923:

DECENTRALIZATION AND VOTING RIGHTS FOR *BUMIPUTRA*

The first *Volksraad* extraordinary session in the new period convened on April 4, 1921, and Mr. Dr. W. M. G. Schumann was once again chair. Twenty-two members attended the session; Muurling also returned to represent the colonial government.

ON May 17, 1921, a new member, H. Agus Salim, was introduced in the session. He had succeeded Cokroaminoto in *Sarekat Islam*. The session discussed reviewing the laws that would see a greater right of autonomy for colonies.

In late December 1921, R. M. A. A. Kusumo Utoyo took part in the *Commissie voor de Autonomie van Indie* (Autonomy Committee of the Indies) with R. T. A. Wiranata Kusuma and R.A.A. Achmad Jayadiningrat, who was chairman. The three regents seemed to be selected based on their reputation as capable and progressive.

The committee was established to build a narrative to influence public opinion in the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands. In early 1922, this committee sent several delegates to the Netherlands, where a parliamentary election was taking place. The delegates were expected to influence the parliament members in the Netherlands to support greater autonomy in the Dutch East Indies.

During the extraordinary session in 1921, 17 amendments covering two main issues were proposed. One of the amendments raised during the session included *de behandeling van het voorstel tot herziening der Grondwet* (discussion on the proposal to review the Constitution). Sixteen others pertained to the articles in the Constitution.

Among them were amendments to Articles 1 and 164 of the Basic Law regarding replacing the term "Nederlandsch-Indie" with "Indonesia". This amendment, which was proposed by Van Hinloopen Labberton, Cramer, and Vreede, was denied. Another amendment to Article 122 regarding replacing the term "*Koloniën en bezittingen*" (Colonies and Subsidiaries) with "*zelfstandige staatsdelen*" (independent states), as proposed by Van Hinloopen Labberton, Cramer, and Vreede, was annulled.



Meanwhile, 10 motions were proposed during the second extraordinary meeting period in 1921, among which were made by the *bumiputra* members. They raised issues pertaining to decentralization, particularly on providing *bumiputra* with greater voting rights. This motion was introduced by Abdul Muis, Cokroaminoto, Van Hinloopen Labberton, Thayeb, Teeuwen, Sastrowijono, and Dwijosewoyo.

The motion had been introduced in the first ordinary session in 1918, but the discussion was postponed, and, per the state's constitution, postponed motions had to be reviewed before getting discussed. The motion highlighted the issue with the government's explanation of the constitutional reform in the Dutch East Indies that coincided with establishing a parliament with full legislative power under the government.

The language issue that had arisen at the beginning of the *Volksraad's* establishment re-emerged. In 1922, Agus Salim gave a speech in

Assembly for Volksraad end years of service on 1931-1935 period.

(Source: Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 20 February 1935)

As an institution established in the interests of the Dutch East Indies colonial government, there was an unwritten rule that required all Volksraad members to speak Dutch.

Malay at a *Volksraad* session. Dozens of *Volksraad* members, especially the European members, were shocked as they witnessed this. Salim had created a commotion.

As an institution established in the interests of the Dutch East Indies colonial government, there was an unwritten rule that required all *Volksraad* members to speak Dutch. The *Volksraad* Chairman eventually reprimanded Agus Salim, although the reprimand did not affect him. He reasoned that he had the right to speak in Malay as a council member.

However, Salim not only spoke in Malay but also criticized the Dutch government's negligent attitude towards the people it colonized. He said: "Volksraad's decisions were ignored by the government and vanished, while the Dutch East Indies had saved the Netherlands from the destruction caused by World War I."

Salim's actions angered Bergmeijer, a member of the *Volksraad* who represented Zending. Bergmeijer then asked Salim to translate the word "economy" into Malay. He thought and hoped that Salim would end his speech out of shame for not being able to answer his question. However, Salim cleverly responded to Bergmeijer's challenge. He would answer Bergmeijer's question on one condition: "Why don't you tell me first what term is used for 'economy' in Dutch?"

That silenced Bergmeijer, then Salim continued his speech. Salim knew at the time that there was no proper Dutch equivalent for the word "economy".

1923-1927:

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE *VOLKSRAAD* ELECTION SYSTEM AND THE IMPACTS OF THE 1925 *REGERINGS* *REGLEMENT* AMENDMENT

The first extraordinary assembly of the 1923 *Volksraad* opened on May 2. The Chairman of the *Volksraad* at the time was still Mr. Dr. W.M.G. Schumann, who chaired 36 members.

IN 1923, *kiesregeling* or election regulations began to apply to the *bumiputra* on Java and Madura. The islands were divided into four *kieskring* (electoral districts), including (1) I, West-Java (West Java); (2) II, *Midden-Java* (Central Java); (3) III, *Oost-Java* (East Java); and (4) IV, *Vorstenlanden* (Regions of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta and Surakarta).

Outside Java and Madura, there were Electoral Districts V (*Zuid-Sumatra*/South Sumatra), VI (Minangkabau), VII (Batak Lands), VIII (East Coast of Sumatra, Riau, and subordinate areas), IX (*Oost-Borneo*/Borneo East), X Celebes (Sulawesi), XI (Maluku Islands), and XII (Bali and Lombok).

The first ordinary session of the *Volksraad* in 1924 was opened by Governor-General Dirk Fock, who was previously welcomed by the Welcome Commission consisting of Ariodinoto, Dwijosewoyo, Jacobs, and Van der Weyden.

1924 was the first time that indigenous representatives in the *Volksraad* were selected through an election. A few regions had one representative. For example, Sumatra had only one seat or was represented by only one person.



PPPKI second congress in Surakarta, c. 1929. Some of them were M.H. Thamrin (sitting, 3th from left side), Sukarno (sitting, 7th from left side), Ali Sastroamijoyo (standing, 7th from left side), and Sartono (standing, 9th from left side).

(Source: KITLV 53480)

In 1925, the 1854 RR was renamed *Indische Staatsregeling*. The change had its consequences, namely changing the composition of the *Volk-sraad* to 61 members, including the chairman, with 30 members being *bumiputra*, while 23 were Dutch.

In relation to this composition, members were further divided as follows:

1. Of the 30 elected members, 20 were elected and 10 were appointed;
2. From a minimum of 25 Dutch members, 15 were elected and a maximum of 10 were appointed; and
3. Maximum 5 Dutch citizens, 3 were elected and 2 were appointed.

1927-1931:

FROM *VOLKSRAAD* TO THE CENTRAL INDONESIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE (1917-1949), A CO-LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION WITH LIMITED AUTHORITY

If the *Volksraad* was nothing more than an advisory body in the previous period, in 1927, the *Volksraad* became a co-legislative body to the Governor-General. However, the *Volksraad's* authority was limited as the Governor-General had veto power.

OF the total 60 members, 30 were Dutch, composing of 15 elected and 15 appointed members; 25 were *bumiputra*, comprising 19 elected and 4 appointed members; and 5 were Chinese, composing of 3 elected and 2 appointed members. *Volksraad* membership was determined through an indirect election.

One of the *bumiputra* figures in the *Volksraad* was Yahya Gelar Datuk Kayo from Minangkabau. He was elected a member of the *Volksraad* in 1927. The first *Volksraad* session that he attended was held in June 1927. When he was elected a member of the *Volksraad*, he was still the *Demang* of Padang Panjang, a position then transferred to Air Bangis (December 1928–May 1929).

Yahya was one of 25 *bumiputra* representatives out of a total of 55 *Volksraad* members. He represented Minangkabau for the 1927-1931 period, succeeding Tuan Lutan Datuk Rangkayo Maharajo.

In his first speech on June 16, 1927, Yahya seemed to want to change the *Volksraad*, something which Agus Salim criticized as a farce. Yahya wanted to say that, before there was a *Volksraad*, the government only listened to the government; it did not get enough information from its citizens. However, after the *Volksraad*, situations changed.



Yahya Datuk Kayo

(Source: Volksalmanak Melajoe Serie
No. 77, 1928)

When Yahya addressed the *Volksraad* on June 16, 1927, he did something unusual. He gave his speech in Malay. Besides Agus Salim, Yahya was the only person to use Malay in his first speech. He appealed to the members of the *Volksraad* to interrupt him if there was anything inappropriate, but they must do so in Malay.

The arrests of figures considered dangerous to the government predominated the end of the 1920s.

Another *Volksraad bumiputra* member was Teuku Nyak Arif (1899–1946) from Aceh, appointed in 1927. After completing his civil service study from the *Kweekschool* in 1908 in Bukittinggi, he became active in politics, becoming a member of the *Nationale Indische Partij* (NIP) — previously known as *Insulinde* — in 1918.

A few months before the Youth Congress was held in October 1928, during a *Volksraad* session on June 18, 1928, Nyak Arif delivered a speech in Dutch about the idea of “Indonesia”. At the time, “Indonesia” was still an ideal and a sensitive subject for the colonial government. In his speech, Nyak Arif stated that if the *Volksraad* were to discuss the political situation in this country, it would undeniably touch on the subject of “Indo-

nesia”. Later Nyak Arif, with M. H. Thamrin, would form the National Faction within the *Volksraad*.

During the 1930s, the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government tightened its grip on radical parties. The arrests of figures considered dangerous to the government predominated the end of the 1920s. Nevertheless, the idea of national unity became stronger. Various internal and external issues provoked debates in the *Volksraad* sessions, saturating the council’s historical record regarding the colonial government’s reactionary policies.

1931-1942:

A BREATH OF FRESH AIR IN PARLIAMENT THROUGH THE NATIONAL FACTION

VOLKSRA *Volksraad* AD was the legislative body for the Dutch East Indies during this period. From there, an opportunity arose for the people to show *pro-bumiputra* ideas. One of the ideas that emerged included creating a *bumiputra* faction within the *Volksraad*. Later, this faction would be known as the National Faction.

THE idea of forming the National Faction within the *Volksraad* came from its own member M. H. Thamrin, the chairman of the Betawi People's Association. The idea was influenced by several factors, including:

- a. The Dutch East Indies Colonial Government's negative attitude towards indigenous political movements in the Dutch East Indies.
- b. The Dutch East Indies Colonial Government's equally harsh opinions and treatments against both cooperative and non-cooperative national movements, and its often unilateral reactions against such movements.
- c. The establishment of the *Vaderlandsche Club* (VC) in 1929 as a protest against Governor-General de Graeff's *ethisch beleid* or ethical policy.

The desire to form a National Faction was proof that there had only been two parties that dominated the *Volksraad*. One faction never believed that Political Ethics policies could ever be implemented, while the National Faction never expected anything valuable to be produced from the colonial policy.

The heat of debate surrounding the indigenous majority in the *Volksraad* escalated with the appointment of M. H. Thamrin as the chairman of the



Thamrin and R.A.A. Kusumo Utoyo visit Medan on May 1930, in connection with National Funds.

(Source: <https://niadilova.wordpress.com>; cited from Pandji Pustaka, No. 3, 30 May 1930, page 685)

Comite voor de Inlandsche Meerderheid in de Volksraad (Committee for the Indigenous Majority in the Volksraad). Thamrin believed that the “indigenous majority” proposal in the *Volksraad* was formulated hastily. When the socialist members agreed to the proposal, Thamrin disagreed.

At that time, the Council was very small. For example, in 1924, there were roughly 700 elected members on Java, among them only 169 were indigenous. Of the 169, about 70 were *priyayi*, such as regents, while the rest were civil servants. Pressure from the *priyayi* over the indigenous group’s selection process was strong and unavoidable. Most indigenous members of the *Volksraad* were either officials or moderate nationalists, like Thamrin et al.

In the second, third, and fourth session—held between 1921–1931—the PEB was a dominant indigenous group. Meanwhile, in the fifth *Volksraad* session between 1931–1935, an association consisting of indigenous officials dominated the council.

In the *Volksraad*, the indigenous faction gave its best effort to keep its best representatives in office so they could continue to voice issues regarding the people of the Dutch East Indies. Indigenous representatives in

the *Volksraad* expressed their opinions and ideas often, usually through a speech or motion. The Dutch East Indies Colonial Government would usually consider the ideas first before relaying them to the ministries, the Minister of Colonial Affairs, and the *Tweede Kamer* in the Netherlands.

To make indigenous representation a reality in the *Volksraad*, which had long been expressed by the people of the Dutch East Indies who wanted self-government, rationales and planning were required. In making this effort, sometimes friction developed between indigenous and European representatives.

Throughout the *Volksraad's* journey in 1928–1930, for example, Thamrin once challenged the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government to transfer an exiled veteran nationalist, Cipto Mangunkusumo, from Banda to Batavia to occupy his seat on the Council.

On August 14, 1931, the position of an advisor was placed directly under the Governor-General. Dutch East Indies officials at the time were allowed to correspond directly with civilian and military authorities.

Governor-General A.C.D. de Graeff (1926–1933) attempted to solve the growing gap between Europeans and Indonesians, one of which by strengthening the advisory position of the *Inlandse Zaken* (Indigenous Affairs Agency). With the *Gouvernementsbesluit* (Decree of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government), on August 14, 1931, the advisory position was placed directly under the Governor-General. Dutch East Indies officials were allowed to correspond directly with the civilian and military authorities. The Governor-General must always know about, for example, the affairs of the Arab community in the Dutch East Indies and study the development of Islam in the international context. However, the new instructions had almost no political effect.

In July 1931, M. H. Thamrin brought up the *Poenale Sanctie* as an issue that should be handled by the *Nationale Fractie* or the National Faction.

On August 14, 1931, the position of an advisor was placed directly under the Governor-General. Dutch East Indies officials at the time were allowed to correspond directly with civilian and military authorities.



Cornelia Hendrika Razoux Schultz-Metzer.

A year later, in July 1932, M. H. Thamrin, who was re-elected as chairman of the National Faction, announced in the *Volksraad* that there had been a small change in the faction's objective, namely "expeditious Indonesian independence".

In 1935, the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government appointed a Dutch woman named Razoux Schultz-Metzer to be a member of the *Volksraad*. Two years later, Thamrin proposed universal women's suffrage.

At that time, the *Volksraad* membership was composed of various groups. The majority was Dutch and the rest included indigenous people (Indonesia), Orientals (Arabs and Chinese), and Dutch-Indonesian mixed heritage, who later formed their own faction. The presence of Razoux Schultz-Metzer was a distinguishing factor of this period's *Volksraad*. Then, Thamrin was in favor of having indigenous women occupy seats at the *Volksraad*.

On 16 September 1928, Cipto was appointed by the *Volksraad* election office to occupy the seat vacated by a member of the *Pasundan Paguyuban*, Oto Kusuma Subrata. With Cipto sitting in the *Volksraad*, opinions that were largely represented by the conservative group, namely the civil servants and BB (*binnen lands bestuur*) officials, could now be countered by a veteran nationalist who was very familiar with the respective region's situation and issues.

After the "indigenous majority" proposal had been won and after what Stokvis referred to as De Graeff's predicament, the National Faction went on to enjoy a fine first year in the *Volksraad*. Regardless, the majority of the *Volksraad* kept their stance sturdy against nationalists who vehemently opposed the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government.

The National Faction focused its efforts more within the *Volksraad*. Its goal was to ensure national independence could be attained in the shortest possible time by:

- a. Proposing constitutional changes.
- b. Attempting to eliminate political, economic and intellectual differences between the indigenous people and the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government.
- c. Conducting both things without breaking the law.

The use of the word “faction” in the *Volksraad* was actually inaccurate since “factions” did not necessarily comprise members from the same political party or association; some did not even belong to a particular party. Nonetheless, factions were common in the *Volksraad*, where a group of people could eventually form their own faction. From its objective, that was to improve the indigenous people’s welfare in the Dutch East Indies, it was clear that the National Faction had revolution in mind, although their opinions were often dismissed by the Dutch East Indies government.

The birth of the National Faction under the leadership of Thamrin was a concrete step for the indigenous people in the Dutch-dominated *Volksraad*. Indigenous representatives in the *Volksraad* often brought up the reality of people’s life in the Dutch East Indies — something the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government rarely knew about.

The various motions proposed by the National Faction represented the situation of the indigenous people in the Dutch East Indies, namely social issues surrounding the life of the people at that time. However, not all motions were granted by the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government, some were even rejected.

The various motions proposed by the National Faction represented the situation of the indigenous people in the Dutch East Indies, namely social issues surrounding the life of the people at that time.

SOETARDJO'S PETITION

Soetardjo was very confident in filing what he considered a reasonable petition to request autonomy for Indonesia to form an independent government. That way, indigenous people would receive treatments equal to the Dutch citizens.

ON July 15, 1936, Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo filed a petition, proposing that Indonesia should be independent within the next 10 years, although it would still be within the boundaries as stipulated in Article 1 of the *Grondwet* (Constitution). Article 1 of the Netherlands' Constitution stated that the Kingdom of Netherlands covered the Nederland (Netherlands), the Dutch East Indies, Suriname, and Curacao. Kasimo and Ratuangi supported the petition.

Another point of the petition was to urge the colonial government to hold a conference where representatives from both the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies would attend under equal position. The conference's goal would be to jointly design the plan for the next 10 years, to prepare the Dutch East Indies for autonomy, even though it would still be a part of the Kingdom of Netherlands. The petition viewed the need for establishing a royal council consisting of representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia to discuss the relationship between the two within the framework of the constitution and to consider the possibility for Indonesia to be equal to the Netherlands.

Soetardjo's petition had a juridical basis because Article 1 of the Netherlands' Constitution stated that the Kingdom of Netherlands covered the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies, Suriname, and Curacao. In Soetardjo's view, the four regions should be equal, so he was very confident in filing what he considered a reasonable petition to request autonomy for Indonesia to form an independent government. That way, indigenous people would receive treatments equal to the Dutch citizens.

Clearly, the petition provoked a fierce debate in the *Volksraad*. The discussion on this hot issue lasted for a week until a vote was finally held on September 29, 1936. The vote resulted in 26 votes in favor and 20 against.

The group that voted against Soetardjo's Petition argued that the Indonesian people were not mature enough to be independent, while those in favor of Soetardjo's Petition argued otherwise, insisting that the Indonesian people were mature enough to stand on their own. They also urged the government to grant the people more rights they should have had.

However, what was clear was that the Dutch Parliament denied Soetardjo's Petition on the grounds that it was not yet time for the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies to sit at the table as equals. This rejection was stated in the Decree of the Kingdom of Netherlands on November 16, 1938.

The rejection of Soetardjo's Petition was a great blow to the movement, especially to the moderates. The failure of the Petition which was supported by the national movement whipped the national movement to demand and rearrange their ranks in a united organization called the Indonesian Political Association (GAPI), on 21 May 1939. The association openly voiced a demand of "Parliament for Indonesia".

The failure of Soetardjo's Petition also provided a turning point in the people's attitude towards the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government. The people, previously cooperative, began to accumulate distrust towards the government and would later raise a stronger drive to seek full autonomy.

The desire of the people of the Dutch East Indies to fight for independence became even stronger after the formation of GAPI as a unifying forum. From there, the strategy of the *Volksraad* members, who were part of the movement organizations and political parties, began to polarize.

Outside the *Volksraad*, national movements united, although within the *Volksraad* their voices were divided. The rift was particularly apparent within the National Faction. After the opening of the new *Volksraad* in 1939, the National Faction was revisited. Yamin, who in 1939 became a member of the *Volksraad*, devised a plan, which, in some ways, was greater than the plan devised by Thamrin.

Yamin suggested the National Faction to formulate a program that would be announced to all Indonesians. The aim was to stop criticism that the National Faction had only represented Java and not for regions outside Java.



Volksraad Assembly in 1933.

(Source: De Indische courant,
17 June 1933)

Yamin's proposal was not approved by Thamrin. So, on July 10, 1939, following Yamin's ideas in the Volksraad, the Indonesian National Group (GNI) was founded in addition to the National Faction. The body did not represent the parties in the Volksraad but it represented the people's groups in society. It could be said that the GNI was provincial. All GNI members were delegates from outside Java, such as Yamin, Soangkupon, Abdul Rasyid, and Tajuddin Noor. Members of the National Faction from outside Java who remained loyal to the National Faction were Mukhtar and Lapian.

The press welcomed GNI's establishment and saw it as an effort to enforce the national struggle. However, there were other voices who were concerned that the effort was a divisive act that would only weaken the struggle. Considering their principles and objectives, the two groups did not offer much of a difference as both managed the interests of various areas outside Java, so Sumatrans, for example, could also remain in the National Faction.

On August 15, 1939, Thamrin filed a motion demanding *Nederlandsch-Indië* and *Inlander* be replaced by *Indonesia*, *Indonesiër*, and *Indonesisch* as statutory terms. On January 18, 1940, Abikusno, Thamrin, and Amir Syarifuddin announced the Indonesian People's Congress (KRI). They called on all Indonesian youths to become propagandists for the realization of an Indonesian parliament by forming committees, study sites, and parades.

On August 23, 1939, Dr. H. J. Levelt, who represented the government, responded to the motion. He stated that the government would remove the word "*inlander*" in society and replace the term "*Indonesier*" or "*inheemse*" with "*bumiputra*". However, the government denied the request to replace the term "*Nederlandsch-Indië*" with "*Indonesia*" as it would require an editorial replacement of the Dutch East Indies' Constitution. Such changes could only be made with the permission of the *Staten Generaal*, who, at that time, could not be reached again.

The government would remove the word "inlander" in society, and replace the term "Indonesier" or "inheemse" with "bumiputra".

CHUO SANGI-IN 1942–1945

After its attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941, Japan directed its Greater East Asia war towards Southeast Asia. Indonesia became Japan's main target due to its rich natural resources.

WITH the fall of Singapore, the Netherlands' position in Indonesia was threatened. The Japanese then targeted the oil station in Tarakan, which it managed to attack and occupy on January 10, 1942. Following the Japanese takeover of Tarakan, Balikpapan fell to the Japanese on January 20, Pontianak on February 2, Banjarmasin the evening on the same day, and Palembang on February 14. Once Palembang fell, Java was only one step away.

Japanese troops entered Java through three sites: Banten, Eretan (West Java), and Kragan (East Java). It is interesting to note that, generally speaking, the Japanese troops' arrival was welcomed by Indonesians. Indonesian people at that time believed in the Jayabaya prophecy as an expression of the people's aspirations for freedom. The Japanese had been aware of this, so when announcing the Pacific War, the Japanese swiftly took the opportunity to get the people's trust by distributing pamphlets from airplanes.

The pamphlets' content: The Japanese would soon fulfill Jayabaya's promise, that there would be yellow-skinned people from the north who would come to save the Indonesian people from Dutch colonialism. Second, the Japanese's victory over Russia in 1905 had inspired the emerging Indonesian nationalists to develop trust.

In the early days of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, the government was temporary, so the Java Military Government Office (*Jawa Gunseibu*) was formed directly under the supervision of the 16th Army Chief of Staff who was appointed Head of Government.

Military governance in the occupied territories of Indonesia was regulated in two main documents, namely "The principles concerning governance in the Occupied South", formulated in the Liaison Conference between the Japanese Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese Cabinet

on November 20, 1941, and "The Main Agreement between the Army and the Navy concerning military rule in occupied territories", dated November 26, 1941.

According to the documents, the military administration on Java was governed by the Commander of the 16th Army, whose code was "Osamu Group". During the occupation, he was known as the *Gunshireikan* or *Saiko Shikikan* (Commander-in-Chief), but the day-to-day governance



was carried out by the Head of Military Administration called the *Gunseikan*. *Saiko Shikikan* set the rules called *Osamu Seirei*, while the rules issued by *Gunseikan* were called *Osamu Kanrei*. The regulations were published in *Kan Fo*, the state-owned newspaper, an official publication by the *Gunseikanhu* (Office of the Head of the Military Administration).

The Japanese approximately three-and-a-half-year occupation of Indonesia impacted the collective memory of the nation, both negatively and positively. The cruelty of the Japanese military rule in Indonesia was documented in historical records, taking the form of the *romusha* and the pillaging of people's wealth for Japanese interests. Women were also forced into sexual slavery, becoming *jugun ianfu* or "comfort women".

Still, the Japanese occupation also presented Indonesian youth with opportunities, such as being trained for Defenders of the Homeland (PETA) army, being brought to the battlefield as members of the *Heiho* or auxiliary soldiers to the Japanese troops.

**Volksraad Assembly discussed
about sugar sales regulation.**

(Source: De Sumatra Post,
30 January 1933)



Volksraad members visit
Goodyear factory in Buitenzorg,
one company that utilized rubber
as raw material.

(Source: Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad,
3 February 1937)

The short Japanese occupation had provided considerable opportunities for the national movement to solidify the plans for independence. Although the Japanese's role in realizing Indonesian independence was still debatable, the fact was that the Japanese formed an agency to support the preparation for Indonesia's independence.

The agency was called the Investigating Agency for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (*Dokuritsu Junbi Chosa-kai*). It was through this agency that the Indonesian people, through the nation's founding fathers, designed and formulated an independent Indonesian state, from its foundation and territorial sovereignty to its structure. Another organization that was also formed during the Japanese occupation was the *Chuo Sangi-In*, the Central Advisory Board.

On August 1, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army announced the drafts for the Indonesians' participation in the government which included the *Chuo Sangi-In* or Central Advisory Board and *Shu Sangi-kai* or Regional Advisory Board in 17 residencies, Special Municipality of Jakarta, the Special Regions of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, and other high-level positions. The *Chuo Sangi-In's* function was merely advisory.

The advisory nature of the *Chuo Sangi-In* was actually similar to the *Volksraad* previously formed by the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government. Like the *Chuo-Sangi In*, the *Volksraad's* authority was limited to providing recommendations, not a full-fledged legislative body.

At that time, war prohibited the Japanese from considering and establishing a people's representative system. The Japanese only established the *Chuo Sangi-In* for the sole purpose of answering questions posed by the Japanese military government and providing inconsequential recommendations to the operations of the Japanese occupation.

Indonesian political figures were given a venue to express their aspirations, an institution to speak up just as the Dutch gave them the *Volksraad*, but they were only expected to produce recommendations that aligned with the Japanese military government's political strategy on Java, where the Japanese issued a series of regulations in the early days of occupation.

Based on *Osamu Seirei* No. 36 of 1943, *Chuo Sangi-In* could discuss issues, such as: the expansion of the Military Government; improvement of the people's status, education and information; industrial and economic issues; prosperity and social assistance; and health.

At a glance, the *Chuo Sangi-In* might seem to cover all important issues. However, all was done in favor of the Japanese interests. As for the Indonesian people, the contrary was true in areas such as status, welfare, social assistance and health. The occupation government proved to neglect the above topics, although the *Chuo Sangi-In* had repeatedly proposed these issues in the sessions. In fact, the Indonesian people's status, welfare, and health had continued to decline since the Japanese occupation.

All *Chuo Sangi-In* sessions were held in Jakarta. Regular sessions were held every three months. Ten days before the trial was held, the *Saiko Shikikan* would announce the matters to be discussed and the session's rules. Meanwhile, the *Chuo Sangi-In* Special Session was only held as

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necessary. An example of such a session was the Special Session on September 11, 1944, which was held in regards to the announcement for the "Promise of Independence".

The formation of *Chuo Sangi-In* showed that the Japanese had also thought of a council similar to the Volksraad during the Dutch Colonial Government. However, its organizational style and function were different from the *Volksraad*. This distinction was made clear in the official statement by the Japanese Military Occupation Government which emphasized that no government employee should sit on this council.

This difference was only natural in a war situation that required certain structures and functions. The *Volksraad* was a council formed in time of peace whose functions were based on liberal parliamentary principles, so its members had a space to produce initiatives and propose resolutions requesting the government to correct its stance on certain issues.

Regarding the formation of *Chuo Sangi-In*, Soekarno was of the opinion that the Japanese council provided an even more limited space for the Indonesian people to speak up. In comparison to members of the *Chuo Sangi-In*, *Volksraad* members, albeit disempowered, still could

freely criticize the government and question all aspects of the Colonial Government. In contrast, the *Chuo Sangi-In* members had no capacity whatsoever. In fact, the Japanese Military Occupation Government declared that there would be no place for Indonesians whose goals were not aligned with the occupation government's goals.

CHUO SANGI-IN MEMBERSHIP

The *Osamu Seirei* No. 36 of 1943 concerning the formation of the *Chuo-Sangi-In* stated that the *Chuo Sangi-In* consisted of members of the *Chuo Sangi-In* and its Secretariat, also called *Zimukyoku* (Article 2). Members of the *Chuo Sangi-In* were those appointed and chosen to represent the regions (*Shu* and *Tokubetsu-shi*) by the *Saiko Shikikan* and those recommended by the special regions (*kochi*).

THE membership composition was as follows:

1. Twenty-three members appointed by the *Saiko Shikikan*;
2. Eighteen members chosen from and by members of the *Shu Sangi-kai* and *Tokubetsu Shi Sangi-kai* (each *Shu* and *Tokubetsushi* was represented by one person);
3. Two members proposed by *Kochi*.

In *Osamu Kanrei* No. 36 and 37 of 1943 issued by the *Gunseikan*, it was stated that to allow the government to listen to the people's voice, civil servants would not be appointed as members of the *Chuo Sangi-In*, either in the headquarter or at the regional level. Civil servants were to focus on their positions only.

According to Article 4 of *Osamu Seirei* 36 of 1943, the Chairman (*Gicho*) and Deputy Chairman (*Huku Gicho*) of *Chuo Sangi-In* were elected by the members of *Chuo Sangi-In*. However, in reality, all decisions remained with *Saiko Shikikan*, as evident in *Chuo Sangi-In*'s first Vice Chairman election.

This *Zimukyoku* consisted of two divisions (*ka*): the General Affairs Division (*Shomu-ka*), which took care of general affairs, finances, and correspondence, and the Negotiations Division (*Gizika*), which prepared the sessions, served as an interpreter, facilitated discussions, recorded discussion minutes, managed internal and external relations, and took care of matters not covered by the *Shomu-ka*.



**Volksraad Assembly Kick-Off in
1936**

(Source: Soerabaijasch handelsblad,
18 June 1936)

The *Chuo Sangi-In* sessions were presided over and managed by the *Chuo Sangi-In* Chair. If the chairman was unable to attend the session for any reason, the vice chairman would fill in the chairman's position. If both the chairman and vice chairman were unable to attend, a member appointed by *Saiko Shikikan* would fill in the chairman's position.

Chuo Sangi-In members served for one year, but if a new member was appointed to fill a vacant position, the new member would serve only for the remaining term.

Among the members selected or appointed to represent the regions, 21 were from the nationalist group. This showed that the nationalists were better represented in the *Chuo-Sangi In* than they did in the *Volksraad*. Following the nationalists, the Islamic groups had six representatives; the civil servants, who were previously thought to not be involved, had eight names; and last but not least, there also were three Chinese representatives.

On September 5, 1944, one year after the *Chuo Sangi-In* members were selected, *Osamu Seirei* No. 36 was issued. The policy stated that the *Chuo Sangi-In*, *Shu* and *Tokubetsu-shi* memberships would be extended for another year from October 1944. The policy became effective immediately after it was announced.

The war that had weakened Japan's position forced the Japanese Military Occupation Government to protect its influence in Indonesia. Based on the 85th Special Session of the Japanese Parliament in Tokyo on September 7, 1944, Prime Minister Koiso declared to the whole world that the East Indies (Indonesia) would be granted independence at a later date. This statement came to be known as the "Koiso Promise".

Soekarno's speech before the *Chuo-Sangi In* members after he was elected as chairman showed a form of trust and optimism towards the Japanese government's promise for independence, which was then represented by the Japanese Prime Minister.

The "Koiso Promise" was followed up by a greater political participation for Indonesians and a permission to conduct investigations on issues related to Indonesia's independence. In addition, on September 8, 1944, the day before Koiso's "promise of independence", the *Shikikan* Declaration Number 6 was issued regarding the permission to raise the Indonesian flag "*Sang Merah Putih*" ("The Red and White") and to sing the national anthem "*Indonesia Raya*" ("Great Indonesia").

Based on the 85th Special Session of the Japanese Parliament in Tokyo on September 7, 1944, Prime Minister Koiso declared to the whole world that the East Indies (Indonesia) would be granted independence at a later date. This statement came to be known as the "Koiso Promise".

However, there was much uncertainty surrounding Koiso's promise as it was never discussed seriously. For example, the Japanese had not set a deadline for independence as it did for Myanmar and the Philippines. Still, the impact of the Koiso's Promise on the Indonesian people was reported massively on the local newspapers, resulting in the people's enthusiasm, joy, and gratitude, which prompted many celebrations.

However, there was much uncertainty surrounding Koiso's promise as it was never discussed seriously. For example, the Japanese had not set a deadline for independence as it did for Myanmar and the Philippines.

Neither the arrogance nor the power of the Japanese Military Occupation Government diminished, while the economic situation was getting worse day by day. This situation created unrest among the people, which eventually erupted through the rebellion of a PETA detachment against Japanese officers in Blitar in mid-February 1945.

The revolt failed, but it had shocked the government and was among the most dangerous challenges to the Japanese Military Occupation Government on Java. Had this happened at an earlier time, it was likely that the Japanese Military Occupation Government would have taken action with far-reaching consequences. However, it was too late for Japan, as it had already announced its "promise of independence".

Even after the rebellion, the Japanese Military Occupation Government did not escalate its monitoring activities. In fact, they began to soften their grip on Indonesian political life. For example, in the seventh *Chuo-Sangi In* session in February 1945, members began to criticize the government.

Everything went away quickly for Japan. Their dream of realizing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" slowly faded away. On March 1, 1945, *Saiko Shikikan* announced the establishment of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Investigative Agency (BPUPKI). After various further changes, finally the Commander of the Seventh Region Army led by General Itagaki Seishiro in Singapore allowed the establishment of the BPUPKI on May 28, 1945. The agency consisted of a chairman, deputy chairman, and 60 members, including four people from the Chinese and Arab groups and one from the Indo-Dutch group.



Welcoming ceremony in Volksraad for the new Governor General van Starkenborgh Stachouwer in 1936.

(Source: Soerabaijasch handelsblad, 18 September 1936)

Additionally, there were seven Japanese special members to attend each congregation with no voting rights. It should also be noted that almost half of the members of the *Chuo Sangi-In* were also members of BPUPKI. During the BPUPKI opening ceremony at the *Chuo Sangi-In* Building on May 28, 1945, Hinomaru flag was raised by Mr. A. G. Pringgodigdo, followed by the Red and White by Toyohido Masuda.

In the first session from May 29 to June 1, 1945, most Indonesian members asserted their opinions on the impending independence. Muhammad

Yamin and Soekarno were among the speakers who proposed the five national principles, which became known as the Pancasila. Then, the second session on July 10–16, 1945 discussed various issues, including the form of the state and the government structure. All went without Japanese intervention. However, the country being discussed would still operate within the boundaries of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In carrying out its duties, BPUPKI held two official sessions and one informal session, all of which were held in Jakarta prior to the Japanese defeat against the Allied Forces on August 14, 1945.

Before the BPUPKI was formed, on May 16–18, 1945, an all-Java youth congress was held in Bandung under the sponsorship of the Indonesian Youth Force which was established by the Japanese in mid-1944. There were two versions to the congress: the official one featuring speeches by Japanese officials and unofficial ones which featured debates among the delegates. The unofficial version solidified solidarity among participants.

The congress passed two resolutions. First, all associations in Indonesia must be united under one leadership. Second, Indonesia's independence must be realized as soon as possible. The second resolution was driven by the youth's impatience over Japan's empty promises.

On June 18, 1945, *Chuo Sangi-In* held its eighth and last session under the Japanese occupation. At that time, the war was closing in to the island of Java, while Morotai and Tarakan had already fallen to the hands of the Allied Forces. Bomb attacks, especially on Kalimantan and Sulawesi, had intensified. Members of the *Chuo Sangi-In* realized that Japan was in an increasingly desperate position. This presented a good opportunity for Indonesians to decide on their own fate.



Members of BPUPKI were divided into several *Bunkakai* and a Fundamental Law Committee with 19 members under the leadership of Soekarno. The name of this committee was later changed to the Constitutional Committee. Some of the Constitutional Committee members were assigned to sit on the Small Committee for Drafting the Constitution under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Mr. Supomo. In carrying out its duties, BPUPKI held two official sessions and one informal session, all of which were held in Jakarta prior to the Japanese defeat against the Allied Forces on August 14, 1945.

BPUPKI held official sessions discussing issues regarding the national principles, state territories, citizenship, and Constitution drafts, which was facilitated directly by BPUPKI Chairman Dr. Rajiman Wedyodiningrat. The first session took place from May 28 to June 1, 1945 to discuss the national principles. The second session took place on July 10–17, 1945 to discuss the draft of the Preamble to the Constitution, economics and finance, defense, and education and pedagogy.

The unofficial session, which was attended by 38 of BPUPKI's members, took place during a recess between the first and second sessions to discuss the draft of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. This session was chaired by BPUPKI member, Soekarno.

**Volksraad Assembly Kick-Off
in 1939.**

(Source: Bataviaasch nieuwsblad,
15 June 1939)

During the General Assembly held on June 1, 1945 at the Pejambon Building, previously the Chuo Sangi-In Building, BPUPKI continued discussing Indonesia's national principles.

The first BPUPKI session, held on May 29, 1945 and chaired by Dr. Rajiman Wedyodiningrat and R. P. Suroso, discussed Indonesia's national principles. Meanwhile, the First Session of the General Assembly, held on May 31, 1945 at the Chuo Sangi-In Building, discussed Indonesia's national principles as well as territories and nationality.

During the trial, Supomo asked about national principles of an independent Indonesia. Supomo revealed that he agreed with several speakers in the session on the absolute conditions (constitutive factors).

He agreed with the opinion that "essentially Indonesia should cover the Dutch East Indies." Second, he also agreed that the "people" should consist of Indonesian nationalities, who naturally were indigenous Indonesians. The Chinese, Indian, and Arab Descent who had for generations lived in Indonesia must also be accepted as citizens

by being granted Indonesian nationality. The third absolute requirement under international law was the establishment of a sovereign government.

During the General Assembly held on June 1, 1945 at the Pejambon Building, previously the *Chuo Sangi-In* Building, BPUPKI continued discussing Indonesia's national principles. Chaired by Dr. Rajiman Wedyodiningrat, Sukarno gave his speech on national principles in the session.

CENTRAL INDONESIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE (1945-1949)

On August 7, 1945, *Nanpo Gun* (Southern General Army) announced the formation of the *Dokuritsu Junbi Inkai* or the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI). Only a few hours apart, in Jakarta, *Saiko Shikikan* also gave the same announcement to the people in Java and Madura.



ALTHOUGH PPKI was formed based on *Nanpo Gun's* decision, in reality, the committee's first session was held only on August 18, 1945, the day after Indonesia's independence, which made it no longer bound to the *Nanpo Gun*. The proclamation had annulled all laws previously imposed by both the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government and the Japanese Military Occupation Government. The proclamation was the source of all new legal sources.

The positions of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of PPKI were held by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta respectively, while the Advisory Body was chaired and vice chaired by Mohammad Hatta and his deputy

Volksraad members had a meeting in the house of Sukarjo (2nd from left side). Some of them were Soangkupon (4th from left side), Sam Ratulangi (5th from left side), and M.H. Thamrin (far right).

(Source: Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 24 December 1935)



Volksraad Chairman, Jonkman, along with Volksraad members in a meeting.

(Source: Bataviasch Nieuwsblad, 12 January 1940)

Ahmad Subarjo. The increased number of members strengthened the belief that PPKI no longer belonged to the Japanese as the new member addition was made by Indonesians. Furthermore, because PPKI consisted of members from various Indonesian islands alongside Java, PPKI served as the precursor of the National Committee. PPKI was essentially representative to all Indonesians.

Authority, legislative body, and their ideas and principles were discussed in the first PPKI session on August 18, 1945. The same was true for the National Committee. On the second day of the PPKI session, the National Committee was only mentioned a little as it was displaced by other more pressing topics, such as departments and local governments. Meanwhile, on the third day of the session on August 22, 1945, the National Committee seemed to be the main subject, as evident in PPKI's detailed decision regarding the National Committee.

The 1945 Constitution did not adhere to Montesquieu's separation of power (*Trias Politica*) but adhered to the state power sharing system. This was due to:

1. The 1945 Constitution did not strictly limit authority to a certain organization/body without the interference of other organizations/bodies.
2. The 1945 Constitution did not limit the division of power to only three bodies and also did not limit the distribution of power by only three bodies.
3. The 1945 Constitution did not completely divide the people's power which was exercised by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

Additionally, the President's legislative power could be seen from Supomo's statement in the PPKI session where he stated "Alongside the President is the People's Representative Council (DPR). The DPR can be referred to as a body which, together with the President, aims to draft bills (UU) with the President, in a legislative body."

The DPR essentially held the most power in the Republic of Indonesia. In addition to having rights and obligations in accordance with the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, the DPR was also the President's partner at the legislative level and one that supervised the implementation of MPR's decisions (DPR members also served as MPR members at the time).

As DPR members were also MPR members, all articles concerning the rights of the MPR also applied to the DPR. Experts often mention that the DPR serves two functions: first, as a body that sets policies and makes laws, and second, as a body that controls. For the first function, the DPR has legislative rights, amendment rights, and budgetary rights, while for the second function, the DPR has the right to question, interpellation rights, inquiry rights, and motion rights.

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The South Gambir meeting determined that the number of KNIP members would be more than 60 people. Although members consisted of representatives from certain sects and groups in society as well as regional representatives, it was desirable that they reside in Jakarta. In other words, members from regional areas should be willing to live in Jakarta.

On the third day of the session, PPKI made the following decisions:

1. The National Committee is to be established across Indonesia with a headquarter in Jakarta.
2. The National Committee embodies the unanimous goals and ideals of the Indonesian people to carry out Indonesia's independence by the sovereignty of the people.
3. The National Committee's efforts include:
 - a. Expressing the desire of the Indonesian people to live as an independent Indonesian nation;
 - b. Uniting people from all walks of life as to realize a tight national unity;
 - c. Peacekeeping and public safety maintenance, as well as;
 - d. Assisting leaders in implementing national ideals, and, in the regions, assisting local governments to ensure the people's welfare.
4. The central National Committee leads and provides guidance to the regional National Committee. Where necessary, regional centers can be established.
5. Central and regional National Committees are led by a Chair and several board members responsible to the National Committee. For the first time, the Head of the Regional Center is appointed by the President.

On the evening of August 22, several prominent figures gathered at the National Groups Consultative Assembly Building on Jalan Gambir Selatan number 10 to discuss candidacy for the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP). The South Gambir meeting determined that the number of KNIP members would be more than 60 people. Although members consisted of representatives from certain sects and groups in



society as well as regional representatives, it was desirable that they reside in Jakarta. In other words, members from regional areas should be willing to live in Jakarta.

The number of members did not directly represent the number of total population; members could be added according to needs. They also agreed that the first KNIP meeting should be held on August 29, 1945. The inauguration of KNIP members took place on Wednesday night, August 29, 1945, at the Comedy Building (now the Jakarta Arts Building) on Jalan Pos, Pasar Baru.

During the KNIP inauguration ceremony, the Committee chose the KNIP leaders. Elected leaders included:

- Chairman: Kasman Singodimejo
- Vice Chairman I: Soetardjo
- Vice Chairman II: Latuharhary
- Vice Chairman III: Adam Malik

**Indonesian Independence
Preparatory Committee (PPKI)
meeting on August 1945.**

(Source: NIOD 57080)



The fourth (4th) KNIP's Plenary Session KNIP in Solo.

(Source: ANRI-Ipphos, March 1946)

The next day, KNIP sent delegates to Bandung to form a KNID (regional). Sending delegates to these areas then became a routine task of the KNIP for the same purpose of establishing the KNID.

Earlier in its journey, the KNIP served more as an executive assistant than as a substitute for the MPR, DPR, and DPA. As a government aide, the National Committee often functioned as a substitute for the civil servants and the police. This was especially true for the regions, and, clearly, it served a dual function. In fact, if we look at various edicts, instructions, etc, it is obvious that the KNIP served more as a tool and advisor to the government than as a substitute for MPR and DPR during the revolutionary period.

For almost a month, not a single KNIP product proved that it was the MPR and DPR of the revolutionary period. KNIP functioned more to translate government policies to the people than to record and convey the conditions and wishes of the people to the government. Hence, it was not surprising that KNIP went under criticism.

Criticism against Soekarno arose as the result of Article IV of the Transitional Rules of the 1945 Constitution, which stated that all powers were to be held by the President with the assistance of the National Committee. The powers were unlimited, and because he was assisted by the National Committee, the only way to improve it was to enforce democracy.

To overcome various criticisms, the government announced on October 5, 1945 that preparations for holding a general election had been underway. This was the first news reported on the impending election.

The government's election announcement did not diminish the people's desire to redefine KNIP's function accordingly. Two days after the announcement, on October 7, 1945, a referendum was called in the KNIP. The referendum was sponsored by 50 KNIP members who urged the President to use his special powers to form an MPR immediately, so that KNIP members could be considered as MPR members.

This referendum led to the KNIP Plenary Session I, held in Jakarta on 16-17 October 1945, about nine days after the referendum was proposed. The First Plenary Session of the KNIP was held at the Balai Muslimin Kramat Building.

When discussing the referendum, Amir Syarifuddin said that due to the very precarious situation that was the arrival of the Allies, it would be very likely that members would not be able to attend every KNIP meeting. In addition, because the KNIP was so large and had so many members, it would be difficult to make quick decisions. Hence, he suggested that a "working committee" be formed. The committee could temporarily be given legislative tasks. Amir's working committee was modeled after the working committee of the Indian National Congress in India. The Indian working committee convened once every 10 days, while the KNIP would only meet once a year.

*To overcome various criticisms, the government announced on **October 5, 1945** that preparations for holding a general election had been underway. **This was the first news reported on the impending election.***

KNIP's authority that was carried out by the BP on a day-to-day basis changed, from once being an assistant to the President to becoming an independent body with legislative power.

The rights and obligations of the Working Committee were described on October 20, 1945. The Working Committee's (BP) obligations included: (1) Participate in establishing the State Guidelines (GBHN), meaning that BP was to collaborate with the President in establishing the GBHN; and (2) Together with the President, stipulate the Laws. The first was a task of the MPR, while the second was a task of the DPR.

The description also mentioned that BP, which worked on behalf of KNIP, would no longer manage executive works. BP's power would end after the formation of the MPR and DPR. The description of the tasks made based on the Vice President's Declaration No. X then drastically changed the meaning of Article IV of the Transitional Rules of the 1945 Constitution.

With this declaration, the President's powers were reduced, while KNIP's authority that was carried out by the BP on a day-to-day basis

changed, from once being an assistant to the President to becoming an independent body with legislative power. Declaration No. X, whose birth was encouraged by the Plenary Session of KNIP, had turned KNIP into the root of MPR and BP the forerunner of the DPR.

Who would lead the BP and KNIP? On the second day of the session on October 17, 1945, members listened to the report of the formators whose tasks were to form the composition and personnel of BP. The BP was composed of 15 members, with executives including:

- Chairman: Sutan Syahrir
- Deputy Chairman: Amir Syarifuddin
- Secretary: Suwandi

When Soekarno-Hatta and Amir Syarifuddin were in Surabaya on October 30, 1945 to mediate the dispute between the people of Surabaya and the Allies, through the BP they proposed to the government to give the people the opportunity to establish a political party. The consideration in the BP proposal was based on the fact that the freedom of assembly was guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution.

BP's proposal was immediately answered. On November 3, 1945, a government decree was issued, signed by Vice President Hatta, stating that "we like political parties because, with these parties, we can lead all of the currents of beliefs in society in an orderly manner".

The subsequent maneuver from Syahrir's group to realize the Decree of Guntur 23 through BP took the form of the Working Committee Announcement No. 5 issued November 11, 1945. This announcement contained BP's proposal on the accountability of ministers to the DPR.

The consideration behind BP's proposal was the amendment of Article IV of the 1945 Constitution's Transitional Laws concerning the KNIP's change of function from an assistant to the President to a legislative body.

In a meeting at Hatta's house, Vice President Hatta could accept BP's proposal, while Syahrir was appointed to form a new cabinet. A new cabinet called the Council of Ministers was announced on November 14, 1945, three days after the issuance of BP's proposal regarding ministerial accountability to the DPR.

Syahrir's cabinet clearly violated the 1945 Constitution which stated that ministers can only be appointed and dismissed by the President. According to Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution, each minister was accountable to the President, while Syahrir's Cabinet was responsible to the KNIP. However, Syahrir's Cabinet was considered valid on the grounds of conventionality, as, according to some experts, the country's political emergency at the time justified it.

Even though the Declaration No. X allowed KNIP to exercise all of MPR and DPR's legislative powers, but BP, which was KNIP's executive board, would only exercise part of Article 3 of the 1945 Constitution relating to GBHN as described on October 20, 1945. Of the three DPR functions, BP's obligations were limited to the council's function in establishing laws with the government. The details of BP's obligations were as follows:



The fourth (4th) KNIP's Plenary Session KNIP in Solo.

(Source: Pantja Raja, 15 March 1946)

1. Together with the President establish the GBHN.
2. Proposed a bill (RUU) and, together with the President, establish the laws.
3. Provide amendments to the bills proposed by the government and together with the President establish such laws.

Both in its existing function (as contained in the Declaration No. X) and new function (i.e. to accept ministers' accountability), BP had succeeded in issuing eight decrees right until KNIP's Plenary Session II. Of the eight

BP decrees, five were regarding the rights to produce initiatives and one was regarding the right to propose a motion.

In the uncertain revolutionary period, place of operation became an important issue to the BP KNIP. From 1945 to February 1946, BP KNIP was located in Jakarta. However, safety reasons following the Dutch's return forced BP KNIP to find a new location. Among its places of choice were Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Salatiga, Magelang, and Purwokerto.

However, the five cities were already filled with activities related to the republic. KNIP eventually chose Purworejo in Central Java — a small and relatively safe city during the revolution, close to the seat of the Indonesian government in Yogyakarta. Once all of the supporting equipment, facilities, and infrastructure had been prepared, on March 23, 1946, BP KNIP held its inaugural session in Purworejo.

One of the results of BP KNIP's inaugural session in Purworejo was the establishment of the BP KNIP Liaison Committee on Jl. Cilacap No. 4, Jakarta. The purpose of the new committee was to establish a lasting relationship between BP KNIP in Purworejo and Syahrir's cabinet in Jakarta. Additionally, the session ratified several bills, including the Citizenship Bill, which was later established as Law No. 3 in 1946.

Following Syahrir's leadership, KNIP was led by Mr. Assaat between 1946–1949. In this period, KNIP continued its role as a legislative body to assist the president prior to the establishment of the People's Representative Council. In carrying out its duty, KNIP actively voiced the aspirations of its various political party and community group members. As an assistant to the president, KNIP held a much bigger role, including as a kind of parliament that was involved in the decision-making process important to the survival of the Republic of Indonesia.

Although there were always conflicts within the KNIP, especially from the Unity of Struggle opposition during the revolution, the relationship between KNIP and the presidential institution (the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and his Cabinet) went well. KNIP had always supported government programs, even when the discussions were tough,

KNIP actively voiced the aspirations of its various political party and community group members.

In addition to carrying out legislative functions, BP KNIP also served to monitor the government's performance. In general, BP KNIP carried out this function by assigning BP members to smaller committees.

particularly in the KNIP Plenary Sessions and the KNIP Working Committee Meetings.

Prior to BP KNIP's Purworejo period, KNIP's documents were recorded and archived in a rather simple manner. Minutes of meetings, especially their results, were written briefly. Change occurred only after BP KNIP moved to Purworejo where minutes were recorded in a more detailed and systematic manner. The improvements took place as BP KNIP held more regular activities.

The implementation of the "session" system, a series of meetings held within a certain period of time, had improved since the move to Purworejo too. During the sessions, BP KNIP also often applied a recess period. However, due to security concerns, it took quite a long time for BP KNIP to be able to open up to the press. It was only at the end of 1946 that BP KNIP meetings were open to journalists.

In addition to carrying out legislative functions, BP KNIP also served to monitor the government's performance. In general, BP KNIP carried out this function by assigning BP members to

smaller committees. These committees were tasked with discussing a problem for which it was responsible. The results would be discussed in the BP KNIP Plenary Session using a Q&A mechanism. The results of the Q&A would then produce a motion.

The government also appointed representatives whose task was to answer or provide information at BP KNIP sessions. Referring to its duties as an institution involved in the process of issuing laws, BP KNIP had committees whose focus was to discuss bills with the relevant state ministers. For internal matters, BP KNIP had a household committee responsible for correspondences.

The evolution of BP KNIP's administrative rules and regulations from the beginning to the end of its operation would be something interesting to observe and understand. Unfortunately, this cannot be done as many KNIP documents were lost during the revolution. KNIP documents were deliberately destroyed by the Republic during the Dutch Military Aggression II to prevent the Dutch from getting confidential information regarding the Republic of Indonesia.

Some of the surviving archives are compiled at the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia in a collection entitled "BP KNIP Documents". Among these archives, an ordinance dated June 10, 1947 describes the rules of conduct in the early days of BP KNIP under Mr. Assaat's leadership.

This document explains BP KNIP's ways of working with the government both in drafting and passing the laws and when monitoring the government's performance. It also contains regulations regarding supplementary committees that assisted BP KNIP in carrying out its duties. The committees included:

1. Standing Committee
2. Special Committee
3. Subcommittees
4. Household Committee

The Standing Committee and the Special Committee were tasked to assist BP KNIP in formulating laws and for other purposes related to legislation. The Standing Committee was responsible for conducting an examination of the bills preparation, including reporting the results of the examination by compiling a "Joint Report" which would be submitted to the ministers, as to allow written responses be made through the "Answer Annotation" mechanism.

In addition to the Standing Committee and Special Committee, BP KNIP had a supplementary committee divided into six subcommittees, including:

1. Overseas
2. Domestic
3. Development
4. Information
5. State defense; and
6. Social affairs

The responsibilities of BP KNIP's six subcommittees included:

1. Observing government policies about matters relevant to its topics of responsibility;
2. Observing government difficulties in implementing the law;
3. Listening to people's voices in relation to government policies, such as receiving people on certain days and paying attention to incoming letters;
4. Investigating important events at their own discretion or at the discretion of the Working Committee; and
5. Submitting proposals and reports to the Working Committee on issues relevant to its topics of responsibility.

Regarding household and administrative matters, BP KNIP had at least four members, who, together with the Chairman of BP KNIP, were obliged to: (1) Supervise the secretariat of BP KNIP; (2) Appoint and dismiss secretariat employees, except secretaries; and (3) Draft BP KNIP's budget.

With the assistance of these supplementary committees, BP KNIP carried out its duties, including the task of monitoring the government's performance. In this task, BP KNIP was responsible to listen to the government's statements on policies it would or had implemented. The government statement would be discussed and debated under a mechanism called the "General View" from the BP KNIP Plenary Session. Afterwards, the government would be given the opportunity to provide answers.



In this discussion session, which could last a long time, BP KNIP members could submit a motion to support or deny the proposal or the reported government performance.

BP KNIP's rules of conduct dated June 10, 1947 stipulated that the BP KNIP Plenary Session was held at least twice a month, between the 10th and 25th. Attendance was mandatory for all BP KNIP members. If unable to attend, BP KNIP members were required to notify the session committee before the session began. If a member were consecutively unable to attend the session without a clear reason, the member might be subject to the highest sanction, namely a dismissal from BP KNIP.

The BP KNIP Plenary Session was considered valid if half of the total members were in attendance. If at the appointed hour a quorum had not been met, the chairman and members present could determine a different time for the next meeting. This flexible arrangement was due to the many uncertainties caused by the revolution. This way, a meeting need not be postponed until the quorum was met. Meanwhile, the meeting agenda was prepared and determined by the Chairman of the BP KNIP together with the heads of the subcommittees.

BP KNIP Chairman, Mr. Assaat, led the fifth (5th) KNIP's Plenary Session in Malang.

(Source: ANRI-IPPHOS No. 441
February-March 1947)

LINGGARJATI AGREEMENT AND THE DUTCH MILITARY OFFENSIVES

FOR KNIP, 1947 was a year full of uncertainty. The Dutch Military Aggressions I and II were launched in the Republic's center of activities, making it difficult for BP KNIP to hold its sessions. Even in the Republic-controlled cities, such as Yogyakarta and Purworejo, the atmosphere of uncertainty also affected residents' activities. However, led by Mr. Asaat, BP KNIP continued to carry out his duties. The committee carried out various discussions, starting from a discussion on the composition of KNIP members by the government, a discussion on defense and security, a discussion on the relations with the Netherlands, to issues of citizenship and regional administration.

In early 1947, specifically from February 25 to March 5, KNIP held its fifth plenary session in Malang, East Java — the Republic's power base. Malang was chosen as the venue for the session with careful considerations of defense and security, as well as facilities and infrastructure.

After all, the KNIP Plenary Session was a major event for Indonesian democracy in the revolutionary period. After this session, BP KNIP returned to its duties as the "executive" of the legislative body that supported the works of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Serving as the venue for the fifth KNIP Plenary Session, Malang experienced an increase in activities in early 1947 due to the influx of KNIP and regional KNI members from around Indonesia in the city. TNI and Polri were responsible for the city's security approaching and during the session. The two institutions performed well, as proven by a report explaining how their guardianship resulted in a very conducive environment.

On the last day of the Plenary Session, the Linggarjati Agreement was officially approved and ratified. The KNIP legislature officially accepted that territories of the Republic of Indonesia were limited to Java, Madura and Sumatra.

The daily newspaper *Pandji Rakjat* reported KNIP's acceptance of the Linggarjati Agreement in a concise and clear manner:

“ On the last day of the KNIP plenary session in Malang on March 5, 1947, all parties (except Masyumi and PNI) passed a motion containing a statement of confidence and consensus on the government’s stance, including on negotiation matters with the Dutch (in relation to the Linggarjati Agreement text). ”

However, in its development, Dutch Military Aggression I, which was launched on July 21, 1947, caused the Indonesian government to cancel the ratification of the Linggarjati Agreement. Since then, due to the increasingly uncertain revolutionary situation, the KNIP Plenary Session could no longer be held until 1949, when it was held again in Yogyakarta.

Dutch Military Aggression I (or “police action” according to Dutch sources) was launched in the Republic of Indonesia’s Java and Sumatra islands. This attack, which involved the use of modern weapons, was conducted by the Dutch military and pro-Dutch Indonesians, some of whom were graduates of the *Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indische Leger* (KNIL) or the Royal Dutch East Indies Military. Even so, the Indonesian people’s resistance to the Dutch attack persisted on various fronts.

Viewed from the perspective of the representatives at the negotiating table, Dutch Military Aggression I was one of the many consequences of the Indonesian Government’s rejection of the aide-memoire (diplomatic note) proposed by Lt. Governor General H.J. van Mook in May 1947. The contents of this aide-memoire included:

1. Prior to the formation of the RIS, the Netherlands ruled over the entire Dutch East Indies, and therefore RI must cease all relations with other foreign countries;
2. For the purposes of security and order, the Netherlands proposes a joint security forces within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, including areas of the Republic that require Dutch’s assistance;

Viewed from the perspective of the representatives at the negotiating table, Dutch Military Aggression I was one of the many consequences of the Indonesian Government’s rejection of the aide-memoire (diplomatic note) proposed by Lt. Governor General H.J. van Mook in May 1947.

3. The Netherlands wishes to develop and maintain an eternal bond between the Netherlands and Indonesia (*Staatsverbond*). Indonesia shall remain a federation;
4. Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands a joint ad interim government shall be formed;
5. The Republic of Indonesia, together with the Netherlands, shall fund and establish a joint foreign exchange institution;
6. The Republic of Indonesia must distribute rice to the Dutch-occupied areas;
7. The Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands shall organize a joint ownership of imports and exports.

For the Indonesians, the Dutch's request was unacceptable. Based on this aide-memoire, Indonesia was seemingly "asked" to voluntarily re-submit itself to the control of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government. In reality, the third point of the aide-memoire violated the main point in the Linggarjati Agreement which had only been ratified by the KNIP on March 5, 1947. In the Linggarjati Agreement, the soon-to-be-formed Indonesian-Dutch Union could give Indonesia the right to have its own head of state. The Indonesian-Dutch Union would be headed by the King/Queen of the Netherlands, who would act as a "supervisor".

To prevent war with the Dutch, PM Syahrir proposed a concession to the Netherlands, namely the recognition of Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia during the transition period — something which had actually been denounced by the parties and by BP KNIP. Syahrir's cabinet finally fell on June 26, 1947 due to the tremendous pressure associated with its concessions with the Dutch. The Cabinet of Amir Syarifuddin (PKI faction), which succeeded the Syahrir Cabinet, also had difficulties in responding to the Dutch aide-memoire.

To that end, BP KNIP held a Closed Session with PM Amir Syarifuddin on July 10 and 11, 1947. The BP KNIP session was of the opinion that Indonesia's security was the responsibility of the Indonesian government, and therefore BP KNIP denied the joint security control with the Netherlands. The BP KNIP session together with PM Amir Syarifuddin reached an understanding to provide the Netherlands with other concessions that would give but little consequence to Indonesia.



However, the concession was rejected by the Dutch, who still wished their aide-memoire be fully welcomed. Due to Indonesia's disapproval of the Dutch's request, on July 21, the Dutch launched an attack.

BP KNIP immediately responded to the Dutch Military Aggression I by holding a lightning session in Yogyakarta. The result of this meeting was that the chairman, faction leaders, and groups from BP KNIP were to remain in Yogyakarta to "always be ready for session." Efforts to attract the sympathy of the Dutch people were carried out by the Deputy Chair of BP KNIP, Iskandar Tejasukmana. He delivered a speech over the radio to the Dutch people, urging them to protest the Netherland's armed attack on Indonesia.

The actions taken by the Republic of Indonesia, including BP KNIP's condemnation of the attack, received international support.

**Vote count atmosphere on KNIP
Chairman election, 1947.**

(Source: ANRI-IPPHOS, No. 446
February-March 1947)

On August 1, 1947, the UN Security Council convened to discuss the Dutch-Indonesia issue. As a result, the UN Security Council urged both parties to start a ceasefire. On August 4, 1947, a ceasefire was announced, which marked the end of the Dutch Military Aggression I.

After the Renville Agreement was signed, political turmoil within the Indonesian government emerged. As a form of rejection of this agreement, all PNI and Masyumi members of the Amir Syarifuddin Cabinet resigned. Amir Syarifuddin himself resigned as Prime Minister.

In 1948, KNIP entered a critical period in the revolution. The Renville Agreement signed on January 17, 1948 on the deck of the USS Renville marked a new chapter in the course of the Indonesian revolution. Previously, under the Linggarjati Agreement on November 15, 1946, the Netherlands had recognized Indonesia's de facto control over Java, Madura and Sumatra.

With the approval of the Renville Agreement, TNI's achievements on the battlefield were in vain. In addition, no point of the Renville Agreement mentioned the Netherlands' recognition of Indonesia's de facto power. In this situation, BP KNIP needed to respond comprehensively to the Renville Agreement and other challenges during this period.

After the Renville Agreement was signed, political turmoil within the Indonesian government emerged. As a form of rejection of this agreement, all PNI and Masyumi members of the Amir Syarifuddin Cabinet resigned. Amir Syarifuddin himself resigned as Prime Minister. The Amir Syarifuddin Cabinet was then succeeded by the Cabinet of the Vice President Mohammad Hatta. Hatta led an Emergency

Presidential Cabinet which gave all its responsibilities directly to President Soekarno. Even so, BP KNIP continued to carry out its duties as a parliamentary cabinet, expressing opinions and monitoring the operations of the executive branch.

Indonesia's weakening position at the global stage emboldened the Netherlands' intent to retain its former colony in its entirety. One of the Netherlands' efforts took the form of a new cooperation scheme with Indonesia. Not long after the Renville Agreement was signed, the Netherlands formed puppet states in its former colonies in 1948, starting from

the State of Madura on January 23, the State of East Sumatra on March 24, the State of Pasundan on April 26, and the State of East Java on November 26 — all of which were part of the Republic of Indonesia under the Linggarjati Agreement.

Just like with other puppet states outside the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands also offered a democratic and prosperous government to Indonesia.

The offer also served as an invitation to create a People's Representative Council consisting of all elements of society, as was the case in the State of East Indonesia.

For the Netherlands, if Soekarno-Hatta could offer a promise of democracy, so could the Netherlands provide a more appropriate democratic system for Indonesia. The Queen of the Netherlands, Wilhelmina, in her speech via radio broadcast on February 3, 1948, conveyed her main propositions to the Indonesian people.

She was optimistic about the possibility of a cooperation between the Indonesian and the Dutch peoples to form a democratic government in the form of a federal state. She also emphasized the path that Indonesia could take to achieve independence, namely through a cooperative relationship with the Netherlands. Afterwards, based on Queen Wilhelmina's speech, the Netherlands would propose a United States of Indonesia to the United Nations for complete independence. Surely, this was different from what the nationalists had in mind.

The BP KNIP sessions in the post-Renville Agreement period were filled with regular agendas without any record of responses to Queen Wilhelmina's speech. During this period, BP KNIP had also moved to the Indonesian capital city of Yogyakarta, making coordination and sessions that became more intense after the Renville Agreement easier to hold.

During the reign of the Hatta Cabinet, BP KNIP's relations with the government went quite intensively. PM Hatta specifically encouraged the ministers in his cabinet to hold frequent meetings with BP KNIP. Hatta had held the BP KNIP in high regard as a representation of the democratic practice in Indonesia. Although Hatta's cabinet was a presidential cabinet, Hatta never dismissed BP KNIP as a legislative body that could strengthen the government's performance.

On February 14, 1948, PM Hatta informed the BP KNIP of his cabinet's programs. Some of the things mentioned in the statement, among others, were that the presidential cabinet system that he ran was only temporary and served only to defuse conflicts between parties. Furthermore, Hatta hoped to return to the parliamentary system soon.

Hatta explained how the government's fighting strategy had changed from defending the Republic of Indonesia to the formation of the RIS. Many rights and powers would indeed be sacrificed should RI operate under RIS but this was the only way for all of Indonesia to achieve independence and sovereignty. PM Hatta told BP KNIP that his next battle would be to be active in RIS, where RI would play its own role.

The government's performance in the regions had become a concern to the BP KNIP members since several years ago. However, the discussion could only be carried out in 1948, since May 15, 1948. BP KNIP finally agreed on the proposal of the Bill on Principal Governance in the Regions as proposed by the government with amendments. The main points of this draft, after BP KNIP's revisions, were as follows:

The regions of the Republic of Indonesia were to be divided into three autonomous regions that would have their own government, namely provinces, regencies or big cities, and village areas. Each region would have a Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), whose members would be directly elected by the respective residents. The executive committee sessions would be held by the chairman who would also be the regional head.

The appointment of governors would be carried out by the president, regents by the Home Affairs Minister, and village chiefs or district heads by recommendations from each respective DPRD. Regional heads would hold an indefinite term of office, but the DPRD could propose for the dismissal of the regional head to the institution that appointed them.

Members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) were elected by and from members of the DPRD. The chairman and deputy chairman of the DPRD could not sit on the DPD since it is responsible to the DPRD as *collegiaan bestuur* (co-government).

Special Regions (DI) had the same structure and level as other regions. DI's speciality lay in the appointment of its regional head by the presi-



dent. The regional heads usually descended from kings of the concerned area prior to RI's founding and still held control over the area. With the DI formation, a king or sultan could continue to govern the area, although he still must answer to the president and listen to the DPRD. This arrangement reflected the Indonesian government's respect for the rights of traditional regional heads and BP KNIP's acknowledgment of their struggle in the Indonesian revolution.

The Dutch Military Aggression II, which began on December 19, 1948, crippled the Indonesian government in Yogyakarta. The Dutch detained Indonesian officials in Yogyakarta, including President Soekarno, Vice President and PM Hatta, and the Chairman of BP KNIP Mr. Assaat. To continue the government, RI sent a telegram to Indonesian officials in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, to run an Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) under the leadership of Indonesian Minister of Prosperity Syafruddin Prawiranegara.

**The observers paid attention
on the fifth (5th) KNIP's Plenary
Session, 1947.**

(Source: ANRI-IPPHOS, No. 446
February-March 1947)

The consolidation of Indonesian diplomats and leaders, including Mr. Mohammad Rum and the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations, PM Hatta in detention in Bangka, and Acting President Syafruddin Prawiranegara in Bukittinggi, urged international leaders to take a stand against the Netherland's action on Indonesia. As a result, on 7 May 1949, five months after the Dutch aggression against Yogyakarta, the Rum-Royen Agreement was reached.

The Indonesian leaders were immediately released by the Dutch, while the government was returned to PM Hatta from the PDRI. In the history of BP KNIP, this was the last phase of its existence.

The Indonesian leaders were immediately released by the Dutch, while the government was returned to PM Hatta from the PDRI. In the history of BP KNIP, this was the last phase of its existence. The challenge of BP KNIP at that time was to find the right way to reduce the turmoil caused by the Dutch Military Aggression II and to prepare for the formation of the United States of Indonesia (RIS).

The return of the Indonesian government in Yogyakarta was the first step to realizing Indonesian sovereignty within the RIS, a temporary government prior to the establishment of the final Republic of Indonesia. The BP KNIP session conveyed the common view on the government's statement, whereby BP KNIP finally supported and approved the actions taken by the government.

The government submitted two bills to the KNIP Session to be discussed together, namely the Bill on Joint Agreement on the Approval of Drafts and All Exchange of Correspondence regarding the Transfer of Sovereignty by the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the RIS and the Bill on the Ratification of the RIS Constitution along with the Appendix on the Principles of Governance.

With the inauguration of Mr. Assaat as acting president of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta, it meant that RI had become one of the countries within the United States of Indonesia (RIS). RIS, formed at the end of 1949, was short-lived as, in August 1950, the federal state became the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).



On August 20, 1949, the Chairman of BP KNIP Mr. Assaat was appointed as Acting President of the Republic of Indonesia. He held the position for a year and three days before the position was handed back to Soekarno, who again served as President of the Republic of Indonesia under the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

The sixth (6th) KNIP's Plenary Session in Sitihiunggil, Yogyakarta. PM Hatta gave an explanation in front of KNIP's Plenary Session.

(Source: ANRI-IPPHOS No. 1423
14 December 1949)

EFFORTS TO REUNITE THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (1950-1960)



The Netherlands will announce to the international community that the Republic of Indonesia, founded by the republican extremist intruders, is gone.



Illustration that portrayed a satire to nationalism perspective from Soangkupon, an indigenous Volksraad member.

(Source: Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië, 27 February 1932)

DPR-RIS:

EFFORTS TO BUILD A FEDERAL STATE

From the Dutch perspective, one of the main objectives of the Dutch Military Aggression or "Police Action"/NICA (Netherlands Indie Civil Administration) launched on December 19, 1948 was to control Yogyakarta, the seat of the Republic of Indonesia's government, and to arrest and detain its leaders.



If the Netherlands achieved its military aggression goal, it would announce to the international community that the Republic of Indonesia, founded by the republican extremist intruders, had perished and that security in the Dutch East Indies had been restored. But that scenario didn't work. The reaction of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Paris, France, was not as the Dutch expected.

The UN Security Council canceled its Christmas leave and immediately held a series of sessions with an agenda to discuss events of invasion and occupation. From the discussions finally emerged an agreement to issue a resolution, which contained:

a

Stop the hostility.

b

Release the President and the Republic of Indonesia's leaders who were captured on December 19, 1949.

c

Order the Three Nations Commission (KTN) to provide a complete report on the situation in Indonesia since December 19, 1948.

On February 13, 1949, Vice President Moh. Hatta released an official statement detailing Indonesia's willingness to negotiate on the condition that the Indonesian government would return to Yogyakarta and the Dutch troops would withdraw from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia per UN resolutions. The Federal Consultative Assembly/Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg (BFO) officially supported Indonesia's official statement.

Therefore, on February 26, 1949, the Dutch announced their plan to hold a Round Table Conference (KMB) in The Hague, as the UN Security Council requested. The main topics to be discussed at the conference included the "handover" of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) and the formation of the Dutch Indonesian Union.

The implementation of KMB must end all existing problems, namely social, political, economic, and cultural conflicts and issues. Therefore, through the KMB, the Netherlands had to recognize (Dutch version: surrender) its sovereignty over the Indonesian territory (Dutch East Indies) to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. It meant that there would be no transitional period of sovereignty, unlike the one stated in the Linggarjati and Renville Agreements which always failed.

As the conference aimed to end all disputes, arrangements, including preparing the provisional constitution, must be made before the KMB. As a modern country, indeed, RIS must have a constitution stipulating the form of government, the system of governance, and others.

Based on the "concept" of this constitution, RIS would have six institutions, namely the President, the ministers, the Senate, the People's Representative Council, the Supreme Council of Indonesia, and the General Audit Council (*Algemene Rekenkamer*). For the first time, the president would be elected by government representatives and local state agencies. In turn, the president would appoint three formators to compile the cabinet. Then, at the recommendations of the three formators, the president would select one of them as Prime Minister.

As a modern country, indeed, RIS must have a constitution stipulating the form of government, the system of governance, and others.

When necessary, the government could consult the Senate's opinion on issues. Likewise, the Senate could also advise the government as it saw fit.

In a republican-federal system, the President was "*onschendbaar*"; meaning he could not be held accountable. Instead, the ministers would be responsible. Meanwhile, as the head of state, the President would have several prerogatives, such as the right of clemency (pardon) on sentences imposed by the court. Furthermore, the President would be the commander-in-chief of the entire RIS military, and the President and his ministers constituted the state government.

The Senate was the regional or state representative. Each state had two sitting representatives elected or appointed by their respective local governments. The President appointed the Senate chair, who could be a member of the Senate or an external member. The Senate chair was only entitled to give advice. Jakarta was designated as the Senate's place of business. When necessary, the government could consult the Senate's opinion on issues. Likewise, the Senate could also advise the government as it saw fit.

The People's Representative Council (DPR) had 150 members. Members representing the Republic of Indonesia state made up 50 percent of the total council members. Meanwhile, the number of council members representing other states would be determined by the ratio of their respective population, election results, or appointments by the people's representative bodies from the regions concerned. The Chinese (Chinese), European, and Arab minor groups would be represented by at least nine, six, and three members, respectively. The DPR must elect a chair and one or more deputy chairs. The DPR has the right of interpellation (*interpellatie* — the right to ask for information from the government), the right to ask questions, and the right to question (*enquête* — the right to examine matters of public interest).

The Round Table Conference took place on August 23 and ended officially on November 2, 1949. The draft of the KMB agreement, brought by the three delegates, would later be submitted to the DPR or parliament of their respective countries for ratification. Each DPR or parliament would need only to approve or deny the KMB results. The KMB also stipulated that the transfer of sovereignty must be carried out no later than December 30, 1949, so a *fait accompli* was established to prevent members of the DPR — or the “BFO” and “RI” parliaments — from taking too long to evaluate the results of the KMB agreement.

In that political situation, each government’s DPR or parliament began to hold a session to discuss whether the results of the KMB were accepted. The ratification of the KMB agreement in the states that were members of the BFO went relatively smoothly. Until early December 1949, all states had accepted the results of the RTC agreement.

Meanwhile, the Indonesia-Yogya State KNIP convened only in early December, from 6 to 15 December 1949. The session was held at Siti Hinggil, Yogyakarta Palace. This session was one of KNIP’s last sessions. One of the events in the sessions was to discuss the KMB results, which had been agreed upon by the two RI delegations, the BFO and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Unlike in the BFO member states, the results of the KMB were not received easily in RI.

From the session, 226 members agreed, 62 refused, and 31 walked out. One of the parties that rejected the results of the KMB was the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), led by St. Syahrir. With this composition, KNIP agreed to ratify the results of the KMB.

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The KNIP's approval of the KMB resulted in an edict and two laws. The creation of the two laws went a little bit unusual as they were created by the government and the KNIP Working Committee instead of by the government and KNIP.

The Declaration of the President of the Republic of Indonesia and KNIP on December 14, 1949 read as follows:

1. Only the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, recognized as independent, has complete sovereignty over the entire region.
2. All RI institutions needed to uphold and complete the independent and sovereign Republic of the United States of Indonesia shall be donated to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

The two laws were promulgated on the same date as Laws Number 10 and Number 11/1949, each ratifying:

1. Master Mutual Agreement, agreement drafts, and all exchange of correspondences regarding the transfer of sovereignty by the Kingdom of Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.
2. Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

In addition to approving the results of the KMB, KNIP also made several decisions, including:

- c. To determine the three candidates for the RIS Senate.
- d. To appoint the 50 members of the DPR-RIS who were delegates from the Republic of Indonesia-Yogya.
- e. To elect Prawoto Mangkusasmito as Deputy Chair of KNIP.

Since the KMB's ratification process, in November, a National Preparatory Committee (PPN) was formed to elect the President of the RIS and appoint the cabinet formators who would receive the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands. Elected as Chairman of VAT was Mr. Mohammad Roem from the Republic of Indonesia, with Ida Anak Agung Gde Agung from NIT as representatives. The PPN consisted of 31 people: 15 from the Republic of Indonesia and 16 from the BFO. Most of the PPN members were members of the RI-BFO at KMB.

To carry out its duties, PPN established four commissions: 1. Central Commission, 2. Procedure Commission, 3. Administrative Commission, and 4. Military Commission.

The main tasks of VAT were:

1. To elect the President of the RIS.
2. To coordinate security throughout Indonesia.
3. To complete the transfer of government.

On November 25, 1949, the PPN began holding its first plenary session. In that session, the Chair of the Procedure Commission, Prof. Dr. Supomo, delivered the procedure for selecting the President of the RIS, signing the RIS Constitution, and receiving the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands.

Then in a session on December 6, 1949, the Procedure Commission determined that the election process for the first RIS President would be organized by an election committee that would soon be formed. The committee members consisted of representatives from Indonesia and other states that had previously joined the BFO. Each state would be represented by one person, bringing the number of members to 16 people. The election committee then went by the name the State Authorities. The Procedure Commission also stipulated that the state representatives sign the RIS Constitution.

Per the Procedure Commission's provisions, the RIS Constitution was signed on December 14, 1949. Meanwhile, the election for the RIS President was held on December 16, 1949, with a single candidate, namely Soekarno, who was previously the President of the Republic of Indonesia-Yogya. Therefore, the Republic of Indonesia must approve Soekarno's appointment. The KNIP Working Committee (BP) stated its approval in the session, so Sukarno was accepted as President of RIS. The following day, December 17, 1949, at Siti Hinggil Keraton Yogyakarta, Sukarno was sworn in as President of the RIS.

Each state would be represented by one person, bringing the number of members to 16 people. The election committee then went by the name the State Authorities.

The difference between RIS and the Republic of Indonesia was in their state institutions, namely the presence of a Senate representing the federal state, which is different from the regional representatives who represented the provinces.

Under Article 74 paragraph 1 of the RIS Constitution, President Soekarno and state authorities must appoint three cabinet-formateurs on December 18, 1949. However, the cabinet formation did not go as smoothly as the presidential election because many assembly members wanted more than three cabinet-formateurs. After deliberation, an agreement was reached for the President of RIS to appoint four cabinet formateurs. The four formateurs were Drs. Mohammad Hatta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, and Sultan Hamid II.

Then, the President appointed Mohammad Hatta as Prime Minister. On December 19, 1949, Moh. Hatta successfully formed the RIS Cabinet, which consisted of 14 portfolio ministries and three non-portfolio ministries. On December 20, 1949, as the President of RIS, Soekarno inducted the RIS Cabinet under the leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta at the Concordia Building, Jl. Sipayer (now Jl. Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo).

After the Cabinet under Prime Minister Hatta had been formed, the next step was to appoint a RIS delegation to receive the transfer of sovereignty in the Netherlands. The delegation consisted of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Moh. Hatta as head of the delegation, with members including Prof. Dr. Supomo, Mr. Sujono Hadinoto, Mr. A.K. Pringgodigdo, and Moh. Jahja as scribes. On December 23, 1949, the delegation led by Mohammad Hatta left for the Netherlands.

The early months of the RIS administration were sometimes called the "RIS Constitution Period", often also referred to as the RIS Provisional Constitution. The temporary nature as stated in Article 186: "The Constituent Assembly and the government shall immediately stipulate the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia". The formation of this constitution was considered a bit rushed, seemingly just to fulfill the requirements for forming a federal state, RIS.

The RIS Constitution or RIS Provisional Law consisted of 197 Articles preceded by the Preamble, which read as follows:

“We, the Indonesian people, who for decades have been united in the struggle for independence, with a steadfast heart, intend to claim the right to life as an independent and sovereign nation; Now, with the grace of God, we have reached an elated and noble stage in our history, and thus we have compiled our independence in a state charter in the form of a federal republic under the belief of God Almighty, humanity, democracy, nationality, and social justice to reach happiness, prosperity, peace, independence in society and a sovereign and fully independent state of Indonesia.”

The sovereignty of RIS was exercised by the government, the People’s Representative Council, and the Senate, which made up the RIS Parliament. The difference between RIS and the Republic of Indonesia was in their state institutions, namely the presence of a Senate representing the federal state, which is different from the regional representatives who represented the provinces, as is the case with the Republic of Indonesia today.

Despite the weaknesses present in the KMB agreement, politically, Indonesia had gained quite a considerable advantage in the framework of foreign affairs, including regarding international relations issues. Opportunities to conduct international relations increased along with the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state. It was also easy to become a member of the United

Internally, the RIS People’s Representative Council (DPR-RIS) represented all Indonesian people. The total number of people’s representatives who sat in this institution was 150 people, consisting of 50 people representing various regions in the Republic of Indonesia-Yogyakarta and 100 people representing the rest of the regions.

As for relatively small groups, such as the Chinese, Europeans, and Arabs, according to Article 100, they must be represented by nine, six, and three members, respectively.

Nations (UN). As a result, Indonesia became the 60th member of the world institution since September 28, 1950.

Internally, the RIS People's Representative Council (DPR-RIS) represented all Indonesian people. The total number of people's representatives who sat in this institution was 150 people, consisting of 50 people representing various regions in the Republic of Indonesia-Yogyakarta and 100 people representing the rest of the regions. According to Article 109 and Article 110 of the "Provisional" Constitution of the RIS, the first DPR RIS was established according to the following provisions:

The regions dictated their methods for selecting representatives to DPR-RIS. If it could not be done through a general election, the selection would be made by appointing the respective representatives or according to the people's will.

The 100 members from outside the Republic of Indonesia-Yogyakarta were selected through a joint negotiation in the concerned regions. The number of members was determined based on the total population of the respective regions.

As for relatively small groups, such as the Chinese, Europeans, and Arabs, according to Article 100, they must be represented by nine, six, and three members, respectively. If that number were not achieved per the above provisions, the RIS Government would appoint additional representatives for the small groups.

Regarding the Senate, Article 80 and so on of the RIS Constitution stipulated that the Senate represented the states. Two members represented each state. Each member elected by the government was then selected by the respective Regional People's Representative Council, which then would nominate them to become members of the Senate. Based on these provisions, the first RIS DPR and Senate were formed, which held a joint session on February 15, 1950.

The membership of the DPR-RIS was different from that of the KNIP or the KNIP Working Committee. The requirements to become a member of the DPR and Senate were stated in Part III of the RIS Constitution. Members of the DPR must be at least 25 years of age and possessed the right to vote or be elected. This requirement also applied to the members of the Senate, except for the age. According to the provisions of the RIS Constitution Articles 101 and Article 82, to become a member of the Senate, a candidate must be at least 30 years old.

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TURMOIL TOWARDS UNITY

Although the Republic of the United States of Indonesia had been formed and operated as an independent and sovereign country, even becoming a member of the United Nations, all existing political problems remained.

DIFFERENCES in understanding and principles between groups that accepted the KMB agreement and those who rejected it were noticeable among both civilians and military. Many former KNIL did not want to join or merge into the RIS Armed Forces (APRIS) despite being decided in the KMB. Instead, they demanded to remain in the KNIL unit, which, as a whole, had been made into the federal army or the state army.

On the other hand, among the government or the legislature, a movement wanted to dissolve the federal states and merge with the Republic of Indonesia, or RI-Yogya, to be specific. Sukabumi and South Sumatra were examples. In Sukabumi, the local DPRD demanded that the Sukabumi Regency be separated from the Pasundan State and reunited with the Republic of Indonesia-Yogyakarta. Similar movements emerged in several other areas.

Many politicians disagreed with the results of the KMB, including Syafruddin Prawiranegara, who was the former Chairman of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI), and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Agus Salim. Many thought that the federal system was the Dutch's trick to keep control of Indonesia through the federal states it had formed.

There were grounds for such accusations. On January 4, 1950, the Malang DPRD, which was part of the East Java State, issued a resolution to separate from East Java and merge with the State of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta. Then, following the Ratu Adil Armed Forces (APRA) attack led by Captain Westerling in Bandung, on January 30, the Sukabumi Regency DPRD, which was part of the Pasundan State, issued

the same resolution to leave the Pasundan State and join the Republic of Indonesia.

APRA's armed attack on January 23, 1950 in Bandung indirectly accelerated the "unitarian" process. By March 1950, only four states remained: the Republic of Indonesia, West Kalimantan, East Sumatra, and East Indonesia. Although not disbanded, West Kalimantan was in crisis because Sultan Hamid as Head of State—also serving as Minister of State in the RIS Cabinet—was involved in the APRA-Westerling incident. Then the State of East Indonesia also faced a problem with the separatist movement of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS), proclaimed by Dr. Soumokil.

Meanwhile, the People's Consultative Assembly throughout East Sumatra demanded the continuation of RIS and that the State of East Sumatra (NST) remained a part of it. However, the People's Congress demanded the opposite: to disband the NST. The social revolution heavily influenced the opposing ideologies in the early years of Indonesia's independence.

To accommodate the efforts to merge the states into the Republic of Indonesia and the plans to re-establish a unitary state, the RIS Senate formed a committee to draft the Unitary State Constitution. Then, on May 22, 1950, the Senate proposed the Committee's Constitution draft to the government.

Aside from the Republic of Indonesia, only East Sumatra and East Indonesia remained as states. Therefore, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia recommended for the RIS Government to negotiate with the two states regarding the formation of a unitary state. The government received the recommendations well and went on to approach the governments of the two states. As a result, the two state governments authorized the RIS government to negotiate with the government of the Republic of Indonesia.

Meanwhile, two motions regarding forming a unitary state flourished in the RIS parliament. The first motion came from Soesanto Tirtoprodjo

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from the PNI faction. In his motion, Soesanto recommended that the states joining the Republic of Indonesia reconsider their decision as it had caused turmoil in various societal circles in the respective states, especially the State of East Indonesia and the State of East Sumatra.

Another opinion came from Mohammad Natsir, the Head of the Masyumi Faction. His issue was forming a unitary state instead of consolidating RIS states into the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, what must be studied was how to prevent the formation of a unitary state from causing conflict, both within the community itself and between states.

In such a situation, Prime Minister Hatta assigned Mohammad Natsir and Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX to resolve various crises that occurred in the regions. Having visited multiple regions, they began to accept that several states wanted to dissolve themselves to join with the Yogya government or as states of the Republic of Indonesia. In other words, they wanted to dissolve the federal state to unite with the Republic of Indonesia,

but they were not willing to be ordered to dissolve without the help from the RI-Yogya.

Based on his findings, Mohammad Natsir delivered a speech before the RIS Parliamentary Session on April 3, 1950. In his remarks, Natsir proposed a motion which, among other things, read:

“Nowadays, the people’s representatives of any state all want a unitary state, in this case, no state feels that one state is superior to the other, all are equal, let us establish a unitary state together by means of liquefying all states including The Republic of Indonesia Jogja and on the basis of the same rights, let this integral motion, before being discussed in parliament, be reviewed by the president and ministers, and have the parliament unanimously approve it.”

The motion became known as the “Natsir Integral Motion”, and the motion was received by the RIS Parliament (DPR) on the same date. After Natsir delivered his Integral Motion, a conference took place between RIS, represented by Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta — who also represented the interests of the State of East Indonesia and the State of East Sumatra — and RI, represented by Prime Minister Abdul Halim. The conference resulted in the “Agreement Charter” between RIS and RI, signed on May 19, 1950.

Contents of the Agreement Charter:

Whereas we agree in the shortest possible time to implement the Unitary State together as the incarnation of the Republic of Indonesia based on the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, with a Constitution created by amending the Constitution of the RIS in such a way that the spirit of the 1945 Constitution and all of the good parts from the RIS Constitution be included in the following points:

Inward: perfecting people’s livelihoods and the unity of Indonesia.

Outward: maintaining good relations with other countries.

Whereas we approve of the making of this Provisional Constitution for the Unitary State by a committee formed for that purpose.

Next, the RIS Government, together with the Government of Indonesia-Yogya on May 19, 1950, formed a “Joint Committee” consisting of 14 members: seven from the RIS government and seven from the Indonesian government. Both the committees from RIS and RI-Yogya consisted of two elements, namely: the people’s representative element (DPR, Senate, and the KNIP Working Body) and the government element.

The joint committee was tasked with drafting the Constitution of the Unitary State. After working and holding negotiations among the members, the committee submitted the results of their work to the RIS Government and the Indonesian Government of Yogyakarta. After negotiating the results of the committee’s work, the two governments agreed with several amendments to the draft of the Provisional Constitution of the Unitary State.

On August 15, 1950, the government ratified and officially announced in the State Gazette (State Gazette No. 56 of 1950), RIS Law No. 7 of 1950 concerning the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia to the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Both the RIS and RI-Yogya governments had requested the DPR not to use its amendment rights so that the Unitary State could be formed immediately and its government could begin efforts to overcome various kinds of domestic difficulties faced by the two governments (RIS and RI) at that time.

From this agreement, on August 15, 1950, the government ratified and officially announced in the State Gazette (State Gazette No. 56 of 1950), RIS Law No. 7 of 1950 concerning the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia to the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. On the same day, a solemn ceremony was held at the last joint meeting of the RIS DPR-Senate.

Then, President Soekarno read out the "Charter of Statements on the Establishment of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia", which contained, among other things:

"We hereby notify the joint meeting of the People's Representative Council and the Senate of the United States of Indonesia that the proposed law to amend the Provisional Constitution of the

Republic of the United States of Indonesia into the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, drawn up by the government with the approval of the state governments of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, was well received by the People's Representative Council and the Senate of the United States of Indonesia at their meetings on August 14, 1950.

On this day, August 15, 1950, the text of the law was signed by us and by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and announced by the Minister of Justice.

Based on the proclamation of Indonesian Independence dated August 17, 1945, on behalf of the people, at the current level of the struggle for independence, we declare as a domestic change the formation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the homeland of all Indonesians."

Then on August 15, 1950, the DPR and Senate of RIS and RI-Yogya Workers Agency were officially closed, ending its history. On the following day, namely August 16, 1950, all chairs, deputy-chairs, and members of the legislative bodies, along with the chairs, deputy-chairs, and members of the Supreme Advisory Council of the Republic of Indonesia-Yogya, became members of the People's Representative Council of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. On the same day, they were officially inducted by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno.

At a ceremony on August 17, 1950, President Soekarno, in his state address, read about the dissolution of the United States of Indonesia and the return of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

FORMATION OF THE TEMPORARY PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (DPRS RI)

The Statement Charter by the President of RIS Soekarno regarding the formation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia also marked the end of the federal state.

THE change in the country's form impacted the formation of the Provisional DPR (DPRS), which officially began its term of office on August 16, 1950. The formation of the DPRS in the early days of Liberal Democracy was agreed upon in the 1950 Constitution.

The provisional constitution stated that Indonesia's sovereignty lay in the hands of the people and was carried out by the government together with the People's Representative Council. The Senate was formed when the federal state was abolished or merged into the DPRS.

Based on Article 56 of the 1950 Constitution, the DPRS would represent all Indonesian people, each member representing every 300,000 of the country's native population. As for minority representation, Article 58, paragraph 1 of the 1950 Constitution stipulated that at least nine members would represent the ethnic Chinese, six represented the ethnic European, and three represented the ethnic Arab.

The mechanism for selecting the DPRS members was agreed upon through general elections. However, in the period leading to the general election, as stated in Article 77 of the 1950 Constitution, DPRS members should consist of: former members of the RIS DPR, former members of the RIS Senate, members of the Central Indonesian National Committee Working Committee (BP-KNIP), and the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) RI. The inclusion of the DPA RI as part of the DPRS was based on the consideration that the DPA was a central council accustomed to providing advice to the Indonesian government on the government's political direction and legislative action.

Based on Article 77 of the 1950 Constitution, the DPRS would have 236 members, consisting of 148 members of the RIS DPR, 29 RIS Senate members, 46 BP-KNIP members, and 13 DPA-RI members. However, at the beginning of the formation of the DPRS in 1950, there were 232 DPRS members. The strength of political parties at that time could be seen through the distribution of parliamentary seats (DPR).

Masyumi had 49 members (21%) in the DPRS, followed by the PNI with 36 seats (16%). Outside of the two parties, no single party had more than 20 members. The third most significant power in the DPRS was the PSI, whose leader, Sutan Syahrir, was prime minister during the revolution, with 17 members.

Furthermore, based on historical records from 1954, DPRS had 235 members. In 1950, there were 17 factions, and 26 of the members did not belong to any faction. The number of factions then increased to 20.

Looking at DPRS' composition in 1950, there were at least three dominant political ideologies: the nationalist, the leftist, and the Islamic groups. The nationalist was represented by around 71 members of the DPRS, most of whom came from the PNI with 36 members. In total, the nationalist group made up 30 percent of the parliament. The left, which included PKI, Murba Party, and PSI, had 47 members, making up 20 percent of the parliament, while the Islamic group, represented by the Masyumi Party and PSII, had a combined total of 54 members, making up 23 percent of the parliament. The remaining 11 percent consisted of the 26 non-party members whose ideological views were unclear.

Masyumi had 49 members (21%) in the DPRS, followed by the PNI with 36 seats (16%). Outside of the two parties, no single party had more than 20 members.

In a government that implements a parliamentary democracy system, the DPRS can overthrow the cabinet if it sees that the government has taken actions without the approval of the DPRS (Article 83 paragraph 2 of the 1950 Constitution).

Although in the early days of Liberal Democracy the DPR was temporary as members were not selected through an official election, it still served its function. As stated in Article 89 of the 1950 Constitution, the DPRS and the government exercised legislative powers. The DPRS acted as a law-making body and could exercise the right of initiative (proposing a law to the government), while the government could submit a proposed bill to the DPRS.

DPRS' other duties were mentioned in several articles, including:

1. Article 113-116 UUDS 1950: DPRS has the right to determine the state budget. The proposed state budget is issued by the government and must be approved by the DPRS.
2. Article 83 paragraph 2 of the 1950 Constitution: DPRS has the right and obligation to supervise actions taken by the government. In other words, the government cannot take action without the approval of the DPRS. If the government takes action without the support of the DPRS, then the DPRS can force the cabinet to resign.

In addition to the tasks mentioned above, the DPRS also had four rights over the government, such as:

1. The first right, as contained in Article 91 of the 1950 Constitution, was the right of amendment. The DPRS had the right to make changes in the proposed law submitted by the government to the DPRS.
2. The next right was the right of interpellation and the right to ask questions as regulated in Article 69 of the 1950 Constitution. This right allowed the DPR to question the cabinet on implemented policies.
3. The third right, as stated in Article 70 of the 1950 Constitution, was the right of inquiry. DPRS could investigate the policies implemented by the government.

4. The fourth right was the right of immunity as formulated in Article 71 of the 1950 Constitution. The article stated that the chair and members of the DPRS and ministers could not be prosecuted due to their verbal or written delivery in the assembly.

In a government that implements a parliamentary democracy system, the DPRS can overthrow the cabinet if it sees that the government has taken actions without the approval of the DPRS (Article 83 paragraph 2 of the 1950 Constitution). In addition, the 1950 Constitution also stated that the President had the right to dissolve the DPR if the DPR failed to represent the will of the people.

However, the President cannot act arbitrarily to dissolve parliament. There is a provision in Article 84 of the UUDS, which states that after the dissolution of the DPR, new members of the DPR must be elected within 30 days. This is an attempt to prevent the president from arbitrarily dissolving the DPRS.

Meanwhile, with 49 seats in the DPRS, Mohammad Natsir, the Chair of the Masyumi Party, was appointed as the first prime minister during the Liberal Democracy period. Natsir's appointment as prime minister was arguably an effort to respect Natsir's integral motion. Natsir's appointment also highlighted Masyumi's position as one of the major parties in Indonesia.

The formation of the cabinet by Natsir, who was appointed as the cabinet formator, was not easy. At the beginning of its formation, Natsir needed the support of at least 150 DPRS members, including from smaller parties such as Parkindo, the Catholic Party, and the Labor Party. In addition, support from the PNI as the party with the second most members after Masyumi in the DPRS was also needed to strengthen the cabinet's position.

However, the President cannot act arbitrarily to dissolve parliament. There is a provision in Article 84 of the UUDS, which states that after the dissolution of the DPR, new members of the DPR must be elected within 30 days.

The chair of the DPRS from PNI, Mr. Sartono, advised Natsir to always negotiate with the parliamentary deliberative committee consisting of 18 members from all factions in parliament on all matters.

As Natsir said, a *zaken* cabinet would be formed if the PNI decided not to join his cabinet. Negotiations for positions in the cabinet between Natsir and the PNI were tough. It was difficult for both parties to find an agreement regarding the position of the representatives of each party. Natsir, appointed by Sukarno to form the cabinet, wanted Masyumi to have more seats than other parties.

After all, Masyumi was the most prominent force in the DPRS. Natsir wanted Masyumi to get six cabinet seats, including the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Teaching. PNI also requested two posts. Natsir's difficulty in lobbying the PNI resulted in him returning the mandate to form a cabinet to Soekarno twice, but this was rejected. Natsir said that Soekarno wanted him to create a cabinet that was not too reliant on the parties' interests.

On 7 September 1950, the Natsir Cabinet was officially formed with 18 members. With the cabinet's composition, Natsir formed a coalition with 52% of DPRS members. Meanwhile, the PNI, which officially became the opposition in parliament along with the PKI and the Murba Party, emphasized that it would continuously monitor the cabinet's programs. However, at the beginning of the cabinet's formation, PNI was cautious in taking a stance as an opposition.

Without PNI in Natsir's cabinet, the government faced difficulty running its programs. Immediately after the cabinet formation, Natsir received much criticism for prioritizing the formation of a *zaken* cabinet rather than arranging a cabinet consisting of political parties that could strengthen the cabinet.

The chair of the DPRS from PNI, Mr. Sartono, advised Natsir to always negotiate with the parliamentary deliberative committee consisting of 18 members from all factions in parliament on all matters. This was so that the cabinet's programs could run smoothly and not be rejected by the parliament.

Meanwhile, in the first general assembly session held in early October 1950, parliamentary discussions focused on forming Natsir's cabinet. The option of dissolving the cabinet had emerged in parliamentary sessions. This proposal raised pros and cons. Natsir said that the presence of the opposition in a democratic country was a good thing as long as it was within reasonable limits. He also emphasized that he needed support in parliament so that cabinet programs could be run, with one of the most critical agendas being the general election.

Until the second general session of parliament was held in mid-October 1950, the discussion of the session was still centered on the issue of cabinet formation.

During its development, a motion for the dissolution of the cabinet emerged. This proposal was submitted by Mohammad Yamin, a non-party member of parliament who received support from several members of parliament. Yamin said that the formation of the cabinet was aligned with the *trimarga* consisting of Islam, Nationalism, and Socialism but only covered a part of it. Masyumi opposed the motion to dissolve the cabinet.

There was a split of attitudes in the parliamentary debates regarding the formation and composition of Natsir's cabinet. However, in the end, the parliament granted a vote of confidence to Natsir's cabinet. Although he often received criticism for not involving PNI in cabinet preparation and for his reluctance to account for the cabinet formation to the parliament, in a session held at the end of October 1950, Natsir's cabinet managed to secure a vote of confidence from the parliament. A total of 118 MPs supported the cabinet, while 73 rejected it.

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The crisis experienced by Natsir's cabinet reached its peak in early 1951 when the opposition in parliament led by the PNI filed the Hadikusumo motion.

Another problem faced by the DPRS at that time was related to the appointment of a vice president who would accompany the president in carrying out his duties. At that time, the DPRS had the right to propose the name of a vice presidential candidate to the president. This was aligned with the contents of Article 45 of the 1950 Constitution regarding the appointment of a vice president. Initially, five names appeared to be nominated in the vice-presidential election: Mohammad Hatta, Ki Hajar Dewantara, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Sartono, and Alimin.

The proposed names were then changed. New names appeared, such as Nerus Ginting Suka, Sutan Syahrir, Mohammad Yamin, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, and M. Burhanuddin, resulting in eight proposed names for vice presidential candidates. In the voting session to suggest names for vice-presidential candidates, Mohammad Hatta received unanimous votes from members of parliament.

One of the challenging tasks carried out by Natsir's cabinet was to settle West Irian's status. In the first months of 1950, failure after failure to discuss the status of West Irian became commonplace between the Indonesian and Dutch governments. The difficulty of resolving the status of West Irian was caused by the differing views between the two parties. Indonesia believed that, according to the KMB agreement, West Irian

should be handed over to Indonesia no later than December 27, 1950, or exactly one year after the signing of the KMB. However, the Netherlands had always postponed it.

The DPRS, in its efforts to resolve the status of West Irian, took internal and external. Internal steps were taken by unanimously approving Silas Papare, chairman of the Indonesian Irian Independence Party (PKII), as a member of parliament and by encouraging the government to find ways to implement the motion. Meanwhile, external measures included establishing a parliamentary mission abroad. This mission explained to the visited countries that West Irian, as stipulated in the 1950 constitution, was part of Indonesia.

To determine its stance on the West Irian issue, the parliament held a vote at the end of the parliamentary general view session on the four submitted motions. The results showed that, in the early days of Natsir's cabinet, the parliament gave quite a significant support for government programs related to the West Irian problem.

The crisis experienced by Natsir's cabinet reached its peak in early 1951 when the opposition in parliament led by the PNI filed the Hadikusumo motion. The submitted motion was related to Government Regulation (PP) Number 39 of 1950 concerning the Establishment of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and its Government Council. This PP was born at the end of the Halim Cabinet administration in the Republic of Indonesia, which was still a state of RIS. Hadikusumo demanded the revocation of the PP and wanted more democratic elections for DPRD members.

This PP, which consisted of 8 chapters with 17 articles, was issued by the government because the law governing the election procedures for provincial DPRD and the regions it represented could not be implemented. With the issuance of PP No. 39 In 1950, all Regional People's Representative Councils were dissolved.

Hadikusumo's motion was filed in mid-January 1951, with strong support from the opposition and government-supporting parties (PIR, Parindra, and Parkindo), while another government-supporting party, PSI, decided to abstain. As a result, Hadikusumo's motion received the most parliamentary votes and gave the cabinet a crushing defeat. Seventy votes were in favor of the motion, while 48 were against it.

The downfall of Natsir's cabinet was going to happen sooner or later. Since the beginning, Natsir's cabinet faced many challenges from the parliament due to the failure to form the Masyumi-PNI coalition cabinet.

On March 20, 1951, opposition parties supporting the Hadikusumo Motion decided to walk out of the session. Some non-party lawmakers followed the move. PIR then withdrew its ministers from the cabinet, Minister of Justice Wongsonegoro and Minister of Public Works Herman Johannes. As a result, the cabinet could no longer carry out its program.

On April 26, 1951, the Sukiman cabinet was officially formed with 20 members. In mid-May 1951, Natsir and the Masyumi Leadership Council supported the Sukiman cabinet.

On March 21, 1951, Natsir decided to return his mandate to President Soekarno. This marked the end of Natsir's term of office after approximately six months. Soon after, President Soekarno appointed Mr. Sartono, a senior PNI figure, to become a cabinet formateur until a new cabinet was finally formed.

The downfall of Natsir's cabinet was going to happen sooner or later. Since the beginning, Natsir's cabinet faced many challenges from the parliament due to the failure to form the Masyumi-PNI coalition cabinet. Immediately, Mr. Sartono, who Sukarno appointed, tried to persuade Masyumi to build a coalition cabinet.

However, talks between the PNI and Masyumi did not reach a meaningful agreement. Sartono failed to attract Masyumi to the coalition cabinet he tried to build.

According to Sartono, the failure was caused by four things. First, Masyumi's disapproval of the cabinet program offered by Sartono in terms of foreign policy with the Netherlands. Second, Masyumi wished that the DPRD formed through PP No. 39 of 1950 be replaced with the latest regulations without freezing the DPRD's. Third, Masyumi demanded the post of Prime Minister, something the PNI could not provide. Fourth, Masyumi also demanded the Minister of Foreign Affairs position, which the PNI also expected.

On the other hand, although the PNI demanded the post of prime minister, Sartono himself rejected the possibility of him becoming prime minister. Sartono's failure to form a cabinet made President Soekarno appoint Sidik Djojokusarto (PNI) and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (Masyumi) as cabinet formateurs. It took eight days to form Natsir's cabinet replacement, which was longer than the five days that President Soekarno gave.

Sukiman maintained that the position of prime minister was Masyumi's right. The PNI initially refused, although it eventually accepted it on the condition that the proposed prime minister was no longer Mohammad Natsir. Sukiman agreed with the proposal despite the opposition from Natsir's camp. Disputes escalated between the two camps within Masyumi. On April 26, 1951, the Sukiman cabinet was officially formed with 20 members. In mid-May 1951, Natsir and the Masyumi Leadership Council supported the Sukiman cabinet.

Despite being in the same coalition, Masyumi and PNI had a turbulent relationship in the parliament. After each got five cabinet seats, relations between the two parties heated up due to a policy from the Minister of Home Affairs Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, who requested the DPRDs to stop all their activities. This request provoked Masyumi's anger.

The anger was well-founded. After all, Masyumi, which had many affiliated organizations, had benefited from the DPRD's election system (Article 4 PP No. 39 of 1950). Under the election system, which had been in effect until the Hadikusumo motion was introduced, Masyumi was able to control the majority of seats in the DPRD. The conflict began with Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo's decision to appoint PNI members as governors in West Java and Sulawesi, two Masyumi-controlled areas.

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After all, Indonesia's location in Southeast Asia had strategic advantages, with abundant natural resources. Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, made for a great industrial market for Western countries.

PNI's political stance showed that the coalition of the two parties was very fluid. The Masyumi-PNI coalition only lasted for two cabinet terms: the Sukiman cabinet and the Wilopo cabinet. During the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (1953–1955), Masyumi even appeared as an opposition for the first time during the Liberal Democracy period.

One of the most important things that stood out during the Sukiman cabinet was Indonesia's foreign policy stance. Previously, Indonesia's foreign policy was meant to be free and active. With this political attitude, Indonesia could have the freedom to play a role in international politics without having to side with a bloc during the Cold War.

Although Indonesia had expressed its impartial stance during the Cold War, the United States had its eye on Indonesia. After all, Indonesia's location in Southeast Asia had strategic advantages, with abundant natural resources. Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, made for a great industrial market for Western countries.

THE TRANSITION TO PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (1952-1954)

As one of the Southeast Asian countries undergoing a decolonization process in the 1950s, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia adopted the idea of a parliamentary government based on the European system of government.

THE multi-party democracy government system was considered the answer in the struggle for national independence as the previous single-party government system failed to represent the diversity of aspirations of the Indonesian people.

During the 1920s and 1930s, under Dutch colonialism, the nationalists had initiated an idea of parliament for Indonesia. However, in the 1960s, Indonesian figures such as Soekarno declared that the Western parliamentary government had failed Indonesia. And what the country needed was a government system "in harmony with the spirit of Indonesia," and that was "a democracy with leadership" or "Guided Democracy".

The failure of the parliamentary government system can be seen in the history of the Indonesian government in the 1950s. The government at the time had several characteristics: First, civilians dominated the government. Second, political parties held an important role. Third, there was healthy competition in democracy. Fourth, political elites greatly respected the symbols of democracy. Fifth, violations of civil liberties were minimal. And sixth, in line with the fifth point, there was a lack of coercion in politics.

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Arguably, in the 1950s, intellectuals held political power. Intellectuals here refer to high school or Western-university graduates who had constituted the country's political elite during the post-revolutionary period. This fact could be seen at least from the biographical research by Soelae-man Soemardi.

The research showed that high-school and university graduates constituted 83 percent of the 146 cabinet ministers between 1945 and 1954; 59 percent of the 234 parliament members in 1954; and 100 percent of the 61 highest-ranking civil servants in that period. He also found that 94 percent of ministers, 91 percent of parliamentarians, and all civil servants had received a Western education.

The Indonesian national revolution was led by such intellectuals, who had taken advantage of Western liberalism and radicalism and possessed the technical ability to take over a modern country and adequate knowledge of Western languages, Western law, and administrative procedures.

Intellectuals came to exercise power as an independent group. Nevertheless, although dominant in quantity, no intellectual could monopolize social control, even at the elite political level.

Their strength lay not in understanding how the modern state functioned but rather in limited political skills, in the ability to mediate and organize the politically governed masses, and to influence lower-level party leaders and mass organizations, or in other words, the technocrats.

One can then observe Indonesia's post-revolutionary political elites as divided into two main categories of leaders, intellectuals on the one hand, mass leaders on the other. Weak organization, lack of mass membership, and lack of internal cohesion, combined with the relatively important role of parliamentary representatives, defined most Indonesian parties as a weakly articulated group during this period. But at the same time, parties and party-linked organizations were already playing

an essential role in many small towns and villages, contributing to the process of transforming local and traditional loyalties into national and ideological ones and acting as agents of upward social mobility.

The state needed a long campaign ahead of the 1955 General Election to build organizational links between village-level activities and party activities at the national political level. Indonesian historiography often presents the early 1950s as the "difficult years". Significant issues characterizing Indonesia's situation at the time included separatist rebellions in many regions, increasing political tensions between right and left political forces and the highs and lows of the cabinet.

The president had no real power except to appoint formateurs to manage the cabinet. The process was part of a very complex political negotiation. The 1950s parliamentary democracy government system gave Indonesian history its characteristics.

Throughout the history of Indonesia, in its efforts towards building a democratic state, there have been three forms of "Indonesia": First, Indonesia as a country that had just gained independence and sovereignty. Second, Indonesia as a nation-state that was building a path towards democracy, freedom of the press, and welfare of its citizens, which included efforts to advance education and strengthen its courts of law. And third, the neverending struggle for political power. In this case, the state became an arena for fighting political interests that limit bureaucratic professionalism.

Approaching 1952, the Sukiman Cabinet, the second cabinet established during the Parliamentary Democracy period, fell after being hit by the Mutual Security Act (MSA) issue between the Indonesian government and the United States. This issue was the most decisive factor in the downfall of the cabinet. Unlike its predecessor, Sukiman's cabinet, officially called the coalition cabinet, actually had strong parliamentary support.

The president had no real power except to appoint the formateurs to manage the cabinet. The process was part of a very complex political negotiation.

The restructuring of the armed forces during the Wilopo Cabinet was also considered one of the best achievements in Parliamentary Democracy.

After the Sukiman Cabinet ended, the government was continued by the Wilopo Cabinet. The Wilopo Cabinet was a crucial period in Indonesia's political history and a turning point in Indonesia's governance in the post-revolutionary period. The Wilopo Cabinet was the last cabinet for the Indonesian government system to accept a parliamentary system.

During this period, political disputes between the Islamic group (Masyumi) and the secular nationalist party weakened the parliament. During the Wilopo Cabinet, the political elite was polarized into what was known as solidarity makers (political leadership) and administrators (technocrats).

During the Wilopo administration, the DPR had a significant role in various important events. In the early years of the Wilopo Cabinet, the DPR demanded a reorganization of the Ministry of Defense and the removal of the Army leadership in response to the military's opposition to troop reductions. This led to the October 17, 1952 massive military and civilian demonstration at the Presidential Palace demanding the DPR be disbanded. However, the restructuring of the armed forces during the Wilopo Cabinet was also considered one of the best achievements in Parliamentary Democracy.

In connection with the general election planned in 1955, the Wilopo Cabinet had already made preparations for the General Election Bill. Although introduced in 1951, the draft was not passed until 1953, and new elections were held in 1955. The results of the 1955 General Election also surprised many. The votes obtained by the Indonesian Socialist Party and Masyumi were lower than that of the PKI. After the general election, the PNI and Masyumi had 57 seats, Nahdlatul Ulama had 45 seats, and the PKI had 39 seats. There were 28 parties in parliament, an increase in number compared to the 20 parties before the election.

The Wilopo Cabinet bears similarities to its predecessor, the Sukiman Cabinet, which relied on the two main parties holding the majority of votes. However, there were some fundamental differences in the government under the Wilopo Cabinet. First, this cabinet represented different factional groups from both sides. The new structure was later known as the “young generation” cabinet, while its predecessor was called the “older generation” cabinet.

The Wilopo Cabinet had several points basing its government’s work, which did not offer significant differences from the Natsir Cabinet and the Sukiman Cabinet. However, Wilopo affirmed his position regarding civil-military relations. He stated that most countries had reached a stage when security could be maintained by civilian authorities.

Therefore, according to him, the government intended to lift the “military emergency” status imposed under the regulation in 1939. As of June 3, this revocation had been carried out for South Sumatra and should therefore be carried out for the entire country by July, provided that a lighter martial law would take effect in certain areas deemed unsafe.

Following the policies issued, the main focus of the Wilopo government was on the economic situation and state financial problems. In this situation, “savings” in the economic sector was the keyword that indicated the main feature of the Wilopo Cabinet. At that time, Dr. Sumitro returned to the cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Following the policies issued, the main focus of the Wilopo government was on the economic situation and state financial problems. In this situation, “savings” in the economic sector was the keyword that indicated the main feature of the Wilopo Cabinet.

Since the inauguration of the Wilopo Cabinet by President Soekarno, the general election has always been an important issue that has received significant attention. One of the Wilopo Cabinet's leading programs was to hold general elections for the Constituent Assembly and the Regional Council.

The most spectacular efforts made for the economy were related to the rationalization of the army. Conservative factions within the military and conservative political elements opposed the efforts, resulting in the failed rationalization in October 1952. The attempt failed, and the result was disastrous for the rationalization supporters and a blow for cabinet leaders and their supporters.

One result of that policy, on the morning of October 17, a shocking demonstration began on the streets of Jakarta. A group of people, estimated at 5,000 men, broke into the parliament building and called for "Parliament is not a Coffee Shop". From there, they marched around the Old City, displaying well-painted banners calling for the dissolution of parliament and the holding of elections.

A crowd of 30,000 people demonstrated in front of the President's house. Then, through his extraordinary speech, President Soekarno scolded and calmed them down. President Soekarno firmly stated that there would be elections as soon as possible. He also said that he could not dissolve parliament that way, and if the people asked the President to do so, it would mean asking him to become a dictator.

The dissolution of the DPR was one of the issues in the Incident of October 17, 1952. In a situation of confusion and subsequent command shocks, parliament could reaffirm the principle of civilian control over the military.

It was also a challenge for politicians to immediately carry out general elections in a short period. Then, in April 1953, the passing of a law related to the general election finally came to light. Elections for members of the DPR were done in September 1955, while elections for members of the Constituent Assembly were planned for December 1955.

Many factors emphasize the DPR's vital role in accepting or rejecting the cabinet program. Members of the DPR considered the Wilopo Cabinet a cabinet that put forward parliamentary values and democratic rights. In general, the parties that existed were far from being disciplined. The control exercised by the top party leadership could reach areas far from the center of power.

Wilopo stated that the government had carried out sufficient research and preparation to establish a suitable electoral system for Indonesia. Therefore, the next thing that had to be done was to prepare the Bills for General Elections.

Since the inauguration of the Wilopo Cabinet by President Soekarno, the general election became an important issue that received significant attention. One of the Wilopo Cabinet's leading programs was to hold general elections for the Constituent Assembly and the Regional Council. The prospect of an early general election was taken much more seriously once this cabinet took office. One of his first acts was introducing a bill for voter registration in July.

On the general election and establishing a Constituent Assembly in the regions, DPR members voiced differing opinions on the government's statement regarding the Wilopo Cabinet during a public opinion meeting. The government had decided to lean towards a direct election system.

For the DPR, the initial stage in resolving general election problems was to recommend the Wilopo Cabinet immediately form a special agency (institution) to deal with general election issues. These institutions would have the authority and ability to resolve constituent and parliamentary problems at the central and regional levels.

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The first general election in Indonesia was a significant event in the history of the Republic of Indonesia in the 10 years since its foundation and in the history of parliamentary institutions in Asia.

Structurally, the DPR encouraged the government to place the general election agency under the leadership of the Prime Minister. In addition, the institution was based in Jakarta, with branch offices and branches located in every provincial capital, district, and municipality.

The first general election in Indonesia was a significant event in the history of the Republic of Indonesia in the 10 years since its foundation and in the history of parliamentary institutions in Asia. This general election has placed democracy in Indonesia's socio-political trial. It was a resounding victory for the forces of democracy that Indonesians proved they can pass the test in exercising their voting rights. Indonesian voters had debunked the fears, forecasts, and grim criticism that democracy would wither in Indonesia.

1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION:

THE FIRST CELEBRATION OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

Although delayed for almost a decade – the general election was supposed to be held in January 1946 – the 1955 general election was a historical record of the Indonesian people’s success in organizing a democratic political system as a newly independent country.

THE success of organizing a democratic party for the first time in Indonesia’s history gave birth to optimism among the leaders and all the people of Indonesia. The first general election held in September 1955 dismissed the views and predictions of the Western press, which were pessimistic about the Indonesian government’s ability to organize a democratic party.

Held on September 29, 1955, the elections were set for 260 seats, with each seat representing 300,000 votes. The elections were held by the Indonesian Election Committee (PPI), which had branches in 16 regions. In the 1955 General Election, there were 96,000 polling stations (TPS) throughout Indonesia.

The election results recorded the election of 272 members of parliament. The number consisted of 257 people elected in the election. Three were chosen to represent the West Irian region, six were selected to represent the European minority, and six were appointed as representatives of the Chinese minority. In addition, the President appointed an additional 15 members outside the election.

The inauguration of DPR members as a result of the 1955 general election was held on March 20, 1956. The President carried out the inauguration, which was attended by members of the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, which had just received the baton from the Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet, and members of the Provisional DPR.

The first election was implemented according to the 1950 Constitution, which regulated matters regarding the President and other high institutions. UUDS was a modification of the RIS Constitution; along with the dissolution of the RIS and the stipulation of Indonesia as a unitary state on August 17, 1950, the government had to modify the federal constitution to suit the unitary state design.

Based on UUDS, "members of the People's Representative Council are elected in a general election by citizens who meet the requirements and according to the rules established by law". Article 56 of the law states that every 300,000 Indonesian citizens shall have a representative in the DPR.

As with the general democratic tradition, the general election is preceded by a campaign and installation of each party's logos to attract the masses and convey party ideas. The public will then choose the logo of one of the parties they are interested in.

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the baton from the Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet, and members of the Provisional DPR. From the results of the September 1955 elections, 272 members were appointed. The DPR's leadership was formed to allow power balance among the parties participating in the election. The composition of the leadership of the DPR was as follows:

- Speaker: Mr. Sartono (PNI)
- Vice Speaker I: H. Zainul Arifin (NU)
- Vice Speaker II: Arudji Kartawinata (PSII)
- Vice Speaker III: Zainul Abidin Achmad (Masyumi)

The PKI, who occupied the 4th most prominent position in the parliament, had not managed to secure a seat in the DPR leadership. The political dynamics at that time benefited PSII. PSII, which had only eight representatives in parliament, succeeded in placing Arudji Kartawinata in the DPR leadership as Vice Speaker II.

As mentioned above, the elected DPR had 10 committees. Today, the committees go by the term “commission”. The DPR appointed commission members after considering factions and individual members’ requests. Then, members of the concerned commission elected the commission head at the first meeting in a session.

The committees’ task was to supervise government policies according to their respective field of duties. The minister might attend the committees’ meeting at the DPR Speaker’s invitation to discuss matters. This meeting was called *rapat kerja* or a working meeting. In addition to holding working meetings, a committee could also have its meetings without ministers or government representatives. The results of the committee meeting discussion were brought to the plenary meeting for a decision.

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NEW PARLIAMENT, NEW HOPE:

THE INDONESIA PARLIAMENT (1955-1957)

1955-1959 was an important period in the history of the Indonesian parliament. During this period, the parliament was filled by representatives who the people directly elected for the first time.

THE first election was overshadowed by the unstable condition of the Republic, in particular the various security disturbances caused by the emergence of an armed separatist group. This armed group spread terror and fear in society and attempted to delegitimize the central government's power. This condition was exacerbated by the occurrence of divisions within the military.

Meanwhile, among the main parties, namely Masyumi, PNI, NU, and PKI, there was also intense friction in their efforts to influence public opinion and access power. Coalition and feuds between the party's inconsistent groups, fierce polemics between parties were visible in the period leading up to the election.

The conditions above were grounds for the international community's doubt that elections in Indonesia could be carried out properly. The failure of the election could discredit the Indonesian government and could further plunge this nation into division and disintegration. The West, driven by the Dutch press, believed that the elections in Indonesia would not be successful and would cause various disturbances that hurt Indonesia. This attitude was deliberately promoted by the Dutch, who had their interests in some of Indonesia's Dutch-controlled areas.

Fortunately, the 1955 General Election was a success. As a result, the people's representatives had strong legitimacy to voice the people's aspirations and become a counterweight and opposition to the government. Conditions like this have become the hallmark of a democratic (liberal) political life. In addition, during this period, Indonesia succeeded in organizing a major event by mobilizing the solidarity of third-world coun-

tries in Asia and Africa through the Asia-Africa Conference, held in April 1955 in Bandung. This event had helped increase the prestige and role of Indonesia in the international political arena.

The Asia-Africa Conference (KAA) generated a vital momentum in the international political landscape that significantly impacted Indonesia's domestic politics. An example was the increasing international support for Indonesia's struggle to "reclaim" West Irian from the Dutch. In addition, the KAA more or less "mediated" and "calmed" diplomatic tensions between several Asian countries that previously took either side of the blocs in the Cold War.

When he became Prime Minister of the United States of Indonesia, Hatta decided that Indonesia should not side with any bloc but remain active in world peace politics, which became known as "Free and Active Politics." The DPR as the government's partner representing the people's aspirations, also played an active role in controlling and supporting Indonesia's foreign policy, including expediting the West Irian return to Indonesia.

Various problems faced by the government and the state, such as economic problems (trade, shipping) also received significant attention from the DPR. In addition, during this period, especially in 1958, Indonesia as a unitary state was subjected to various rebellions that undermined the central government's authority and threatened the existence of this country. Here we can see how the DPR positioned itself to solve these crucial problems.

The 1955-1959 period saw three cabinet or government changes (Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, and Djuanda Cabinet). The Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959 marked Indonesia's return to the 1945 Constitution, which complicated the DPR's position as its members were elected under the 1950 Constitution.

The DPR as the government's partner representing the people's aspirations, also played an active role in controlling and supporting Indonesia's foreign policy, including expediting the West Irian return to Indonesia.

The pressure to resign was not due to the cabinet's lack of representation in the parliament, Constituent Assembly, or DPR. On the contrary, Burhanuddin Harahap's appointment as Prime Minister in 1955 was a logical consequence of the parliamentary system.

The government's fate was significantly affected by the vote results in the elections held on September 29, 1955. After the mandate handover from the Ali Sastroamidjojo I Cabinet to the government, on the recommendation of Vice President Moh. Hatta, Burhanuddin Harahap from Masyumi was appointed as the new cabinet formator. Led by Masyumi, a new cabinet was formed with a grand coalition of 12 parties.

However, attempts to get the PNI into the new governing coalition were unsuccessful. The Masyumi-PNI conflict occurred because of problems with the cabinet composition. Masyumi rejected the candidates proposed by the PNI to sit in the coalition cabinet. Differences of opinion between the PNI and Masyumi in determining the new government structure erased the hopes of many parties, including Hatta, for a strong government.

Not even a month after the election, the public exerted pressure on PM Burhanuddin Harahap's government to resign. However, the pressure to resign was not due to the cabinet's lack of representation in the parliament, Constituent Assembly, or DPR. On the contrary, Burhanuddin Harahap's appointment as Prime Minister in 1955 was a logical consequence of the parliamentary system.

President Soekarno had authorized forming a new cabinet after Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI gave up his mandate. After that, the Burhanuddin Cabinet held elections which the Ali Cabinet programmed. So, the Burhanuddin Cabinet would hand over its mandate without being asked to resign after the election winner was known and ready to form a new cabinet.

Hatta considered that the difficulty in forming a cabinet was due to too many parties in parliament. Because of this, he once suggested finding a way to streamline the parties.

After holding the election, the Indonesian Elections Committee (PPI) announced the official names of candidates for the new DPR members on March 1, 1956. On this basis, President Soekarno appointed Ali Sastroamidjojo again to be the formator of the cabinet, a manifestation of power in the DPR, with the hope that the newly formed government would get the parliament's support.

Exactly a week after the announcement of the PPI above, on March 8, 1956, Ali Sastroamidjojo had assumed the task of forming a cabinet and was given one week, until March 16, to create a government. On March 24, 1956, the composition of the Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo II was ratified by the President through Presidential Decree No. 85. In his meeting with parliament on April 9, 1956, PM Ali Sastroamidjojo introduced all the members of his cabinet, which consisted of 24 people.

As one of the programs of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, the DPR of the 1955 General Election — born not long after the formation of the people's DPR and the ratification of the Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet — produced the Law on Cancellation of the KMB Agreement.

The government and the DPR had prepared various things, including anticipating international developments resulting from Indonesia's unilateral withdrawal from the KMB agreement. In anticipating this, the government formed a committee to accommodate problems, named the State Committee for Advisory on the Resolution of the Cancellation of K.M.B. This committee was tasked with giving consideration to the government to resolve the consequences caused by the cancellation of the KMB agreements entirely. This committee consisted of the government and the DPR.

The DPR continued to oversee the implementation of the law that canceled the KMB agreement and the government's anticipation of the impacts resulting from the cancelation of the deal that bounded Indonesia with the country that colonized it. The DPR's emphasis and concern were on the issue of Indonesia's sovereignty as an independent country, which must be reflected in every policy implemented by the government of the Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet.

On March 24, 1956, the composition of the Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo II was ratified by the President through Presidential Decree No. 85.

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The following year after the election that resulted in the DPR's formation, Indonesians voted for the Constituent Assembly, whose task was to draft the Constitution. On December 15, 1955, a general election was held to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly. One seat in the Constituent Assembly required 150 votes or half of the members of the DPR. Of the total number of seats assigned by the PPI, as many as 520, only 514 seats filled the Constituent membership.

Of the dominant parties of the 1955 general election, the composition of power in the Constituent Assembly was as follows: PNI had 119 seats, Masyumi 112, Nahdlatul Ulama 91, and PKI 60. Wilopo, a PNI political figure who had served as Prime Minister from March 19, 1952 to June 2, 1953, was elected as Head of the Constituent Assembly.

In the Constituent Assembly, a Constitutional Preparatory Committee (PPK) was formed, consisting of several commissions, including (1) the Household Commission, (2) the Deliberation Commission, (3) the Constitutional Commission, (4) the Term Commission, (5) the Formulating Commission, and (6) Editorial Commission. In the Constitutional Commission, several commissions were formed. There were four commissions within the Constituent Assembly:

- I. The State Ideology Commission or Constitutional Commission I with 61 members
- II. Human Rights Commission
- III. Commission on Forms of Government
- IV. Regional, Language, National Emblem, and National Anthem Commission

Unfortunately, due to heterogeneous membership that often affected partial interests, the Constituent Assembly did not perform its main task as the creator of the Constitution as expected.

The Constituent Assembly repeated its previous year's failure to produce expected results. Consequently, there was unrest among the people and the members of the Council themselves.

Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly was a representative institution mandated by the RIS Constitution and the 1950 Constitution. This institution was a manifestation of the desire of the Indonesian people to have a constitution made by representatives of all Indonesian people. In 1956–1959, the Constituent Assembly conducted various essential discussions and debates regarding the ideal constitutional structure for the Indonesian nation. However, the sharp ideological disparity must be stopped by a Presidential Decree. The Constituent's background as a product of a liberal system became the reason for the dissolution of the constitution-making institution amid the idea of Guided Democracy that the government was intensively promoting at the time.

Unlike the Constituent Assembly, the DPR, which has inherited the parliamentary tradition since Indonesia's independence, had slowly become a very agile institution in balancing the government's performance and guarding the people, nation, and state's interests. As a newly established country, several national and social issues in Indonesia required the attention of parliament as a partner of the government. Very notable was the role of parliament in supporting the government's efforts to gain international recognition by passing laws on cooperation in bilateral relations and trade with various countries at the beginning of Indonesia's independence.

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in the five-year era of the Provisional DPR/DPRS (August 1950 to March 1956), there had been five government (cabinet) changes, and during the 1955 DPR's terms of office, there were at least three cabinet changes.

In the era of parliamentary democracy, the role of parliament was very central in maintaining the “common thread” of the state’s vision and mission. The government was less stable due to the cabinet’s frequent highs and lows as it did not receive the people’s trust.

For example, in the five-year era of the Provisional DPR/DPRS (August 1950 to March 1956), there had been five government (cabinet) changes, and during the 1955 DPR’s terms of office, there were at least three cabinet changes. Consequently, the government could not fully carry out its programs and policies, as the DPR, whose function was to connect and glue governmental policies together, came and went.

PARLIAMENT AND THE EFFORTS TO ARRIVE AT A NEW CONSTITUTION (1957-1960)

Efforts to return to a presidential form of government began to surface through Soekarno's political ideas and the conception of the President.

ON February 21, 1957, President Soekarno had discussed a Gotong-Royong Cabinet, which would represent all existing parties and functional groups. However, this discourse was opposed by several parties such as Masyumi, PSII, NU, Catholic, and PRI. This refusal was based on the fact that changing the constitutional system was the domain and task of the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, it should be left to the Constituent Assembly in the parties' opinion.

The discourse proposed by President Soekarno was known as the "Presidential Conception". With an intent to save the nation and the state from the difficulties it faced, Soekarno stated his proposal with the following points:

1. The Western system of parliamentary democracy (liberal democracy) is not suitable for Indonesia's identity. Opposition in DPR, which consistently attempts to overthrow the Government, does not match the Indonesian identity. Therefore, the Parliamentary Democracy system must be replaced with a Guided Democracy system, cooperative democracy, a democracy led by the wisdom of deliberation.
2. In order to implement this Guided Democracy system, it is necessary to form a Gotong Rojong Cabinet, whose members must consist of all parties, and an organization based on the balance of power that exists in society. By implementing the Gotong Rojong Conception, the opposition in DPR, the differences of opinion in the DPR, should be used to seek improvement and progress, not merely overthrow the existing government.

3. Establishment of the National Council. Members of the National Council consist of functional groups in society. Its main task is to provide advice to the Cabinet, whether requested or not. The functional groups are workers, peasants, intellectuals, national businessmen, youth, women, the 1945 generation, religious scholars, Protestant-Catholics, people who carry regional votes, chief of staff, police chief, Attorney General, and several ministers.
4. Formation of the Four-Leg Cabinet. The president's conception calls for the formation of a Four-Leg Cabinet, in which the major parties, namely PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI, are intended to create national cooperation.

The President's conception, in principle, reduced the power of the 1955 DPR. President Soekarno felt that the various problems that occurred and the political instability that endangered the life of the nation and the state stemmed from the DPR's opposition, which he considered destructive. The President linked it to the liberal democratic system, which he opposed. As an alternative to that system, the President adopted the concept of Guided Democracy, which put forward the principle of *gotong royong*. Then the President interpreted the cooperation by appointing representatives following the balance of power in society. That's where the term "Four Legs" came from, a nod to the strength of the four main parties that won the 1955 General Election.

Since the Presidential Conception was delivered in 1957, there had been a tug-of-war between the government and the President versus the parliament and society. The discourse itself raised concerns about strengthening the President's power and the death of democracy.

However, under the pretext of saving the country, Soekarno succeeded in convincing various groups of the importance of the conception he proposed.

Soekarno's political ideas became a milestone for the discourse on returning to the 1945 Constitution. After the Presidential Conception was delivered, steps were taken to realize the political views implicated in the conception. Soekarno then sought the formation of a new

cabinet without adjustment to the composition of seats in parliament. The new cabinet was eventually formed under the name of the *Karya Cabinet*.

This new cabinet began when President Soekarno held a closed meeting at the State Palace with several community leaders and political organization figures to discuss the cabinet's formation and choose the right person to lead this cabinet. In this new cabinet, Soekarno wanted its members not to come from political parties as it was not founded based on the interests of political parties.

After holding the meeting on April 4, 1957, President Soekarno took a stand by appointing citizens as members. Soekarno acted as a cabinet formator. On April 4, 1957, a meeting was held to form an extra-parliamentary cabinet of professionals (*zaken kabinet ekstraparlemen*).

The President emphasized that the cabinet should be formed as an emergency. The cabinet's composition was no longer concerned about the strengths that existed in the DPR but with the expertise and skills of the appointed ministers.

The meeting agreed on a name Juanda, who neither came from any political party nor government. As a cabinet formator, Soekarno succeeded in forming an Extra-parliamentary Emergency Cabinet with Juanda as prime minister.

The cabinet, formed based on Presidential Decree Number 108 of 1957 and inaugurated on April 9, 1957, by Soekarno, was named *Zaken Cabinet* or *Kabinet Karya* (Cabinet of Work). This cabinet did not have political party elements, and its establishment was not based on political parties' interests. This cabinet mainly consisted of professionals in their respective fields, although some ministers came from political parties.

As a cabinet formator, Soekarno succeeded in forming an Extra-parliamentary Emergency Cabinet with Juanda as prime minister.

This Extra-Parliamentary Emergency Cabinet (*Kabinet Karya*) program was called *Panca-Karya*, which comprised:

1. Form the National Council
2. Normalize the Republican State
3. Continue the Implementation of the KMB Cancellation
4. Fight for West Irian
5. Intensify Development

After the cabinet programs were compiled, the Djuanda Cabinet reported them to the DPR beginning May 17, 1959. Discussion of these programs in the DPR did not experience any difficulties and did not face many challenges. Therefore, the parliament allowed the cabinet to work. In addition, this shows that, although different from the previous cabinet formation, the Karya Cabinet was still responsible to the DPR.

With the formation of the Karya Cabinet, the government overlooked the power in the DPR, focusing instead on the ministers' respective expertise. At the beginning of its term, this cabinet did not meet President Soekarno's expectations as conveyed in the Presidential Conception. Moreover, this cabinet could not be called a four-leg cabinet, as representatives from the PKI as one of the four parties that won the election were not included, even though a few PKI sympathizers were appointed as ministers in the *Karya* Cabinet. Nonetheless, this was the cabinet with the most extended lifespan compared to some of the previous cabinets.

In addition to the criticisms made regarding the formation of this cabinet, Juanda as prime minister also had to face various problems, including the tension between President Soekarno and Vice President Moh. Hatta in 1956 when Hatta resigned from the vice-presidential seat; the

With the formation of the Karya Cabinet, the government overlooked the power in the DPR, focusing instead on the ministers' respective expertise.

emergence of regional upheaval due to the disparity between the central and regional governments; and the issue of reclaiming West Irian, which previous cabinets also had not been able to resolve.

The PRRI-Permesta rebellion, which occurred during the Juanda Cabinet, could not be separated from several opposition groups from Masjumi and PSI that began to push for their position in the central government. Some of these parties' political elites even chose to join the Council of Struggle formed by the military commander in the troubled areas. Together with the dissident commanders, these political elites demanded broad regional autonomy in the economic sector.

On this basis, they then put forward the "Charter of the Struggle to Save the Country"; the content of which was to propose that Mohammad Hatta and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX become cabinet formateurs to replace the Juanda Cabinet, who was deemed unable to overcome political tensions.

If their proposal was not accepted, the Struggle Council threatened to take their policies and consider themselves "free from the obligation to obey Sukarno as Head of State". The proposal was submitted to President Soekarno, Prime Minister Juanda, Mohammad Hatta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and the chair of parliament. But Juanda rejected the proposal.

This refusal then provoked a reaction from the rebels, who established a rival government. The Council of Struggle declared the establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) on February 15, 1958 in Bukittinggi. PRRI was supported by Permesta in North Sulawesi, making this rebellion be better known as PRRI-Permesta.

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Various efforts made by the government succeeded in thwarting the rebels' attempts to attract sympathy from neighboring countries. These rebels' actions ended as the Minister of Foreign Affairs released an announcement on June 26, 1958. The statement informed the fall of Manado into the hands of the Indonesian Armed Forces, which ended the rebellion in February 1958. The government also stated that since the beginning, the uprising — which attempted to attract the sympathy of other countries under the pretext of an anti-communist movement — never received the people's support.

Apart from peaceful means, military efforts through the TNI's Rapid Action Operation were also taken to stop the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in mid-1958. The involvement of political elites in PRRI-Permesta tarnished the prestige of the related political parties.

Amid efforts to resolve the upheavals in the region and the struggle for the liberation of West Irian, the Djuanda Cabinet or the *Karya* Cabinet's achievements were recognized even by the international community. This achievement was echoed by the Djuanda Declaration, which later became the beginning of the recognition of Indonesia as an archipelagic country.

The Djuanda Declaration began when the Djuanda Cabinet held a meeting on December 13, 1959, to discuss the crisis in the country. The discussion narrowed down to the Dutch's show of strength through their warships in the Java Sea and the waters of East Indonesia. In the face of this incident, a cabinet meeting decided to draft a law to prevent the Dutch's actions from happening again. However, after going through negotiations, it was agreed that the Indonesian government must immediately respond to the Dutch actions. The Cabinet then agreed to issue a statement that became known as the Djuanda Declaration.

The Djuanda Declaration received attention from the international community, including some negative responses. Nevertheless, Indonesia continued to promote the idea of an archipelagic country, as stated in the declaration. Indonesia's efforts continued at international forums, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, held in 1958. The government also attempted to turn the declaration into law to become a force in the struggle to reclaim West Irian.

Due to the government crisis surrounding the Djuanda Declaration, the law on Indonesian territorial waters based on the declaration could only be promulgated after the 1959 Presidential Decree. The law was drafted not to be discussed and approved by the DPR but as a governmental emergency law.

Due to the government crisis surrounding the Djuanda Declaration, the law on Indonesian territorial waters based on the declaration could only be promulgated after the 1959 Presidential Decree.

MILITARY AS A POLITICAL POWER

TNI's success in crushing the PRRI-Permesta rebellion under General Nasution further increased Nasution and the military's political power.

IN this liberal era, a government with a Parliamentary Democracy system affected political and economic developments as well as defense and security developments. The military experienced an expansion of power, especially when viewed from their involvement in the economy and politics.

The military, especially the Army, had a duty to deal with political turmoil in various parts of Indonesia, which caused the government to declare a state of emergency. However, the Army used this emergency to involve itself in state matters.

With the legitimacy of the Presidential Conception and with the doctrine of the Middle Way initiated by General Nasution, the Army began to be directly involved in government. The 1956–1958 period showed the Army's influence in the Indonesian political system and the shift in its role.

The law-backed state of emergency paved the way for the Army to have an essential role in security and defense as well as in politics, general administration, and the economy. After showing its strength in overcoming the insurgency, the military demanded more governmental roles.

General A. H. Nasution, who led the Army, succeeded in controlling and unifying the political interests of the Army. To make itself a central force in the government, the Army began to point out the weaknesses of Parliamentary Democracy. It demanded a change in the government sys-

tem by proposing a return to the 1945 Constitution. Working together with Soekarno, the Army developed a framework for implementing Guided Democracy.

The Army's steps towards Guided Democracy were a reaction to the emerging government crisis. In reality, expanding the military's political role was not an intentional plan to fulfill the military leaders' political ambitions. Nevertheless, the Army's reactionary move demonstrated the Army's preparedness to take advantage of unexpected opportunities.

At the end of Parliamentary Democracy, the consolidated power within the Army allowed its leaders to take strategic steps to put pressure on the government.

Facing the critical years at the end of the Parliamentary Democracy period, the military intensified pressure on political parties, the government, and the President from 1958 onwards. In this case, under martial law, the Army reacted to the current government crisis by continuing to pressure the National Council to speed up its work.

In addition, the Army also pressured Soekarno to immediately approve the Army's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. The efforts were successful, and the Army became even more involved in the government, particularly in designing the implementation of Guided Democracy. Soon, it became a force in the Guided Democracy government.

The Guided Democracy system of government allowed the military to have an active role in state affairs. In addition, as a counterweight, Sukarno paved the way for PKI to become a vital part of the government. The military provided organizational support for President Soekarno.

The Army became even more involved in the government, particularly in designing the implementation of Guided Democracy. Soon, it became a force in the Guided Democracy government.

In 1959 – 1965, with Sukarno's support, army leaders expanded and maintained their positions in the non-military sector. The army was described as a central force.

Meanwhile, Soekarno also realized that the army's strength in the government needed to be balanced by the power of the mass that supported him. Thus, the PKI was chosen to be on Soekarno's other side. Both the Army and the PKI showed loyalty to President Soekarno. The conflict between the two had been resolved, and Soekarno's role as the mediator between these two great powers was necessary.

In 1959–1965, with Sukarno's support, army leaders expanded and maintained their positions in the non-military sector. The army was described as a central force. It was also told that the military continuously faced struggles against elements of the extreme left (the 1948 Madiun Rebellion and the attempted coup of 1965) and the extreme right (DI and PRRI/Permesta rebellions 1957–1961).

Relying on the military force had become the primary choice of resolving upheavals in various regions. Indeed, the military's strength was undeniable, so the demands for the military to have a role in the government continued to be made.

THE 1959 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE

President Soekarno inaugurated the Gotong Royong DPR (DPR-GR), whose members were appointed and inducted personally by him. This event also marked the end of the Parliamentary Democracy period.

SINCE being introduced by Soekarno in 1956, the idea of Guided Democracy slowly spread. Soekarno began to openly express his thoughts on Guided Democracy through speeches on the 1956 Youth Pledge Day and the 1956 PGRI Congress Reception. His speech emphasized Indonesia's unity crisis due to a disease he said came from political parties.

The government had been on the journey to uphold the idea of Guided Democracy since the *Karya* Cabinet period led by Djuanda. The cabinet was formed due to the emergence of the Presidential Conception on February 21, 1957. Apart from creating the *Karya* Cabinet, the Presidential Conception also gave rise to the National Council, which President Soekarno inaugurated on July 12, 1957. The National Council was meant to serve as an advisory body and accommodate inputs from outside the parliament.

In its journey, the National Council, led directly by Soekarno, moved quickly to replace the Parliamentary Democracy, practiced under the 1950 Constitution, with a new system. According to him, the Parliamentary Democracy system was not suitable for Indonesia's identity. Soekarno also saw that through the new system, the opposition in the DPR could no longer overthrow the Government.

Nasution believed that the 1945 Constitution would place the President in a strong position while holding him accountable to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR) for law approvals.

Therefore, this Parliamentary Democracy system must be replaced with a Guided Democracy system, a cooperative democracy, which was led by the wisdom of deliberation. Implementation methods were first discussed in the National Council, and the results were conveyed through the President to the government. Guided Democracy was implemented under the 1945 Constitution because the 1950 Constitution clearly could not become a solid basis for the new system.

Realizing that significant steps were needed to implement the Guided Democracy idea, Soekarno withdrew the idea. He felt that many people were surprised and not ready for the concept of Guided Democracy. It was only in 1959 that Soekarno reiterated the concept of Guided Democracy, accompanying it with the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution and forming the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Soekarno brought back this idea as the Constituent Assembly failed to make progress with the constitution.

In addition, the Army pressured the government, the President, and political parties to decide and support the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution. A. H. Nasution initiated the idea of return-

ing to the 1945 Constitution. Nasution, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, intended to pave the way for ideological and political stability and provide a political basis for security.

Nasution believed that the 1945 Constitution would place the President in a strong position while holding him accountable to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR) for law approvals. In addition, the 1945 Constitution allowed the presence of political parties and working groups that would serve as a forum for the military in the political arena.

Debates and fears of a military takeover began to emerge. So, on November 12, 1958, Nasution, in his speech at the Military Academy, Magelang, proposed the middle way doctrine. The doctrine emphasized the military's involvement in political affairs and incapacity for a takeover.

Nasution's speech dispelled rumors that the military, particularly the Army, would stage a coup against the government, and Indonesia would be ruled under a military dictatorship. However, the doctrine suggested threats and pressure from the Army to get involved in the government as a functional group. The speech seemingly declared that the Indonesian military was a political force to be reckoned with.

At the end of 1958, the National Council and the Cabinet began to support the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution. In addition, the ongoing martial law was extended for one year. Thus, the parliament was getting weaker. Meanwhile, the path to return to the 1945 Constitution was clear, as Soekarno began to buy into the idea.

The government then began to negotiate the steps to propose returning to the 1945 Constitution. But, first, the government was required to propose a return to the 1945 Constitution to the Constituent Assembly as a formal procedure based on the regulations contained in Article 134 of the 1950 Law. The President delivered the proposal on behalf of the government.

The entire Council finally approved the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution of Ministers through its session on February 19, 1959. On February 20, 1959, the Djuanda Cabinet officially approved the formulation of the recommendation to implement Guided Democracy in the context of returning to the 1945 Constitution. The proposal's manuscript was submitted to the DPR and the Constituent Assembly a day later. Finally, the government's decision was conveyed directly in the March 2, 1959 DPR session.

The entire Council finally approved the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution of Ministers through its session on February 19, 1959.

After the first session failed to obtain a unanimous vote, the second ballot was taken on June 1, 1959, attended by 469 people. The second ballot resulted in 264 votes in favor and 204 votes against.

The government also conveyed its decisions and statements to the DPR before the Constituent Assembly through a message to the Constituent Assembly delivered by President Soekarno on April 22, 1959 in Bandung.

The government decisions and statements showed the eroding power and diminishing confidence in the Constituent Assembly in its function as a constitution maker.

The Constituent Assembly held a vote to establish the 1945 Constitution as the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The preliminary hearing before the first vote held on May 30, 1959 determined that the vote was considered valid if two-thirds of the Constituent members present agreed. If less than two-thirds of the vote agreed, the assembly would hold a second vote on June 1, 1959, and the third vote on June 2, 1959.

In the first ballot on May 30, 1959, of the 478 Constituent members, 269 voted in favor and 199 against Indonesia's return to the 1945 Constitu-

tion. Therefore, because a quorum was not met, a second ballot was held on June 1, 1959.

After the first session failed to obtain a unanimous vote, the second ballot was taken on June 1, 1959, attended by 469 people. The second ballot resulted in 264 votes in favor and 204 votes against. A quorum was not met yet again.

A third vote was held on June 2, 1959, with 468 members in attendance. Of the 468 members, 263 voted in favor, 203 voted against. The third session received the public's attention. Many flocked to the Constituent Assembly at Gedung Merdeka, Bandung, to find out the outcome of the vote that would determine the fate of the Indonesian nation and state.

Meanwhile, amid uncertain conditions due to the Constituent Assembly's voting results stagnation, the government attempted to control the situation through A. H. Nasution as Chief War Supreme Ruler. Accordingly, Nasution issued Regulation of the Central War Authority/Army Chief

of Staff dated June 3, 1959, No. Prt/Peperpu/040/1959. The regulation contained the prohibition to carry out political activities throughout Indonesia.

Soekarno, in the end, chose another way to return to the 1945 Constitution, namely through a Presidential Decree, which was unconstitutional. However, many people accepted the decree as a solution because even the constitutional steps through the Constituent Plenary Session, which were filled by long debates, could not be fully realized. Moreover, the fear of the impending government crisis and pressure from the Army were driving forces behind Soekarno's presidential decree.

On July 5, 1959, Soekarno issued a Presidential Decree on Returning to the 1945 Constitution. Soekarno's crucial action was based on *staatsnoodrecht* or national safety law in a state of extreme danger. Through the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, Sukarno's ideas in the Presidential Concept stated two years earlier in 1957 were achieved. A copy of the decree:

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA/SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMY

ON THE RETURN TO THE 1945 LAW

BY THE GRACE OF GOD ALMIGHTY

WE, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA/
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMY,

Hereby solemnly declare:

Whereas, the recommendation of the President and the Government to return to the 1945 Constitution, delivered to all Indonesians by Presidential Mandate on April 22, 1959, did not obtain a decision from the Constituent Assembly as specified in the Provisional Constitution;

Whereas, in connection with the statement of the majority of Constituent Assembly members to no longer attend the session, the Constituent is no longer likely to deliver the task entrusted to it by the People;

Whereas, such a thing creates a state of constitution that endangers the unity and security of the State, Homeland, and Nation, and hinders the development of a just and prosperous society;

Whereas, with the support of most Indonesian People and driven by our own convictions, we are forced to take the only way to save the Proclamation State;

Whereas, we believe that the Jakarta Charter dated June 22, 1945, embodied the 1945 Constitution and was part of the series that made up the Constitution.

Therefore, on the grounds mentioned above,

WE, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA/
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMY

Establish the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly;

Establish that the 1945 Constitution shall again apply to the entire Indonesian Nation from the day this Decree is established and that the Provisional Constitution shall no longer be in effect.

The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, consisting of members of the House of Representatives and delegates from the regions and special groups, and the Provisional General Consideration Council will be established in the shortest possible time.

Established in Jakarta,

On July 5, 1959

On behalf of the Indonesian People:

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA/SUPREME
COMMANDER OF THE ARMY,

Signed,

SOEKARNO

The Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959 primarily emphasized that the 1945 Constitution had been reinstated to replace the Provisional Law. As a result, many changes occurred in Indonesian state institutions as a presidential system replaced the parliamentary system of government. Hence, the day after the decree, on July 6, 1959, Prime Minister Juanda immediately handed over his mandate before the parliament.

Following the issuance of the July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree, Lt. Gen. A. H. Nasution, as Army Chief of Staff, also issued an executive order. The order was addressed to all soldiers: enlisted, non-commissioned, and active-duty soldiers, as well as and all TNI employees. The order was to participate in carrying out the safety of the nation and state at important times to realize a life under the 1945 Constitution. For the interest of the state, concerning the maintenance of stability, security, and order, the Army Chief of Staff through the Government Regulations in lieu of Law (Peperpu) Information Coordinator confirmed that after the decree was issued, the Danger Act, along with the prohibition on political activities, would remain in effect.

After the July 5, 1959 Decree, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved and the MPRS was immediately formed. In addition, the 1955 DPR, formed based on the Provisional Law, was also affected by the decree. The President asked the 1955 DPR to continue working but adapting its operations to adhere to the 1945 Constitution. Through Presidential Decree Number 1 of 1959, dated July 22, 1959, concerning the House of Representatives, the DPR continued to work as a legislative body to support the decree's implementation.

The Presidential Decree also regulated the formation of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, the Provisional Supreme Advisory Council, and the adjustment of the National Design Council. In addition, several Presidential Decrees, namely numbers 1 to 4, were made according to the results of the Work Cabinet meeting on July 22, 1959, and were immediately promulgated on the same day. The Presidential stipulation was issued in implementing a decree so that changes, dissolution, formation, and appointment of leaders in state institutions supporting the government were immediately implemented.

The DPR, formed based on a parliamentary government in 1955, still operated but under the presidential government. The 1959 DPR was sworn in on July 23, 1959 at the State Palace by President Soekarno.

Although the idea had long been promoted, the July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree confirmed the conception of the Guided Democracy period. The transition from Parliamentary Democracy to Guided Democracy was also President Soekarno's attempt to strengthen his position as president so that he had the power to carry out his programs. So the implementation of guided democracy marked a transition from a parliamentary system, in which power was centered in the hands of political parties, to a presidential system with President Soekarno as the leading actor.

The DPR was one of the state institutions affected by the July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree. The DPR, which was elected according to the results of the 1955 General Election and operated based on UUDS, was asked to continue to carry out its functions by changing its order of business to adhere to the 1945 Constitution. After the decree's issuance, the DPR in that period was referred to as the 1959 DPR.

If we review its performance during the *Karya* Cabinet's (Djuanda Cabinet) administration, the 1955 DPR was productive in making and passing laws. From 1957 to 1958 alone, it passed 167 laws, not including those passed before the July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree, which totaled 29 laws in 1959.

In about five years of its tenure, the 1955 DPR actively produced products of law that were useful for the life of the nation and state. A total of 113 new laws were passed from the 145 government bills and 8 DPR bills.

The DPR, formed based on a parliamentary government in 1955, still operated but under the presidential government. The 1959 DPR was sworn in on July 23, 1959 at the State Palace by President Soekarno. Presidential Decree No. 157/1959 determined the same leadership for 1959, namely:

- Speaker: Mr. Sartono
- Vice Speaker I: H. Zainul Arifin
- Vice Speaker II: Arudji Kartawinata
- Vice Speaker III: H. Zainul Abidin Ahmad

The 1959 DPR had 18 factions. Factions were formed by members from the same party or group or those with the same political principles. However, not all DPR members got into a faction — four members, for example, decided not to join any faction.

After the issuance of the Presidential Decree, Prime Minister Juanda and the *Karya* Cabinet handed over their mandate on July 6, 1959. Thus, a new cabinet with a presidential system was formed, namely the *Kabinet Kerja* (Working Cabinet). The cabinet was ratified on July 9, 1959 based on Presidential Decree No. 153/1959. In Working Cabinet I, President Soekarno acted as prime minister. To assist him in settling government affairs in the Working Cabinet I, President Soekarno appointed Juanda as the first minister. The Working Cabinet ruled from 1959 to 1964, comprising Working Cabinet I, Working Cabinet II, Working Cabinet III, and Working Cabinet IV.

Article 1 of Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1959 stated that a Party was an organization of people's groups with a shared desire to achieve their goals as structured in the form of a State.

The members of the DPR-GR, appointed by President Soekarno, were no longer designated based on political party composition or power according to the 1955 General Election but based on societal groups, namely nationalists, Muslims, communists, Christian-Catholics, and functional groups.

In the Working Cabinet I's composition, not a single head of a major party was appointed as a minister, making it a non-party cabinet. Furthermore, to ensure that the new government was truly non-party, several ministers left their parties, including Soebandrio from the PNI and Leimena from the Indonesian Christian Party, marking a decrease of party influence in the cabinet.

In addition to avoiding dependency on the DPR, Soekarno also attempted to implement a fully guided political system by issuing Presidential Decree No. 7/1959 on Conditions and Simplification of Political Parties. The presidential decree revoked the Government's Declaration of November 3, 1945 regarding the recommendation to establish a political party. The government believed that many parties sprang up but failed to create political stability.

Article 1 of Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1959 stated that a Party was an organization of people's groups with a shared desire to achieve their goals as structured in the form of a State. The parties must accept and maintain the principles and objectives of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia according to the 1945 Constitution.

One of the conditions for a party to be established and acknowledged, as stated in Article 5, was to have branches spread across at least a quarter of Level I Regions throughout Indonesia. So, based on this understanding and conditions, some political parties that had existed since the 1955 General Election might face a simplification possibility.

Political parties are the pillars of strength in the parliament, meaningful in the government system, especially in the work of parliament as a government supervisor. However, the issuance of Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1959 concerning Conditions and Simplification of Political Parties increasingly caused conflict between the parliament and the government. The parliament felt threatened as the pillars of its power were “disturbed” by the president.

The Presidential Decree exacerbated the conflict between the government and the DPR, whose relationship was heating up due to the debate over the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget Plan (RAPBN). The open conflict between the parliament and the government culminated when the DPR rejected the 1960 State Budget Plan (RAPBN) proposed by the government.

Because the conflict over the RAPBN had escalated the tension between the parliament and the government, Soekarno issued Presidential Decree No. 3/1960 (State Gazette of 1960 No. 24) on March 5, 1960, implying that the 1955 DPR was disbanded and would be replaced by a new legislative structure.

In the inauguration ceremony of the deputy chair of the DPR-GR on January 5, 1961, President Soekarno reiterated that the position of the DPR-GR was as an assistant to the President/MPRS Mandate and to help the President implement everything set by the MPRS.

The DPR-GR's members came from nationalist, Islamic, communist, and Christian-Catholic political parties and a functional group. However, people outside the government felt that the composition was harmful. They believed that it would most likely birth a dominant group with a strong influence and position in the DPR.

This presidential stipulation was followed by the formation of a new DPR, known as the *Gotong-Royong* People's Representative Council (DPR-GR), through Presidential Decree No. 4/1960. With the disbandment of the DPR as a result of the 1955 General Election, the executive power strengthened, especially with Soekarno as president.

The structure of the *Gotong-Royong* DPR was finalized on June 24, 1960. Since then, the 1959 DPR had been officially replaced. The consolidation of the composition of the DPR-GR was carried out at the Tampaksiring Palace, Bali, by inviting the heads of three major parties, namely the PNI, NU, and PKI, as well as Colonel Wiluyo Pus-poyudo, who represented the Indonesian Army. The members of the DPR-GR were sworn in on June 25, 1960. The members of the DPR-GR, appointed by President Soekarno, were no longer designated based on political party composition or power according to the 1955 General Election but based on societal groups, namely nationalists, Muslims, communists, Christian-Catholics, and functional groups. Thus, members of the DPR-GR came from two major groups, namely political parties and the groups mentioned above.

The DPR-GR consisted of 283 members and was composed of 130 party representatives; highlights included 44 from the PNI, 34 from NU, and 30 from the PKI. Masyumi and PSI did not get seats in the new DPR.

The composition of the party representatives might imply Sukarno's objectives to establish unity between nationalism, Islam, and Marxism, a desire he had had since 1926. This composition of party representatives became known as the Nasakom doctrine (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). Then, 153 seats were allotted to functional groups such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, State Police, workers, farmers, Islamic leaders, youth, and scholars.

According to the book *20 Years of Indonesia's Independence*, all members of the DPR-GR were appointed by President Soekarno directly. Hence, the President himself also set the DPR-GR's regulations through Presidential Regulation Number 24 of 1960 and Presidential Regulation Number 32 of 1964. In his speech on June 25, 1960, the President stated that the task of the DPR-GR was to carry out the Political Manifesto, realize the People's Suffering Mandate, and implement Guided Democracy.

In the inauguration ceremony of the deputy chair of the DPR-GR on January 5, 1961, President Soekarno reiterated that the position of the DPR-GR was as an assistant to the President/MPRS Mandate and to help the President implement everything set by the MPRS.

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The various dynamics emerged after President Soekarno announced to dissolve the 1955 DPR and form a new “gotong-royong” DPR. As a legislative body, the two were quite different.

In fact, even further, according to General A. H. Nasution's confession in his book *Fulfilling the Call of Duty Volume 5*, President Soekarno deliberately appointed the heads of the legislative and judicial institutions as ministers. In this way, power was centralized as ministers must be held accountable to the President and ministries were subordinated under the President.

If an institution failed to follow the President's wish in performing its duties, the institution would be immediately dissolved and replaced with a new one. The State Apparatus Retooling Committee (Paran) under General Nasution was one of the institutions dissolved. Thus, the concerns of the League of Democrats and perhaps other parties who also rejected the dissolution of the 1955 DPR and the establishment of the DPR-GR became a reality.

The various dynamics emerged after President Soekarno announced to dissolve the 1955 DPR and form a new “gotong-royong” DPR. As a legislative body, the two were quite different. DPR-GR's membership was no longer based on the political or organizational power balance as was the case in the previous period.

The DPR-GR's members came from nationalist, Islamic, communist, and Christian-Catholic political parties and a functional group. However, people outside the government felt that the composition was harmful. They believed that it would most likely birth a dominant group with a strong influence and position in the DPR.

Various other slanted views about the DPR-GR emerged. The reactions that arose against the DPR-GR were rooted in the dissolution of the 1955 DPR. Since President Soekarno dissolved the DPR and announced the plan to form the DPR-GR, many had predicted the legislative institution's impending fate and position.

However, all the efforts and reactions against the formation of the DPR-GR could not hinder President Soekarno's wish. Since entering the Guided Democracy period, Soekarno had had great power due to his Political Manifesto, and the legislative body had lost its function as it operated under the president.

The DPR-GR's replacement of the 1955 DPR exhibited an erosion of the legislative body's ideal role. The legislature completely lost its role in the DPR-GR period. Even as Suharto replaced Soekarno, the legislature never again gained the power and capacity to criticize the government, pass budgets, and make laws.

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THE NEW FACE OF INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT (1959-1966)




While the House of Representatives (DPR) in its regulations uses the terms “duties and authorities”, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) first carries out all its obligations which are deemed as duties, and then followed by the rights that it has.



Caricature of (Anti) Democracy League
on Harian Rakyat 29 June 1960.

TRANSFORMATION FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT

The topic of people's representatives as the assistants to the President obviously cannot be separated from the position, duties, and authority of the House of Representatives. This was stated in the 1945 Constitution and other regulations contained in the laws of the Republic of Indonesia.



This chapter discusses the extent of the role of the legislature in the practice of Indonesian constitutional system. Can the House of Representatives (DPR) consistently carry out its performance in accordance with its position, duties, and authorities according to the system of the 1945 Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Indonesia?

Before discussing the topic further ahead, the reasons for the choice of words or terms used, such as *position*, *duties*, and *authority*, both contained in the 1945 Constitution and during the period of the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance (DPR-GR), will first be disclosed. There are several terms used in this regard. Some call it *position*, while some use the terms *duties* and *authority* or *function*. Some of them only use the term *authority*, which of course has a different meaning from *duties* and *authority*.

Until now, there is no standardized term that can be used in this context. The Constitution also does not explicitly specify the issue. At the DPR level, it is more often referred to as "rights and obligations" and "functions" instead of "authority and duties". Meanwhile, at the MPR level, the term *duties* is mentioned before *authority*, so it is stated as "duties and authority". While the House of Representatives (DPR) in its regulations uses the terms "duties and authorities", the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) first carries out all its obligations which are deemed as *duties*, and then followed by the rights that it has.



In its implementation, DPR's duties and authority have been regulated in the 1945 Constitution. In relation to its legislative function, DPR has duties and authority, namely preparing the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas), compiling and discussing Bills (RUU), and enacting laws together with the President.

In relation to its budgetary function, DPR has the duties and authority to approve the State Budget (APBN) Bill, to heed the considerations of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) on the State Budget Bill and the Bills on tax, education, and religious rights, and to follow up on the results of the audit on the management and responsibility of state finances submitted by the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK).

Caricature of Ligemokrasi
on Harian Rakyat, 10 June 1960.

In relation to its supervisory function, DPR has the duties and authority to supervise the implementation of laws, State Budget, and government policies. Meanwhile, the other duties and authority of DPR are to absorb, collect, accommodate, and follow up on the aspirations of the people, including selecting members of the Audit Board by taking into account the considerations of DPD.

The House of Representatives in its organizational structure and its position, duties, and authority, as well as DPR's role in the decision-making process, is constitutionally regulated in the 1945 Constitution. The DPR is a high constitutional body in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which fully represents the aspirations of the people. From the point of view of the Indonesian constitutional system, DPR is no longer a young institution. It has undergone multiple corrections and many things have changed throughout the decades. But until 1960, the DPR was only at the stage of trying to carry out its roles. Around 15 years after independence day/the Proclamation on 17 August 1945, the DPR had never fully implemented the mandate of the 1945 Constitution, both temporary and permanent, and neither did the MPR.

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During the first period of the 1945 Constitution, which took effect from 18 August 1945 to 27 December 1949, when the status of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 changed to becoming

a united state or the so-called Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), the DPR was only known in the constitutional theory as referred to in 1945 Constitution. Meanwhile, in practice, the MPR had not been formed as a state institution of the Republic of Indonesia. Because the highest state institution, the MPR, had not been realized as intended by the Constitution, all its duties and authority were still carried out by the President with the assistance of the Constituent Body.

The same situation occurred during the 1949 RIS Constitution period, which took effect from 27 December 1949 to 17 August 1950, when the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia was one of the states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. Similarly, during the

Provisional Constitution of 1950, which took effect from 17 August 1950 to 5 July 1959, all of these institutions did not know about the People's Consultative Assembly.

However, there was an institution similar to the MPR, known as the Constitutional Assembly, whose duties and authorities were similar to the Assembly in the 1945 Constitution. More clearly, this Constitutional Assembly was known since the existence of the RIS Constitution and the Provisional Constitution of 1950, from 27 December 1949 to 5 July 1950, when the 1945 Constitution was re-enacted.

Going back to the issue of the formation of the DPR, in a number of periods as mentioned earlier, it was actually not available in practice, because the 1945 Constitution at that time only had semantic value. The assembly had not been established, so all of its duties and authority were carried out fully by the President together with the Central National Committee (KNP). This was indeed possible according to the 1945 Constitution based on Article IV of the Transitional Rules. It stated: "Before the People's Consultative Assembly, the People's Legislative Assembly, and the Supreme Advisory Council were formed according to the Constitution; all its powers were carried out by the President with the help of a National Committee".

The national committee in question was KNP or the Central Indonesian National Committee, which was inaugurated on 29 August 1945, approximately 11 days after the 1945 Constitution was ratified. The number of members was about 150 people, consisting of 27 people from the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, including six people who were added to the responsibility of President Soekarno as chairman of the committee, and also people's leaders from all groups, backgrounds, and layers such as *pangreh praja*, scholars, the movement groups, the youth, as well as the trade and commerce groups.

In the beginning, the committee's position was merely as an assistant to the President, which was only to provide considerations and suggestions. From Article IV of the Transitional Rules of the 1945 Constitution,

"Before the People's Consultative Assembly, the People's Legislative Assembly, and the Supreme Advisory Council were formed according to the Constitution; all its powers were carried out by the President with the help of a National Committee".

it could be seen that the power of the Central National Committee was not exactly the same as that of the assembly. However, 40 days later, the position of the National Committee became a body with full authority and together with the President exercised the powers of the MPR, since Mohammad Hatta issued the Vice President Decree Number X on 16 October 1945.


The contents of the decree clearly stated that the powers of the Central National Committee became the same and equal to the duties and authority of the DPR according to the 1945 Constitution, namely:

- a. Legislative power, namely making laws and regulations according to articles 5 paragraph (1), 20, up to 22 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution.
- b. Establishing the State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) according to Article 3 of the 1945 Constitution.

Meanwhile, other duties and authority that should be carried out by the MPR were still fully carried out by the President with the assistance of the National Committee as referred to in Article IV of the Transitional Rules of the 1945 Constitution. The duties and authority were as follows:

1. Establishing the Constitution, according to Article 3 of the 1945 Constitution.
2. Electing and appointing the President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia according to Article 6 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution.
3. Witnessing the swearing-in of the President and Vice President according to Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution.
4. Amending the Constitution according to Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution.
5. Carrying out people's sovereignty according to Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, and so on, all of which must be carried out by the President with assistance from the Central National Committee.

In the history of state administration, the Constitutional Assembly elected by the general election on 15 December 1955 began its hearing on 10 November 1956 to form a permanent constitution, replacing the Provisional Constitution of 1950. The Constitutional Assembly had attempted



to carry out its duty to draft a new constitution. But then on 22 April 1959, President Soekarno on behalf of the government before the Constitutional Assembly, in the context of implementing Guided Democracy, suggested that the Constitutional Assembly stipulate the 1945 Constitution as the permanent constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Subsequently, the Constitutional Assembly held a vote at the recommendation of the President/government for three times, but to no avail. Political history continued and culminated with the President issuing a decree with his announcement on 5 July 1959 on a Sunday afternoon at 17.00 Western Indonesia Time, at the same time changing the status of the country with the statement "Returning to the 1945 Constitution", with all the risks.

Both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution clearly distinguished the People's Representative Council/ Consultative Assembly into two bodies, namely (1) the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), and (2) the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat).

Since then, in addition to the ideological basis of Pancasila, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia had the 1945 Constitution as a legal basis and a source of legal order. Thus, the "Preamble to the 1945 Constitution", the "Body", and the "Elucidation of the 1945 Constitution" were enacted as a unit to replace the Provisional Constitution before the Presidential Decree.

Likewise, since the 1945 Constitution was re-enacted until the occurrence of the September 30 Movement/the Communist Party of Indonesia, which Bung Karno referred to as *Gestok*, the Constitution could not be implemented in a pure and consistent manner. This could be seen from the results of the General Assembly of the Old Order Provisional MPR, from 1960 to 1965, whose decisions were inconsistent with or even deviated from the 1945 Constitution.

Both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution clearly distinguished the People's Representative Council/Consultative Assembly into two bodies, namely (1) the House of Representatives (Dewan

Perwakilan Rakyat), and (2) the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). "*Perwakilan*" comes from the word "deputy" or "representative" who represents. Meanwhile, "*permusyawaratan*" comes from the word "deliberation" or "negotiation"; the representatives can be elected, appointed, or chosen by the people.

With a condition like this, everyone would choose or appoint a person or group whom they trust in carrying out their wishes. However, because everyone had different interests and different beliefs about their candidates for representatives, the representation must be determined by election. Appointment was deemed impossible because the people would appoint a lot of representatives.

Therefore, everyone who is lawful according to the law is every Indonesian citizen who, as a legal subject, has the right to vote for and/or become the people's representatives who sit in the House of Representatives. Therefore, the DPR became the representative of the people as a whole, but is not yet an incarnation of the people. The incarnation of the

people is in the MPR as the executor of sovereignty. This is intended so that the MPR is truly “The People’s Congress”, and as the incarnation of the people or the only highest state institution.

The House of Representatives in the Indonesian constitutional system is a state institution that carries out these parliamentary functions. In terms of supervision, the function of the legislature in an independent society under the rule of law is to create and maintain conditions that will preserve the dignity of a person as an individual.

However, history stated that the DPR did not always have a strong and solid position in carrying out its supervisory function over the government. After going through a dynamic process during the Parliamentary Democracy period in the 1950s, the DPR was no longer able to present complete checks and balances with the executive power. The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 became the starting point for the function of parliament in Indonesia at that time, at least until almost 40 years later.

From the legal aspect, the legality of the Presidential Decree can still trigger debate until now. Some people said that the decree was an unconstitutional method adopted by the Government of President Soekarno after seeing the failure of the Constitutional Assembly to form a new constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1950 and the series of political events during the Parliamentary Democracy period. However, another opinion stated that the Decree of 5 July 1959 had a legal basis for *staatsnoodrecht*, which referred to a state of emergency. In its subjective meaning, an emergency constitutional law (*staatsnoodrecht*) becomes the authority of state authorities to declare a danger even though there is no written rule for it beforehand.

Therefore, the continuation of the Presidential Decree for the existence of the DPR occurred when on 22 July 1959, the government issued Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1959 on the House of Representatives. What was meant by a Presidential Decree (Penpres) as explained in the Elucidation of

“What was meant by a Presidential Decree (Penpres) as explained in the Elucidation of the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 1959 concerning the House of Representatives was a Presidential Regulation prior to the existence of MPR-DPR and in concreto in the context of the Presidential Decree implementation.”

the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 1959 concerning the House of Representatives was a Presidential Regulation prior to the existence of MPR-DPR and *in concreto* in the context of the Presidential Decree implementation.

In this context, the use of presidential decree as a juridical form in establishing the 1959 House of Representatives was actually a new form of regulation. The President's letter addressed to the DPR in August 1959 explained that since the re-enactment of the 1945 Constitution, there had been new forms of state regulations, namely (1) Presidential Decrees to implement the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959; (2) Presidential Regulations; (3) Government Regulations to implement the Presidential Regulations; (4) Presidential Decrees; (5) Ministerial Regulations and Ministerial Decrees.

The leadership of the DPR after the 1959 Presidential Decree was still filled by the same people as that of the previous DPR.

Later on, these presidential decrees had an important role in determining the constitutional life of the Republic of Indonesia and the existence of the DPR. However, in the first opening plenary session of the DPR after being "reformed" through the Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1959, all factions generally supported the Presidential Decree and accepted the President's request to continue working within the framework of the 1945 Constitution.

In the session which was attended by 183 members, each faction had the opportunity to speak by being represented by a member of their faction. The next day, the "new" DPR members based on the 1945 Constitution were sworn in. The leadership of the DPR after the 1959 Presidential Decree was still filled by the same people as that of the previous DPR.

The election for the leadership of the DPR did not end up following the previous DPR Rules of Procedure considering that they were new parliamentary leaders. The composition of the faction consisted of 18 factions and there were four members who declared no faction. The existence of factions in the DPR, in terms of terminology, still followed the term "faction" which had been known since the Provisional DPR period in 1950, as stated in Article 28 paragraph (3) and paragraph (5) of the Provisional DPR (DPRS) Rules of Procedure. In fact, if the DPRS Rules of Procedure only explained what was meant by a faction, in the regulations of the 1959

DPR, the subject of factions was contained in a special chapter on factions.


In the Rules of the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance of the Republic of Indonesia during the next period of 1960, the term faction disappeared again. Only the term "group" was known at that time. This continued until the periods of 1964 and 1966, where apart from being known as "group", it was also known with the term "party". The term faction was only starting to be used again in the period of 1967 up to the present, as was always used in the DPR Rules of Procedure.

The DPR Rules of Procedure after the 1959 Presidential Decree regulated these factions specifically in Articles 151 to 154. It was stated in the rules that members of the DPR who share a party/group or have the same political goals can join forces in the same faction in the DPR (Article 151 paragraph 2).

On 1 October 1959, the DPR finally began to hold its first plenary session since the DPR agreed to continue working within the framework of the 1945 Constitution after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. After being discussed by the factions and perfected, the DPR Rules of Procedure were then ratified on 9 October 1959.

However, the stipulations in these rules of procedure could not be fully implemented in reality. Due to the short age of the DPR after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 and the dominant power of President Soekarno, not even a year later some rules that were made were no longer available in the new DPR rules which were once again ratified. One of them was the rules of procedure for electing the leadership of the DPR. Rules regarding this matter were no longer included in the DPR-GR Rules of Procedure. However, there was instead an opportunity for the President's intervention in the election for the leadership of the DPR.

Compared to the DPR Rules of Procedure in the era of Parliamentary Democracy, the process of selecting the



Working Field Coordination
of DPR GR's Commission.

If deemed necessary, the speaker could negotiate with the questioner about the form and content of the question. If this question was then answered by the President in writing, no verbal discussion would be held regarding the matter.

Speaker of the DPR in the period after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 basically was not much different, even though the democratic system implemented was no longer parliamentary. The differences that existed only lie in the details of the election method when there were two candidates.

The main duties of the commission were basically the same as the duties of the sections and departments in the two DPR Rules of Procedure. Regarding the rights or efforts of the DPR, the DPR Rules of Procedure after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 were stated in Chapter VI concerning the "Efforts of the House of Representatives to Carry out its Duties", while in the DPR Rules of Procedure for the period of Parliamentary Democracy, it was regulated in Chapter VII concerning the "Rights of the House of Representatives".

The efforts of the DPR to be able to carry out its duties and facilitate cooperation with the Government as referred to in the DPR Rules of Procedure after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 include: (1) asking questions; (2) requesting information; (3) conducting an investigation; (4) submitting amendments; and (5) submitting opinions or other suggestions.

Asking questions to the President could be done by each member of the DPR. Questions must be brief, clear, and submitted in writing through the Speaker of the DPR, who would forward them to the President. If deemed necessary, the speaker could negotiate with the questioner about the form and content of the question. If this question was then answered by the President in writing, no verbal discussion would be held regarding the matter. However, the questioner might request that the question be answered verbally. If the President fulfilled the request, the questioner at the appointed meeting could briefly explain the question so that the President could explain more broadly on the matter in question. The other members were not given a chance to speak.

Requesting information from the President could be submitted by a minimum of 10 members. The proposal must be short and clear, and submitted in writing through the Speaker of the DPR. The speaker then notified the DPR about the existence of the proposal. The secretariat

reproduced and distributed the proposals to members of the DPR and sent to the President. The proposers were then given the opportunity to explain their proposals in the Deliberative Committee meeting. After getting an explanation from the proposers, the Deliberative Committee should determine the day and time if the request for information was decided to be followed up.

In the plenary meeting that had been determined, the proposers would re-explain the issues that would be requested for information. The President would then give a statement. From the information given by the President, the proposers and other members would be given the opportunity to share their views. After that, the President would be given another opportunity to give an explanation. The discussion would be concluded after this session. To give an answer to the President's response, the proposer or a minimum of 10 members might submit a proposal for a statement of opinion. The procedure followed the same method as that of the request for information stated above. The DPR could then state its opinion on the President's response.

Up to this point, the authority of the DPR in the DPR Rules of Procedure after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, in a written juridical manner, still showed the independence of the DPR from the intervention of the President. Unfortunately, in reality, President Soekarno's authoritarian attitude turned it the other way around.

In the midst of a new atmosphere for the DPR to return to work, on 31 December 1959, the Government issued Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1959 on conditions and simplification of parties. The reason for this presidential decree was so that there were rules for the development of parties as a tool of democracy in an atmosphere of guided democracy. The Government seemed to view that the political situation had become so unstable that it was necessary to revoke the Government Decree of 3 November 1945 regarding the government's recommendation on the formation of political parties.

In the Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1959, it was stated that in order to be recognized as a party, the party's articles of association must clearly state that the party accepts and defends the 1945 Constitution and bases its work program on the Political Manifesto of the President of 17 August 1959. In addition, it also contained provisions that the President, after listening to the Supreme Court, may prohibit and/or dissolve parties that are contrary to the principles and objectives of the state.



Caricature on *Harian Rakyat*,
3 July 1964.

However, this Presidential decree may result in the dissolution of political parties, which can also affect the composition of political parties in the DPR. Later on, Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party would be the first victims.

Soekarno's direction of party regulation seemed to have paved the way for emphasizing the themes already seen in his writings in 1926, which called for unity between nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. This theme in the Guided Democracy era was known as the Nasakom doctrine (Nationalism, Religion, Communism). It seemed that this doctrine implied that PNI (for nationalism), NU (for religion), and PKI (for communism) represented Soekarno's concept which was expected to play a role in the Government at all levels.

Half a month earlier, the President had also issued a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 concerning the Determination of Dangerous Conditions as well as revoking Law no. 74 of 1957 concerning the revocation of the "Regeling of de Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg" and the stipulation of a "State of Danger".

In relation with the economic and monetary turmoil and the Government's plan to prepare a new budget, the DPR after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 also deemed it necessary to convene a new permanent committee called the Budget Committee, which was formed for the duration of the DPR's term of office. The Budget Committee was obliged to:

1. Follow the preparation of the State Budget Plan (RAPBN) by the government from the beginning, through establishing relationships with relevant departments.
2. Provide opinion to the DPR regarding the budget plan submitted by the President to the DPR.
3. Follow the implementation of the approved budget.
4. Submit an opinion to the DPR regarding changes to the spending budget.
5. Review budget accountability and provide reports to the DPR.
6. Provide opinion to the DPR regarding the results of the audit by the Audit Board.

In addition, the procedure for discussing the State Budget Plan was also determined in a different way from the previous period. Previously, the procedure for discussing the State Budget Plan was set only when the DPR was going to discuss the State Budget Plan. However, in the DPR after the Presidential Decree, discussions regarding the State Budget Plan must follow a steady procedure, starting with discussions at the Budget Committee, followed by discussions at the commission and in the DPR Plenary Meeting. However, the new provisions regarding the State Budget Plan in the DPR later turned out to be not working as expected.

In relation with the economic and monetary turmoil and the Government's plan to prepare a new budget, the DPR after the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 also deemed it necessary to convene a new permanent committee called the Budget Committee.

In March 1960, the DPR, which since the Presidential Decree appeared to be following President Soekarno's policies, surprisingly rejected the Government's proposed budget, in an unexpected display of power. Soekarno's response to this incident was also unexpected. The state institution which was a manifestation of democracy was immediately dissolved by the President, who then replaced it by forming the DPR-GR (People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance).

For Soekarno, this rejection meant that the DPR could no longer be invited to cooperate and had to be replaced. On 5 March 1960, the Speaker of the DPR received a letter from the President regarding the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1960.

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What surprised the DPR was the content of the Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1960, in which the President made a decision that violated the constitution to: (1) stop the implementation of the duties and works of members of the House of Representatives; (2) renew the composition of the DPR in a short time; (3) enact the presidential decree regarding the two matters above on the very same day, which was 5 March 1960.

The parliament which existed according to the 1950 Constitution and was composed according to the 1955 General Election was recognized as a Temporary House of Representatives, until a new House of Representatives was formed based on

the 1945 Constitution. Even though the President's actions were contrary to the constitution and considered *coup d'état*, he was justified by the parties and the most votes in the House of Representatives. Minority groups considered the President's actions as a rape, but they had to adjust to the new reality. With such a stance, the House of Representatives had relinquished its birthright.

The new House of Representatives had 261 members, half consisting of party members, the other half from the so-called functional groups, namely labors, farmers, youth, women, religious scholars, scholars, soldiers, and police. All members were appointed by the President. Most of the 130 members of the political party were chosen by him from the previous members of the DPR, completely eliminating members belonging to the opposition group.



For Mohammad Hatta, the peculiarities in the government system had weakened the function of the DPR as the people's representatives, and in the end gave birth to a dictatorship and a crisis of democracy. In this system, the DPR's duty was only to provide the legal basis for decisions made by the Government based on considerations or suggestions from the two institutions.

This way, in Soekarno's opinion, all negotiations could take place quickly, without being tedious as had happened in the previous House of Representatives. The other two institutions, the Supreme Advisory Council and the State Development Agency, because their composition was determined by President Soekarno himself, could become pressure groups against the DPR.

With the changes to the House of Representatives that took place at that time, when all members were appointed by the President, the last remnants of democracy disappeared.

During the inauguration ceremony of the DPR-GR, President Soekarno gave a mandate that the duties of the DPR-GR were to carry out a Political Manifesto, to realize the Mandate of People's Suffering (Ampera),

**Formation and inauguration
ceremony of the People's
Representative Council of Mutual
Assistance (DPR-GR).**

and to implement Guided Democracy. Furthermore, during the inauguration ceremony of the vice-chairmen of the DPR-GR on 5 January 1961, President Soekarno re-explained and re-emphasized the position of the DPR-GR, that the DPR-GR was the assistant to the president/mandatory of the Provisional MPR and contributed energy to the President to implement everything that was determined by the Provisional MPR. This made it clear that the DPR-GR was no longer a high state institution in accordance with the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, but only carried out its duties as an institution that assisted the Government.

During its tenure from 1960 to 1965, the DPR-GR produced 117 laws and 26 proposals for political statements. A total of 117 bills which were later passed into law all came from the Government's proposals. During its tenure, DPR-GR never produced a bill on the initiative of the DPR itself.

THE POLITICAL CONSTELLATION DURING THE ERA OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY

Some of President Soekarno's biggest political problems during the implementation of Parliamentary Democracy (Liberal) were facing huge differences between the revolutionary line that he wanted and the vision and mission of the parties from the 1955 election.

DIFFERENCES that always existed had resulted in frequent cabinet changes in a short period of time. There had been at least seven changes, namely:

- (1). 1950-1951 - Natsir Cabinet
- (2). 1951-1952 - Sukiman-Suwirjo Cabinet
- (3). 1952-1953 - Wilopo Cabinet
- (4). 1953-1955 - Ali Sastroamidjojo I Cabinet
- (5). 1955-1956 - Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet
- (6). 1956-1957 - Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet
- (7). 1957-1959 - Djuanda Cabinet

So, in essence, during this period, Soekarno was not able to seriously make political policies as desired by various interest groups because he often clashed with various interests that would be carried out by political parties. On the other hand, the constitution also limited Soekarno's movement to realize his various policies.

Another thing that made Soekarno worried was that the Constitutional Assembly had repeatedly failed to reach an agreement in its sessions. The Constitutional Assembly first convened on 10 November 1956, but until 1958 it failed to formulate a constitution that would replace the 1950 Constitution. During its two year-long session, the activities of the Constitutional Assembly could be said to have stalled.

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Meanwhile, various opinions emerged among the public, asking the government system to return to the 1945 Constitution as its foundation. On the other hand, various sessions in the Constitutional Assembly also affected the political situation which became increasingly heated outside the court due to various disputes. One of them was the conflict between Muslim youths and communist youths in several areas.

In response to political developments, President Soekarno made a speech at the Constitutional Assembly on 22 April 1959, which in essence was to recommend a return to the 1945 Constitution. This proposal was followed up by the Council by holding a vote. In three out of three votes, the results did not meet the quorum. The deadlock situation that occurred in this session led President Soekarno to conclude that the Constitutional Assembly should be disbanded so that the political life of the Government would be better.

To fulfill this desire, there must be mass mobilization to support it. Soekarno's policies included approaching and entering into an agreement with the Communist Party of Indonesia, an approach that was deemed appropriate because this party was one of the winning parties in the 1955 general election that did not have a representative in the executive.

Furthermore, President Soekarno also approached the Chief of the Army, an organization that had a tight command system. These two approaches were carried out so that they could work closely together and hence were willing to agree on dissolving the Constitutional Assembly, so that the steps of the revolution would not be disturbed as a point of legitimacy of power.

Both the PKI (Community Party of Indonesia) and the military (Army) during the Guided Democracy period tried to win sympathy so they could be closer to President Soekarno. This meant that there was a balance between the three pillars of political power between Soekarno-PKI-Army. Between the Army and PKI later on, there was a political conflict with different ideological orientations.

The consequence of this polarization caused political tensions to reoccur between the Army

Political stability during the Guided Democracy era was highly dependent on President Soekarno's role in regulating the balance between the two legs of a pyramid's political power.

leadership and the PKI, which was when the Army was also preparing to support the political policies promulgated by President Soekarno. Political stability during the Guided Democracy era was highly dependent on President Soekarno's role in regulating the balance between the two legs of a pyramid's political power.

At the beginning of the Guided Democracy period, there were several events that could be used as an effort to balance the three pillars of power, namely the event of the Liberation of West Irian (1960) and the reaction to the formation of Malaysia (1963). At the Liberation of West Irian, it was more of a military force. Meanwhile, the anti-Malaysian policy gained the PKI a significant role in mobilizing the masses to support this policy.

In the event of the Liberation of West Irian, in a meeting on 2 April 1961, the Minister of Defense/ Chief of Staff of the Army received an order from the President/Supreme Commander for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (GKS) to plan a joint operation to liberate West Irian from the Dutch. From several meetings, it was decided that there were three options for military operations, and the pros and cons of choosing one of the military options were assessed. The results of the study of these three options were sent to the President/ Supreme Commander on 30 June 1960, in order to carry out Operation B (military operation) to liberate West Irian.

This is an example of a study of events involving the military that was not yet at the stage of implementing the Liberation of West Irian. The explanation was an example when the military was the main political supporter of President Soekarno.

Furthermore, in other political developments, namely the *Nasakom* (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) conception, the PKI clearly had a very important meaning for President Soekarno. PKI got access to the first ring of the center of power, and at the same time there was an impression that President Soekarno would marginalize various anti-PKI forces. So, in short, Soekarno's conception clearly needed the support of several parties, including the PKI and several other Islamic parties. In

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On the other hand, the PKI also began to take on a role and instill its influence in the National Front so that their role gradually seemed to be competing with the role of the Army and some Islamic parties. The military and Islamic groups could only do their best to sustain the influence of PKI because President Soekarno's policies were increasingly leaning to PKI. Therefore, the role of PKI increasingly overshadowed the military and Islamic forces in the National Front.

In the interaction between the PKI-military (Army), after the various cases that occurred, the military leaders finally decided not to openly oppose the PKI in an effort to disband the PKI. Under such circumstances, it was no longer possible for the military to be able to properly use the influence of the National Front to oppose President Soekarno's policies.

President Soekarno constantly tried to strike a balance between the military and the PKI. This effort was at least relatively successful until the mid-1960s, although there were many frictions between the two until the end of the Liberation of West Irian. The Army finally chose to focus on increasing and developing the role of functional groups that would facilitate Soekarno's politics and paying attention to the strength/role of the parties in dealing with the PKI.

The development on the PKI side was that they were already confident and began to dare to compete with the Army because the number of PKI sympathizers and followers had increased so much. The establishment of branches continued to grow and had representatives in various state representative bodies. However, the PKI did not have an effective strategy to seize power from Soekarno's hands.

The PKI enthusiastically welcomed and fully supported Indonesia's foreign policy that would confront Malaysia. This revolutionary momentum was very beneficial for the PKI because at least they hoped that in the mind of the general public, the spirit of PKI had something in common



with that of President Soekarno, which was high nationalism. Even the PKI hoped that there would be a stigma that PKI nationalism could defeat military nationalism.

On the other hand, in the mind of PKI, there was a desire to take advantage of the weakness of the Government's power because their thoughts and energy were currently drawn into the confrontation with Malaysia.

So, at a certain point, the PKI would easily make efforts to overthrow the legitimate Government of President Soekarno. Meanwhile, on the military's side, there were also frictions in responding to the Malaysian confrontation, between A. Yani and A.H. Nasution. Nasution.

**The opening of the Games of the
New Emerging Forces at Senayan
sports complex.**



Newspapers were used for the PKI's campaign to get rid of its political opponents.

On the other hand, Soekarno made efforts to reduce the political power of the Army. In his first policy, Soekarno took action directed at the Minister of Defense and Security and the Army Chief of Staff General A.H. Nasution as a high-ranking officer with the most potential to challenge Soekarno's leadership. What Soekarno did was reducing Nasution's political power by releasing him from his position as Army Chief of Staff.

Finally Soekarno appointed General Ahmad Yani as Commander of the Army, although Yani was also against PKI and an anti-PKI. However, his leadership style was different from Nasution's. Yani understood the character of Javanese culture and expressed his disapproval of Soekarno's political policies which he did not openly convey.

One way to understand the leadership of President Soekarno was to know the background behind Soekarno's political thoughts about *Nasakom*. *Nasakom* is an acronym for Nationalism-Religion-Communism. The idea of this thought could be traced back to 1926, when the young Soekarno had already stated his thoughts on "Nasakom". In accordance with the reality during the national movement, there were three strengths of groups (organizations) of the national movements, including the Indische Partij, Sarekat Islam (Islam Association), and ISDV (Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging).

The three forces of this movement when viewed from the ideological point of view would detail an attitude of nationalism, based on Islam (religion), and communism (socialism). The unification of these three ideologies was ideal for the reality of the social structure of our society, but it required a fairly long process.

From this, the political life of the Government after Indonesia's independence could be understood. Political life during the Liberal Democracy period was noisy for a long time with the consequences of threatening the spirit of Soekarno's revolutionary political thoughts. Because the revolutionary political life was threatened, the birth of *Nasakom* during the Guided Democracy period became one of the solutions.

President Soekarno's highly centralized leadership gave him various powers. In a subsequent development, on 17 August 1959, President Soekarno gave a speech at the Provisional MPR Session to put forward his ideas on the Political Manifesto (*Manipol*). Other popular political concepts that emerged at this time included *Nasakom*, *Trisakti*, and *Resopin*.

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So, *Nasakom* was born to promote unity in a nation that was experiencing conflicts due to conflicting ideologies (Communist–Religious–Nationalist). So, in essence, *Nasakom* united all the ideologies (beliefs) of existing political parties or the reality of contextuality from the period of the national movement. On the other hand, *Resopin* focused more on power holders, bureaucrats, and the military.

Resopin is an acronym for Revolution–Indonesian Socialism–National Leaders. The ultimate goal of *Resopin*, which was based on *Nasakom*, was to strengthen President Soekarno’s position in exercising the power that was centered on him. The main goal was to move the entire life force of the nation and the state quickly or as soon as possible towards independence.

SIMPLIFICATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The idea or desire to simplify political parties was first put forward by President Soekarno in his Youth Pledge speech in Yogyakarta in 1956.

SOEKARNO stated that Decree X of the Government issued in November 1945 regarding the recommendation to form political parties could be said to be a mistake. He considered this to encourage prioritization of interests of the political parties as a consequence of the policy of the multi-party system. This call was related to the planned general election in January 1946, when the Central National Committee was formed.

The realization of political party simplification by President Soekarno was accelerated when he witnessed the results of the 1955 General Election, which showed the behavior of political parties putting themselves first by imposing the interests of their political parties rather than prioritizing the interests of the electorate and the state.

As an illustration of the number of participants in the 1955 General Election and the characteristics of the results, there were 118 participants in the election for DPR members consisting of 36 political parties, 34 community organizations, and 48 individuals. Meanwhile, the election for the Constitutional Assembly was followed by 91 participants consisting of 39 political parties, 23 community organizations, and 29 individuals.

Meanwhile, according to the results of the 1955 election for members of the Constitutional Assembly, which was held on 15 December 1955, the number of seats for the members of the Constitutional Assembly that were elected was 520, but in West Irian, which had 6 seats, there were no elections. Therefore, the number of available seats was only 514. The results of the election for members of the Constitutional Assembly showed that there was an increasing support for PNI, NU, and PKI, while the number of votes for Masyumi, although still the second winner, fell by 114,267 compared to the votes obtained in the election for members of the House of Representatives.

With the birth of the Presidential Decree No. 7, the Government Decree No. 3 of November 1945 was revoked, which contained the Government's recommendation for the formation of political parties; and at the same time stipulated a Presidential Regulation concerning the main conditions and requirements for simplification of the political party system.

The simplification of political parties was not actually aimed at eliminating the existence of political parties. On the other hand, when the politics of political parties was unhealthy and inter-party relations were chaotic in the parliamentary system, the government obviously could not stand still. There must be an action to regulate them so that things that were destructive did not happen for the survival of the nation and the state. So, the political parties should be willing to carry out a ceasefire, not continuously forcing their own will for the sake of their groups, but on the contrary, they should be able to formulate various national development programs which were the realization of their vision and mission when establishing a political party.

The decision to simplify political parties must be implemented because with the completion of the 1955 general election, the constellation of political life had always been unstable. This was marked by cabinets that kept changing due to the existence of a motion of disbelief from a political party or inter-party coalition, as a result of problems that did not match the platform of one of the supporting parties. The more profound damage was the failure of economic development for the welfare of the people and the cessation of the development of the National Revolution as the ideals of our independence in 1945.

The next stage of policy was to overhaul the political party system. The Cabinet approved a government regulation on 18 December 1959, regarding the requirements for simplification of political parties and the formation of the National Front. The reform of the political party system was considered an important issue because it did not only regulate the existence of a political party, but also involved issues and the implementation of the political party system that could be in line with the aura of the Guided Democracy.

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Quoted from Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1959, the requirements for political parties could be classified into two types, namely quantitative requirements and qualitative requirements. The definition of the quantitative requirements was that a party must have branches spread over a quarter of Level I Regions, as well as in a quarter of Level II Regions throughout Indonesia. Meanwhile, the qualitative requirements could be identified based on the ideology that they adhered to, principles, objectives, program of activities, membership requirements, and funding provisions.

Subsequently, on 5 July 1960, Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 1960 was issued concerning the recognition, supervision, and dissolution of political parties. This regulation was a follow-up to the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1959 on the branches, regarding the procedure for supervising political party branches which were updated with the amendments.

Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 1960 ordered the Articles of Association/Bylaws of every political party that had been established since 5 July 1959 to comply with the provisions number 3 of 1960. The improvement must be done no later than 28 February 1961 and they must have reported several matters to the President, including:

- a. Each Articles of Association/Bylaw.
- b. Records of branches and number of members in each branch.
- c. Records of members' names, ages, and occupations in each branch.
- d. Other organizations that supported and/or took shelter under each political party.

Information from the local police that the political party had been established on 5 July 1959. The Intercession further explained that, initially, based on Article 2 of Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 1960, the deadline was 31 December 1960. However, with Presidential Regulation No. 25 of 1960, the deadline was changed to 28 February 1961 (Article 1 of Presidential Regulation Number 25 of 1961).

There were a total of 8 political parties that managed to pass and get legal recognition as a political party on 14 April 1961.

In this new Presidential Regulation, there were additional requirements, among them regarding membership which was determined to have at least 150 thousand people or each branch had at least 50 members. Meanwhile, its dissolution was still regulated in Article 9 (paragraph 1) of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 1959. The President conveyed it to the Supreme Court. If a decision had been made, the political party that had the decision to dissolve must dissolve itself within 30 days. If it exceeded the allotted time, the political party would be declared a banned party.

The new regulation also stated that in the event of a dissolution of a political party, all members who represented it in the legislature, starting from the MPR, DPR, to DRD (Regional Research Council), would automatically be considered as ceased members of the institution.

Based on the Presidential Regulation, there were a total of 8 political parties that managed to pass and get legal recognition as a political party on 14 April 1961. They were NU, PNI, PKI, *Partai Indonesia (Partindo)*, the Murba Party, PSII Arudji, IPKI, and the Catholic Party. On the same day, Decree No. 129 of 1961 was issued, which rejected the recognition of 4 political parties, namely PSII-Abikusno, PRN-Bebasa, PRI, and PRN-Jody. One of the four political parties was the PRI (*Partai Rakyat Indonesia*), which based on the results of the 1955 General Election only won 2 seats in the DPR. Meanwhile, in the DPR-GR, PRI did not get a seat.

DISSOLUTION OF THE MASYUMI PARTY, PSI, AND THE FREEZING OF THE MURBA PARTY

In his independence day speech on 17 August 1954, President Soekarno had reminded that the permission for the establishment of multi-party and the implementation of the 1955 General Election were hoped not to cause divisions between elements of the nation.

ACCORDING to the political conception of President Soekarno, a political party should act as a tool to achieve the goals of the National Revolution. When it was unsuccessful during the Liberal Parliamentary Democracy period, this goal prompted President Soekarno to create a policy for the implementation of the 1959 Guided Democracy. The dissolution of the Masyumi Party and PSI and the freezing of the Murba Party could be seen from this perspective, namely the inconsistency between the policies of Soekarno's political party conception vis-à-vis the desire or lust for power of the founders of political parties in a multiparty system.

So, Soekarno indeed did not really like the multi-party condition. As he once stated, there was a desire to bury political parties. The desire to bury political parties was caused by the multi-party system which made the life of the nation and the state increasingly lose their orientation to continue the unfinished development of the revolution. The activities of the leaders of the political parties were getting further and further away from the implementation of the National Revolution.

The cause of the disbandment of the Masyumi Party and PSI could be traced to the long conflict between the two parties (Masyumi vs. PKI) over the revival of the PKI after the 1948 Madiun Affair led by the PKI and the FDR (People's Democratic Front). The PKI started to be able to influence various policies of President Soekarno and be accommodated in the government system.

Masyumi as an Islamic party firmly rejected the presence of PKI in the cabinet structure. This refusal was of course contrary to Soekarno's wish, who tried to unite various elements of the nation, namely the nationalists, the religious and the communists, as the strength of the nation's elements to continue the unfinished revolution.

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The refusal and prohibition of Masyumi's representatives from participating in the cabinet were also carried out by Masyumi and PSI in the Djuanda Cabinet (8 April 1957). They strictly wanted Masyumi to carry out non-accommodative political policies to the Government. Indeed, there were two Masyumi figures who participated in the Djuanda Cabinet, namely Prince Noor as Minister of Public Works, who was eventually expelled from being a member of Masyumi. Then Mulyadi Joyomartono as Minister of Social Affairs, who on his own initiative left the Masyumi Party. Masyumi's non-cooperative stance was adopted as the party's official policy. According to M. Natsir, this was simply to correct President Soekarno, who was increasingly authoritarian and supported the rise of communism by accommodating this ideology.

In its development, the conflict between the Masyumi Party and PSI with President Soekarno became sharper when the PRRI-Permesta incident occurred. Some of their leaders were involved in the incident, who Soekarno labeled as rebels against the central Government. They included Burhanuddin Harahap, Mohammad Natsir, and Syafruddin Prawiranegara (Masyumi), and St. Mohd. Rasyid and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (PSI). Together with the Banteng Council and several military commanders from other regions, they constituted the Struggle Council, which was marked by the proclamation of PRRI (15 February 1958).

Efforts to settle the matter had actually been carried out by M. Hatta as a liaison who facilitated meetings with Soekarno. However, this effort failed because the government had adopted a policy of sending military personnel to cities where PRRI existed. The military troops were sent to, among others, West Sumatra, Manado, and several other cities in

Sulawesi. PRRI's power could finally be paralyzed quickly by the military troops.

Soekarno said that the PRRI rebellion was the culmination of fraud and betrayal of the ideals of the Proclamation of 17 August 1945. President Soekarno's subsequent attitude towards Masyumi and PSSI got even clearer when the formation of the DPR-GR was drawn up by President Soekarno himself. The composition of the DPR-GR members did not include the names of representatives from the two parties.

The Government had actually asked Masyumi a question. However, with a firm answer, Soekarno still considered that the Masyumi Party was nothing more than a stubborn force that would only hinder the course of the Indonesian revolution. Even though the Masyumi Party leaders stated various rational arguments, Soekarno's hatred of the Masyumi Party had far exceeded his rational limits.

So according to the logic of Soekarno's revolution, Masyumi and PSI did not deserve to be recognized nor had the right to exist as legitimate political parties. Ultimately, the Masyumi Party and PSI must be disbanded for the sake of the unfinished revolution. Exactly on independence day, which was 17 August 1960, taking into account the Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1959 Article 9, in conjunction with Presidential Decree No. 200 of 1960, it was stated that in the greater interest for the safety of the state and the nation, the Government needed to dissolve the Masyumi Party because the party sponsored and carried out a rebellion. The Government made a decision to dissolve the entire hierarchy of the Masyumi Party and PSI from their divisions/branches down to their branches throughout the entire territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Furthermore, what the government did to the Murba Party was a freezing, instead of a dissolution, of the party, on 5 January 1964. Somewhat different from the conflicts between the two parties above (Masyumi and PSI), what happened to Murba was more because of its consistency in rejecting the existence and practices of PKI's political revival.

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Historically, the Murba Party since the beginning of independence had advocated the formation of a single party, as Soekarno himself wanted. However, the desire did not get much support or response from the parties. The background of the idea was actually intended to sustain the political power of the PKI in the constellation of political parties at the national level.

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In the development of the conflicts between the Murba Party and PKI, several journalists who were anti-PKI as well as supporters of the Murba Party declared a Soekarnoism Support Group (BPS) on 1 September 1964. However, the PKI replied that BPS would not be able to teach Soekarnoism. Soekarnoism's teachings would not be able to be translated, especially by people who were anti-communist, because President Soekarno also opposed groups or individuals who had a communist-phobic attitude.

A document was handed over by a Murba Party leader, Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, to PNI Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo. The document was brought to a cabinet meeting in December 1964. As usual, the PKI denied it by accusing others that the document was made by the Trotskyists, assisted by various neo-colonialism imperialism forces, with a deliberate intent to destroy the strength of PKI.

PKI leaders tried to convince President Soekarno that the documents were fake. And it seemed that President Soekarno was convinced that the PKI had no evil intentions as stated in the document. Finally, to resolve the growing conflicts, President Soekarno summoned the party leaders to the Bogor Palace on 1 December 1964 to resolve the political



dispute. The ten political parties that were present were willing to sign the “Bogor Declaration” and agreed that the document problem was considered resolved and they would remain united in maintaining the spirit of national unity by basing themselves on Pancasila, the Political Manifesto of the Constitution, and the *Nasakom* formulation.

However, five days after the signing of the Bogor Declaration, on 17 December 1964, President Soekarno dissolved BPS, which was deemed to have distorted the teachings of Soekarnoism and divided the unity of *Nasakom*. Then, three weeks later, on 5 January 1965, President Soekarno

President Soekarno welcoming the Indonesian Student Action Union delegations on 18 January 1966 at the Merdeka Palace, Jakarta.



The atmosphere when the "Show of Force" and the demonstrations that were secured by Indonesian Armed Forces received a standing ovation from the people of Jakarta.

took the step of issuing Presidential Decree No. 291 of 1965 which contained the freezing of the Murba Party. After that, it was followed by the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 291 of 1965, which contained the freezing of members of the DPR-GR, and subsequently the arrest of Murba leaders, namely Sukarni and Syamsuddin Chan.

DPR-GR WITHOUT PKI:

A REFRESH TO WELCOME A NEW ERA

The involvement of the Communist Party of Indonesia in September 30, 1965 Movement (G30S PKI, *Gestapu*, *Gestok*) had an impact on changing the membership structure of the DPR-GR.

THE implementation of the concept of Guided Democracy later developed into a democracy that was characterized by the concentration of power in only one leader, namely the president (executive). This concentration of power in one leadership led to many presidential actions which were later deemed to be contrary to the spirit of the 1945 Constitution. Meanwhile, according to President Soekarno, Guided Democracy was a democracy that explicitly led to the implementation of the Mandate of People's Suffering.

The culmination of the G30S PKI incident towards the end of 1965 brought political tensions and a shift in power in Indonesian politics, including in the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance (DPR-GR). During the term of office between 1960-1965, the DPR-GR received influence from PKI leaders. However, after there was evidence of PKI's betrayal, the DPR-GR in 1965 dared to take a stand against the PKI and its masses. This attitude of the DPR-GR was evidenced by the unanimous statement which stated that the PKI and its mass organizations were disbanded. The statement of opinion was issued on 15 November 1965 in the opening plenary session of the second trial during the period of 1965-1966.

The action of the DPR-GR stating that DPR-GR must exist without any PKI elements within it was a historical event in the practice of democracy in Indonesia. The statement from the DPR-GR that urged President Soekarno to dissolve the PKI was made by Harsono Tjokroaminoto, who represented all members of the DPR-GR, which was later taken over by the leadership of the DPR-GR as an official statement of the council and was accepted by the assembly by acclamation. In addition, members of

In order to normalize the situation and fulfill the people's demand to disband the PKI to its roots, the purging of the communist elements started from the structure of the Government. One of those affected was the membership of the DPR-GR. Members of the PKI Faction of the DPR-GR had their membership status suspended as parliamentarians.

the DPR-GR also fully appreciated the actions that had been taken by the previous Government, namely freezing the members of PKI and its mass organizations in their activities as members of the DPR-GR.

Furthermore, the era of DPR-GR without the Communist Party of Indonesia took place, which was in 1965-1966. After the G30S incident, the DPR-GR carried out purification and temporarily suspended 62 DPR-GR members who were affiliated with the PKI and its mass organizations. Although there had been a change in the membership of "DPR-GR without PKI", as long as the Presidential Regulation No. 32 of 1964 had not been revoked, legally the position of the leadership of the "DPR-GR without PKI" was still the same as before, with the status as an assistant to the president. During its only one year of tenure (1965-1966), the "DPR-GR without PKI" had undergone four changes in the composition of its leadership, namely:

1. Period of 15 November 1965-26 Februari 1966.
2. Period of 26 Februari 1966-2 Mei 1966.
3. Period of 2 Mei 1966-6 Mei 1966.
4. Period of 17 Mei 1966-9 November 1966.

In order to normalize the situation and fulfill the people's demand to disband the PKI to its roots, the purging of the communist elements started from the structure of the Government. One of those affected was the membership of the DPR-GR. Members of the PKI Faction of the DPR-GR had their membership status suspended as parliamentarians.

Efforts to purge PKI elements within the DPR-GR were immediately carried out by the leadership of the DPR-GR approximately one month after the incident. In mid-November 1965, the membership of the PKI Faction of the DPR-GR was suspended. This decision was mandated in the Decree of DPR-GR Leadership No. 10/Pimp/I/65-66 and followed by Decree No. 13/Pimp/I/1965-1966.



Referring to the two decrees of the DPR-GR leadership, 62 DPR-GR members were suspended, bringing the total number of the DPR-GR members to 237 people. This decision was supported by the results of the DPR-GR Plenary Session which was held on 15 November 1965. This decision was later confirmed as Law Number 10 of 1966 concerning Membership of the DPR-GR. A total of 62 members of the DPR-GR whose status was suspended or deemed to have been dismissed were not replaced. The dismissal, which was not followed by a replacement, marked the existence of the DPR-GR minus the PKI, although the legal basis was still the same, namely the Presidential Decree No. 4 of 1960.

The disbandment of the PKI referred to the Provincial MPR Decree Number XXV/MPRS/1966, which was decided on 5 July 1966, containing the disbandment of the PKI, a statement that declared PKI as a prohibited organization throughout Indonesia, and the prohibition of any activities or the spreading or developing of ideology or teachings of Communism/

**Opening of the Third General
Assembly of the Provisional MPR
at the Merdeka Building, Bandung,
1965.**

(Photo source: MPRS Public
Relations and Ministry of Home
Affairs)



The farewell of the former DPR-GR leadership with the new leadership at the house of the DPR-GR Speaker H. A. Syaichu in Slipi, the former DPR-GR Speaker, IGG Subamia (third from left replaced by H.A. Syaichu second from left), in Jakarta in 1966.

Marxism/Leninism. Therefore, what was dissolved and declared a banned party was not only the PKI, but all the organizations under it.

The purging of PKI elements in DPR-GR membership which referred to Law Number 10 of 1966 was based on the principle of the status quo (no replacement or filling of vacancies for DPR-GR members who were declared dismissed because they were involved in the September 30 Movement). After the purging of the communist elements, a plan to refresh or add members of the DPR-GR was immediately discussed.

The DPR-GR Deliberative Committee meeting on 8 December 1966 resulted in a consensus. One of them stated that the number of members of the DPR-GR as a result of the general election was 460 people, consisting of 360 people who were elected and 100 people who were appointed. In the context of refreshing or adding members of the DPR-GR based on deliberation between the leadership of the DPR-GR and the bearers of Provisional MPR Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966, an agreement was reached regarding the number of DPR-GR members, which was 90 percent of the total of 460 people, or equal to 414 people.

The DPR-GR was later known as the DPR-GR minus the PKI or the DPR-GR - New Order era. The term of office of the DPR-GR minus the PKI was from 15 November 1965 to 19 November 1966.

Entering 1966, the people's pressure on the Government to create economic and political stability grew. Demonstrations against the government erupted on 10 January in front of the State Secretariat, Jakarta. The masses consisting of youth and student organizations such as *Ansor*, the Muhammadiyah Youth, GMKI, GAMKI, GSNI, the Marhaenis Youth, HMI, the Catholic Youth, and others (part of the Youth Front) urged the Government to immediately revoke all tariff increase regulations that essentially burdened the poor.

They also demanded that the cabinet's authority be restored immediately by firing incompetent officials and urging the government to purge the cabinet from communist elements. Two days later, on 12 January 1966, students who were members of the KAMI (Indonesian Student Action Union) held a demonstration. They did a long march from the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Indonesia to the DPR-GR Building, Senayan.

Observing the increasing intensity of the demonstration which started to threaten national integrity, the DPR-GR Speaker Aruji Kartawinata, the DPR-GR Deputy Speaker I.G.G. Subamia and Rear Admiral Mursalim met with President Soekarno. They submitted a progress report of the student demonstration that demanded the repeal of all Government regulations regarding price increases and transport fares.

In the midst of a volatile and heated national political situation, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) declared its loyalty and obedience to the Supreme Commander, President Soekarno, to face all the challenges of the revolution in accordance with the Sapta Marga and the Soldier's Oath. So far, ABRI and the people had maintained cohesiveness as a prerequisite for the success of the Revolution, especially in terms of national security. This affirmation was contained in a statement by the ABRI leadership on 16 January 1966.

Realizing the dire situation in the country, the leadership of the DPR-GR decided that the Deliberative Committee and the Leaders of the Groups

In the midst of a volatile and heated national political situation, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) declared its loyalty and obedience to the Supreme Commander, President Soekarno, to face all the challenges of the revolution in accordance with the Sapta Marga and the Soldier's Oath.

would remain on standby in Jakarta. The determination for them to stand-by was intended to accommodate the voices and desires that grew in the community as well as other issues in the cooperative relationship with the Government.

During the meeting, the members responded to the actions carried out by KAMI, KAPPI, and the other organizations. The DPR-GR was worried about the existence of a "Street Parliament" in addition to the official parliament, if the DPR-GR did not immediately determine its stance and steps in accordance with the Mandate of People's Suffering. It was also decided that the DPR-GR would continue with the existing members.

In the DPR-GR meeting on 13 April 1966, the chairperson of the meeting reviewed the critical situation in the country and the ways to deal with it. The meeting resulted in three recommendations. First, members of the DPR-GR were also members of the MPRS. And as MPRS members, they had the right to speak, so it was appropriate for the DPR-GR to contribute constructive opinions that could be discussed in the MPRS.

The second recommendation was that overcoming the economic downturn and development would depend on the decisions of the MPRS Session. The third recommendation was related to the materials that needed to be discussed by the Political Committee, namely to obtain a formulation that could be used as a conceptual basis for political and state administrative issues, in particular to re-establish the legal system in Indonesia in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.

On 2 May 1966, which was the opening of the fourth period for the 1965-1966 session, there was a proposal asking the DPR-GR to show the people that they really represented their voices.

On 2 May 1966, which was the opening of the fourth period for the 1965-1966 session, there was a proposal asking the DPR-GR to show the people that they really represented their voices. Whereas according to the 1945 Constitution, the DPR-GR did not stand below but side by side with the president, so the logical consequence was that the leadership of the DPR-GR should be elected by members of the DPR. The next consequence was that the leader of the DPR-GR did not become a member of the cabinet, so did not need to be appointed as a minister. Then, it was no longer necessary to use the nickname

“His Excellency the Speaker”, and it was instead enough to call him the “Speaker”.

In this plenary session, the DPR-GR was occupied by university students. At that time, the Chair of the KAMI Presidium, Cosmas Batubara, spoke in front of 160 of the 230 members of the DPR-GR, and delivered a Political Memorandum of KAMI. This political memorandum essentially questioned the basis for the President to appoint members of the DPR-GR and determine the number. The memorandum also questioned the basis for the President to appoint the Speaker of the DPR if the institution was elected by the people. Another question was the basis for the President to honorably terminate the members of the DPR as stated in Article 8 of Presidential Decree No. 4/1960.

The DPR-GR Political Committee had finally produced a Resolution of the DPR-GR RI which contained “Contributions of Thoughts to be Made the Main Event in the IV General Assembly of the MPRS”. This resolution was ratified by the DPR-GR on 9 June 1966. In the introduction to the letter, the position of the March 11 Warrant as the key to opening a new chapter in the history of the Indonesian Revolution was stated. This was a historic momentum that would determine the next historical path for the Pancasila Revolution in Indonesia.

Based on the temporary recommendation of the leaders, President Soekarno intended to dissolve the MPRS and DPR-GR as a realization of the implementation of the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consistent manner, with the consideration that the implementation of the 1945 Constitution must begin with the formation of a National Committee. This meant that “Before the MPRS, DPR and DPA (Supreme Advisory Council) were formed according to the Constitution, all powers were exercised by the president with the assistance of the Central National Committee” (Article IV of Transitional Rules of the 1945 Constitution).

Unlike President Soekarno’s stance that he could accept the recommendation to dissolve the MPRS, DPR-GR, and DPA to return to the forma-

Based on the temporary recommendation of the leaders, President Soekarno intended to dissolve the MPRS and DPR-GR as a realization of the implementation of the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consistent manner, with the consideration that the implementation of the 1945 Constitution must begin with the formation of a National Committee.



Chairman of the Presidium of the Ampera Cabinet, General Suharto was giving a Government statement on the state situation, 16 August 1966.

tion of the National Committee, this was not the case with Lieutenant General Soeharto (bearer of *Supersemar*, Order of Eleventh March) after receiving the legal considerations submitted by G-V-KOTI. Because, if the MPRS and DPR-GR were dissolved under the current circumstances at the time, juridically all power would fall back into the hands of the President based on Article IV of the Transitional Rules of the 1945 Constitution. This was also considered to be the accumulation of power in one person. The stance of Lieutenant General Suharto later became the stance of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, through its leadership, then issued a statement of position that, after carefully understanding the development of the situation, which manifested the voice of the people's conscience, responded to the statements regarding:

First, the Armed Forces were the safeguards, the Indonesian Revolutionary Guards with three frameworks of objectives to be achieved based on Pancasila.

Second, the Armed Forces were the protectors of the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution and the safeguards of the authority of the President, Bung Karno, along with his teachings, who in good faith, as the child of the revolution, were brave and honest in providing reports

and considerations to the Great Leader of the Revolution, in order to prevent, both now and in the future, the making of inappropriate decisions and policies, which did not embody the voice of the people's conscience.

Third, as a continuation of the previous statement, it was stated that in this connection, the Armed Forces, like the good intention of President Soekarno himself, which also acted as the voice of the people's conscience, would like to place the true nature of the President's position, according to the purity of the principles of the 1945 Constitution implementation.

Fourth, for the purification of implementation based on the 1945 Constitution, as an embodiment of the people's conscience, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia supported President Soekarno's policies regarding:

- The plan to enact the General Election Law, based on the joint powers of the President and the DPR.
- The plan to enact a Law on the Composition of the Supreme Advisory Council, based on the joint powers of the President and the DPR.

This statement letter from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia was issued in Jakarta, 5 May 1966, and signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Defense and Security a.i./Minister Commander of the Armed Forces, TNI Lieutenant General Suharto, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Command to Destroy Malaysia, TNI General Dr. AH. Nasution, Minister/Commander of the Navy, Rear Admiral (L) Mulyadi, Minister/Commander of the Air Force, Air Commodore Rusmin Nuryadin, and Minister/Commander of the Police Force, Police Commissioner General Sucipto Yudodiharjo.

With the issuance of the ABRI Statement, President Soekarno did not end up dissolving the MPRS and DPR-GR. Then, President Soekarno intended to perfect the membership composition of the MPRS, DPR-GR, and DPA, in particular to fill the vacancies in these institutions which resulted from members who were involved in the counter-revolutionary incident of the September 30 Movement.

On 15 November 1965, the DPR-GR minus the PKI held a plenary session. In the plenary session, the DPR-GR issued a stance.

The stance of the DPR-GR could be seen from the following three points of consideration:

1. That the so-called "September 30 Movement", based on the facts that have been obtained so far, was actually masterminded by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and its mass organizations.
2. That the so-called incident of "September 30 Movement" or "Gestapu" was a counter-revolutionary movement because it betrayed the Indonesian Revolution and Pancasila and carried out barbaric acts outside of humanity that caused many victims, among both the leadership of the Armed Forces as well as the people.
3. That the people in general, including labors, farmers, employees, both those who join progressive revolutionary political parties and mass organizations and those who were in the Armed Forces, strongly condemned the counter-revolutionary actions of the so-called "30 September Movement", and demanded the disbandment of the political parties and mass organizations that were the masterminds and perpetrators of the *Gestapu*.

Subsequently, the plenary session on 15 November 1965 decided to:

1. Fully support the policy of the leadership of the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance which had temporarily suspended all activities of the members of the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance who represented the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and its mass organizations, as well as other mass organizations that were suspected to have been involved or involve in the counter-revolutionary movement called the "September 30 Movement".
2. Urge P.J.M. (Your Excellency) President, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/the Great Leader of the Revolution, Bung Karno, to as soon as possible take the final decision in the political field in accordance with his responsibilities to the nation and the state, especially his responsibilities towards The Almighty God, now and in the future, and also in accordance with the demands of the Indonesian people through their progressive revolutionary political parties and mass organizations, which was to dissolve the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and its mass organizations.
3. Urge the government in a short period of time to provide an official statement before the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance Session regarding the course of events of the counter-revolutionary incident called the "September 30 Movement".

In a subsequent development, the DPR-GR members who were from the PKI were dismissed. The dismissal of the DPR-GR member of the PKI Faction and its mass organizations was carried out by Coordinating Minister/Speaker of the DPR-GR, Aruji Kartawinata, toward 57 people who were involved in the counter-revolutionary incident of September 30, 1965 Movement. Subsequently, in a meeting on 12 November 1965, it was decided that 8 more DPR-GR members were going to be suspended in addition to the 57 people who had previously been dismissed.



In addition, *Partindo*, which was considered to be close to the PKI, also experienced a similar thing like the PKI. The acquaintance was shown, for example, by *Partindo's* support for the PKI programs. Because it was believed that he was proven involved in the incident and had close ties to the PKI, members of the DPR-GR from *Partindo* were dismissed by Presidential Decree No. 57 of 1968.

The second year's session of the DPR-GR in the 1965-1966 trial period, which was opened on 16 November 1965 in the plenary hall at the DPR-GR Senayan, Jakarta, was not attended by the communist groups and their mass organizations which had been dismissed from being the members of the DPR-GR but was attended by the coordinating ministers and

Inauguration picture of DPR-GR's
Leaders including H. Achmad
Syaikhu and Syarif Thayeb.

(Source: Syaikhu, 1991)

The composition of the DPR-GR minus the PKI was different from the previous membership of the DPR-GR. The composition consisted of Political Groups (Nationalist, Islamic, Christian-Catholic), and the Functional Groups (Golongan Karya).

ministers from the *Dwikora* Cabinet. The Cabinet Presidium at the opening was represented by the ministers of state, Aminudin Azis and Oey Tjoe Tat.

The DPR-GR in the plenary session on 16 March 1966, ratified a statement of opinion on the President's policies as stated in the Order of 11 March 1966 (*Supersemar*). This letter gave Lieutenant General Soeharto the assignment to ensure the security, personal safety, and authority of the President. In its statement of opinion, the DPR-GR expressed full approval and support for the policies outlined in the letter of order.

In addition, the DPR-GR also stated its willingness to assist Lieutenant General Suharto in implementing the letter of order as well as the DPR-GR's approval and support for Presidential Decree no. 1/3/1966 of 12 March 1966 concerning the disbandment of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), including its organizational parts

from the central to the regional levels along with all organizations that share the same principles/take refuge/shelter under it, and declared the PKI a prohibited organization throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Apart from purging the communist elements from the government, efforts were made to refresh the membership structure of the new DPR-GR (the DPR-GR minus the PKI). The composition of the DPR-GR minus the PKI was different from the previous membership of the DPR-GR. The composition consisted of Political Groups (Nationalist, Islamic, Christian-Catholic), and the Functional Groups (*Golongan Karya*).

Representatives of political parties in the DPR-GR who originally sat in the Spiritual Sub-Class, Material Development Sub-Class, and Spiritual Development Sub-Class were merged back into their parent political party. Therefore, not a single member of the DPR-GR from a political party was a member of the subs of Functional Groups. Instead, there was a new faction, namely the A, B, and C Development Faction (*Fraksi Karya Pembangunan*), all of which had a total of 96 members. The faction was part of non-ABRI Functional Groups in the DPR-GR minus the PKI.

Thus, the principal differences between the composition of the DPR-GR membership based on Presidential Decree No. 4 of 1960 and the composition of the DPR-GR membership after being refreshed, included the presence of non-ABRI Functional Groups in the DPR-GR based on Presidential Decree No. 4 of 1960. Most of its members (more than two thirds) were affiliated to a political party, while all members of the Functional Groups in the DPR-GR, after being refreshed, were purely from the Functional Groups.

The DPR-GR, whose number of members had been increased to 414 people, was the one who carried out the duties and authorities in accordance with the 1945 Constitution until the DPR from the general election results was actually formed. This was regulated in the General Provisions of Article 1 paragraph (2) of Law no. 10 of 1966 concerning the Position of the MPRS and DPR-GR before the general election. Since 15 November 1966, the DPR-GR had been running without the PKI.

The position, duties, and authority of the DPR-GR minus the PKI were further regulated and stipulated in Article 1 of the DPR-GR Rules of Procedure (DPR-GR Decree No. 10/DPR-GR/III/67-68), namely setting the Revenue Budget together with the Government. Second, together with the Government, they made laws and monitored government actions.

Therefore, to carry out the functions referred to in the 1945 Constitution, the DPR-GR had certain rights as regulated in Article 6 of Law No. 10/1966, namely the right to ask questions for each member, ask for information (interpellation), conduct investigations (questionnaire), make changes (amendments), propose a statement of opinion or other proposals, and recommend someone if determined by a statutory regulation.

The position as assistant to the president in the legislative field was actually still valid as long as Presidential Regulation No. 32 of 1964 had not been revoked. However, in practice, before the Presidential Regulation was formally revoked, the DPR-GR minus the PKI was no longer an

*The position, duties, and authority of the DPR-GR minus the PKI were further regulated and stipulated in **Article 1 of the DPR-GR Rules of Procedure (DPR-GR Decree No. 10/DPR-GR/III/67-68).***



Sea of people flooded the general meeting for the safety of the revolution and expressed their gratitude to the Great Commander of the Revolution, Bung Karno and supported Lieutenant General Soeharto's policy of disbanding the PKI.

assistant to the President. This was evidenced by its action in which it did not report first to the President, but instead report to the leadership of the DPR-GR on their own initiative during a recess, making a policy to temporarily suspend 62 members.

Other actions that could also prove that the DPR-GR was no longer an assistant to the president were the dismissal of the leadership of the DPR-GR and the appointment of a caretaker led by the DPR-GR by a plenary session on 2 May 1966, as well as selecting and ratifying the leadership of the DPR-GR by the Plenary Session of the DPR-GR on 17 May 1966. The position as assistant to the president in a formal juridical manner was only abolished by the repeal of Presidential Regulation No. 32 of 1964 by Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 1966, which in Article 2 read: "To trust the DPR-GR to regulate and stipulate its own Rules of Procedure in accordance with the development of the 1945 Constitution implementation".

Even though the DPR-GR minus the PKI was no longer positioned as an assistant to the president, the expected cooperation between the DPR-GR and the president/executive leader still often encountered obstacles. This was considering the political situation which was still very unstable at the time, so efforts were needed to place every problem in its portion so that it could be resolved by the relevant institutions.

To obtain a somewhat clearer picture of how to overcome a problem that arose as a result of unfavorable conditions, a meeting was held between the Deliberative Committee, which was chaired directly by the leadership of the DPR-GR and the Chairman of the Presidium/Bearer of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966. There were six points that became the essence of the meeting.

First, to realize that there were equal responsibilities between BP-MPRS and DPR-GR in accordance with the 1945 Constitution, including authority, limits on supervisory rights in relation to MPRS decisions/decrees, which, according to the MPRS Rules of Procedure, the MPRS Working Body also had a control function over the Government work. Therefore, it was necessary to hold consultative meetings between the two leaders of the institution (the MPRS leadership and the DPR-GR leadership). This consultation was intended to carry out a division of duties in supervising MPRS decisions.

Second, the Chairman of the Cabinet Presidium as the Assistant to the President/Head of the Executive would accommodate and respond to all state issues and would always consult with the leaders of the MPRS and DPR-GR. The results of this triangular meeting would then be brought to the Chief Executive/President for discussion and deliberation.

Third, if the second attempt failed, then the Chairman of the Cabinet Presidium would invite the Leaders of the MPRS and the Leaders of the DPR-GR to discuss directly with the Chief Executive/President, while in this kind of meeting, the Chairman of the Cabinet Presidium would position himself as Assistant to the President.

Fourth, if the third way still failed, only in such circumstances as the final weapon to overcome state difficulties, the MPRS would then be invited to hold a session at the summons of a session (Special Session) by the DPR-GR or hold a general assembly at the decision of the MPRS Working Body.

Fifth, the MPRS as the last institution to intervene in overcoming state difficulties would only hold its session after the lower institutions were no longer able to handle them.

The last point, which was the sixth, everything was based on its policies, namely if the problems that could still be resolved should be resolved by each institution under the MPRS with the best possible resolution.

The IV General Assembly of the MPRS was finally held from 20 June to 5 July 1966 without a hitch. The president, who was previously unwilling to provide an accountability report, finally agreed because of strong political pressure from the MPRS. After the IV General Assembly of the MPRS, President Soekarno dissolved the Dwikora Cabinet and later formed the Ampera Cabinet.

Meanwhile, the problems that could be isolated should be isolated first. Because, what was important was that the goal could be achieved without causing unnecessary things.

The process of reform in the legislative sector after the IV General Assembly of the MPRS had also started to be rolled out. On 19 November 1966, the DPR-GR approved Law Number 10 of 1966 concerning the Position of the MPRS and DPR-GR Ahead of the General Election. With this law, for the first time after Indonesia returned to the 1945 Constitution, the composition and position of the MPRS and DPR-GR were made in the form of a law.

Ahead of the IV MPRS General Assembly, the DPR-GR worked hard to prepare ideas for solving the political and juridical crisis. On 9 June 1966, the DPR-GR in its plenary session ratified the DPR-GR Resolution on "Contributions of Thoughts to be Made the Main Event in the IV General Assembly of the MPRS". The contribution included three main issues to overcome the political crisis, namely the source of the legal order of the Republic of Indonesia, the Order of Legislation of the Republic of Indonesia, and proposals and suggestions. Specifically regarding proposals and suggestions, it was proposed that the MPRS ratify the March 11, 1966 Warrant.

The IV General Assembly of the MPRS was finally held from 20 June to 5 July 1966 without a hitch. The president, who was previously unwilling to provide an accountability report, finally agreed because of strong political pressure from the MPRS. After the IV General Assembly of the MPRS, President Soekarno dissolved the *Dwikora* Cabinet and later formed the *Ampera* Cabinet. Soekarno remained the president, but the preparation of the cabinet was left to General Suharto as the *Supersemar* bearer. Soeharto then assembled a cabinet after consulting with the leadership of the MPRS-GR. The MPRS and DPR-GR leaders no longer had ministerial positions in the cabinet.

The MPRS also decided to withdraw MPRS Decree No. III/MPRS/1963 concerning the Appointment of the Great Leader of the Revolution to become President for Life. The withdrawal, as stipulated in Article 1, would not affect President Soekarno's term of office until another decision was made by the MPR as a result of the general election. The decree took effect on 5 July 1966.

In addition, President Soekarno would give accountability to the MPRS, in the IV General Assembly, with the President's speech entitled *Nawaksara*. *Nawa* meant nine, while *aksara* was meant as articles or points by President Soekarno. So *Nawaksara* meant 9 articles or 9 points, namely 9 articles on the main ideas conveyed by President Soekarno to the MPRS.

In response to the speech, the MPRS argued that *Nawaksara* speech did not meet the expectations of the people, especially MPRS members, because it did not clearly state the policies of the President/MPRS Mandatary regarding the counter-revolutionary events of the September 30 Movement and its epilogue.

PROLOGUE OF THE NEW ORDER:

RESULTS OF WORK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE RENEWAL ERA

The MPRS through the Decree of the MPRS of the Republic of Indonesia Number XXXIII/MPRS/1967 revoked the power of state government from President Soekarno. In the MPRS Decree, the entire speech of the President/MPRS Mandatary that was conveyed to the MPRS on 22 June 1966, entitled "Nawaksara", did not meet the expectations of the people in general.

THE MPRS also considered that the President/MPRS Mandatary had handed over the power of the State Administration to the bearer of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 as stated in the Presidential Announcement/MPRS Mandatary dated 20 February 1967. Then, based on the written report of the Operational Commander for the Restoration of Security and Order/Bearer of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 in his letter No. R-032/'67 of 1 February 1967, which was accompanied by his report speech before the Special Session of the MPRS on 7 March 1967, the MPRS believed that there were signs that President Soekarno had made policies that indirectly benefited the G30S PKI and protected the G30S PKI leaders.

Decree Number XXXIII/MPRS/1967 concerning the Revocation of Power of State Administration from President Soekarno consisted of three chapters with seven articles. Chapter 1 consisted of Article 1 to 5; each of Chapter 2 and 3 contained one article, namely Article 6 and 7.

Article 1 stated that President Soekarno had been unable to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities, like what was supposed to be the Mandatary's obligation to the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, as the person who was mandated, as regulated in the 1945 Constitution.

Article 2 stated that President Soekarno could not carry out the guidelines and decisions of the MPRS, like what was supposed to be the obligation



of a Mandatary to the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, as the person who was mandated, as regulated in the 1945 Constitution.

Article 3 prohibited President Soekarno from carrying out political activities until the general election. Since the enactment of the decree, the mandate of the MPRS was withdrawn from President Soekarno as well as all State Government Powers regulated in the 1945 Constitution.

Article 4 stipulated the enactment of MPRS Decree No. XV/MPRS/1966 and appointed General Soeharto, the bearer of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966, as Presidential Official based on Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution until the election of the President by the MPR as a result of the General Election. Article 5 read that a Presidential Official was subject to and responsible to the Provisional MPR.

Chairman of the Ampera Cabinet Presidium, General Soeharto, after delivering a government statement at the DPR Building.



Sukarno and the volunteer
troops which will be deployed
for Dwikora.

Article 6 stipulated that the explanation of further legal issues concerning Dr. Ir. Soekarno was based on legal provisions to uphold law and justice and left the implementation to the Presidential Official.

Article 7 as the final article explained that the decree was retroactive starting from 22 February 1967. The decree was enacted in Jakarta on 12 March 1967 with the signature of the MPRS Speaker TNI General A.H. Nasution and his four deputies, Osa Maliki, H.M. Subhan Z.E., M. Siregar, and Maj. Gen. Mashudi.

With regard to the New Order, when referring to the “Principles of Policies of the Next *Amperta* Cabinet After the Special Session of the MPRS/1967 and the Next Development Plan”, it was explained that the New Order was the order of all aspects of the life of the People, Nation and State of the Republic of Indonesia, placed on the purity of the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

When viewed from the process, the birth of the ideal of realizing the New Order was a principal reaction and correction to the practices of abuse

that had occurred in the past, commonly known as the Old Order regime. Therefore, the most important understanding of the New Order was an order that had the attitude and mental determination and good faith to serve the people and the national interest, which was based on the philosophy of Pancasila, and upheld the principles of the 1945 Constitution.

The situational foundations of the New Order were the foundations used until the formation of a new Government after the general election, which consisted of a structural foundation, namely the *Ampera* Cabinet and all its apparatus, with "*Dwi-Dharma*" and "*Tjatur-Karja*" as the program foundation, as had been determined by the IV General Assembly of MPRS.

In the period of 1969 to 1973, it could be estimated that the capabilities of the state were still very limited. Program targets could be achieved through the concept of planned development which consisted of three patterns, namely the Material Development Pattern, the Spiritual Development Pattern, and the Defense and Security Development Pattern.

Meanwhile, during the transition to the New Order Government, or during the 1966-1967 session, the DPR-GR had discussed and ratified 13 bills.

DPR-RI DURING THE NEW ORDER: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE STATE (1967-1998)




The parliament or what is commonly referred to in Indonesia as the People's Representative Council (DPR) is essentially a tool to limit the power of a president in a country that adheres to a presidential system.



THE HISTORY AND THE ROLE OF DPR-GR 1967-1971

Slowly, Indonesia's political changes began to occur in the mid-1960s. The trigger was the incident that happened at dawn on 1 October 1965, where there was an assassination of the Minister Commander of the Armed Forces (AD) and five generals by a military gang with ties to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).



The post-September 30 Movement (G30S) period in 1965 was a difficult period for the Indonesian people to go through. The incident caused a number of serious impacts on various aspects of life and social strata of society. One of the most memorable was the one in the political aspect. It could be said that the Guided Democracy period (1959-1966) was a period in which there was a struggle for influence between several political and military factions with different ideologies.

Broadly speaking, there were two opposing forces at that time, namely the military faction and the communist faction. However, there were things that had been forgotten in the discussion of the political arena in Indonesia at the time. One of them was regarding the role and function of pre- and post-Guided Democracy parliaments.

At that time, the Indonesian parliament was controlled by the majority of major parties such as the PNI, PKI, and some of the Islamic factions within the NU Party. In addition, at this time, there was a quite significant intervention and influence of President Soekarno, as if the parliament was under his political control.

The parliament or what is commonly referred to in Indonesia as the People's Representative Council (DPR) is essentially a tool to limit the power of a president in a country that adheres to a presidential system. If all powers, legislature, executive, and judiciary—referring to the theory of



Montesquieu, a French political philosopher—are centered on the president, he will emerge as an institution that tends to be dictatorial because he controls the functions of high state institutions.

In this regard, the DPR should have a significant role in the course of the political history of the Indonesian nation. However, in several historical periods, especially during the period of President Soekarno's rule and the New Order era led by President Soeharto, the role of the DPR was reduced by various executive powers of the president, which then reduced the authority of the DPR as a legislative body.

However, the reality was that there had been a major change in the powers and functions of the DPR, both after President Soekarno's decree and during the fall of the Old Order. At that time, Soeharto's prestige rose, not only because he was concerned with national security and order in the public sphere, but he was also authorized to "secure the conditions" of the Government and politics, especially from the communist elements. During this period, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, or abbreviated as *Kopkamtib*, was formed, which was commanded by Soeharto himself.

The inauguration of Soeharto as an official president by the MPRS in March 1968 marked the end of leadership dualism in Indonesia. At the same time, it ended the Old Order era and started the New Order rule.

The atmosphere in one of DPR-GR's assembly in 1967.



Achmad Syaikh, Speaker of the DPR-GR for the period of 1967-1971 and President Soekarno.

The birth of the New Order Government was based on the determination and commitment to make a total correction of the shortcomings of the political system that had been implemented previously. And the intended correction was to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consistent manner.

Since the beginning, before the New Order government officially started, since 1966 there had actually been a shift in the government's focus of attention. From the problem of nation building to economic development, it was no longer politics that was the commander in chief, but the economy.

To make this correction, the New Order first started with what was called the "national consensus". There were two kinds of national consensus, namely, first, in the form of the determination of the government and society to implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consistent manner. This first consensus was also known as the main consensus. Meanwhile, the second consensus was about the ways to implement the main consensus. This second consensus was born between the Government and political parties and the society.

What prompted the birth of this consensus was the great concern about the desire and effort to change Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with other ideologies and constitutions. The replacement of ideology and constitution with another was considered to replace the order of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition to the concerns about ideology, the New Order simultaneously launched a national development program that was outlined in the long term (25 years) and short term or interval (5 years) pattern.

These two things had prompted the birth of a national consensus which was then set forth in a law, so that it was not only morally but also juridically binding. The laws in question were the Law on the Composition and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD (the Regional House of Representatives), the Law on Elections, the Law on Political Parties and *Golkar*, and the Law on Social Organizations.

It did not stop there; the New Order Government then carried out political restructuring in order to create political order, which included five things:

1. Controlled Bureaucracy

To make Government programs run effectively, an effective bureaucracy that was responsive to the executive leadership was needed. Bureaucratic reform by the New Order Government led to the centralization of government. This included three things, namely, first, the centralization of the Government's policy-making process. This step was manifested in the form of State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) and the Five-Year Development Plan (*Repelita*).

Second, making the bureaucracy more responsive to the central leadership. This strategy caused many ABRI officers and civil technocrats who were oriented to modernization to enter Government agencies.

“In addition to the concerns about ideology, the New Order simultaneously launched a national development program that was outlined in a long term (25 years) and short term or interval (5 years) pattern.”

Third, expanding the authority of the central Government and consolidating control over the regions. The central Government placed the people who could be controlled centrally in various local government positions. ABRI got the highest percentage in this case.

2. Unified Armed Forces

The problem that the new government was facing is factionalism within the armed forces. The military was divided between Sukarno's loyalists, Soeharto's supporters, and regional commanders who enjoyed autonomy. From 1966 to early 1967, Soeharto replaced the regional commanders with officers who favored him. This consolidation coincided with the impediment of General A.H. Nasution, who was a senior general of the Armed Forces. He placed General Nasution in a high but not influential civil post, namely as Speaker of the MPRS.

3. A More Responsive Representative Body

One of the most important legislative policies was the mechanism for recalling members from their membership in the DPR (recall). This model of discipline allowed the political party's central leadership to withdraw their representatives from the DPR if they did not follow the party's instructions. With this kind of mechanism, the Government controlled the behavior of its legislators. The recall system was useful in limiting the diversity of opinions in legislative politics. There had been no significant changes since then. The elections in the New Order era only validated parliamentary politics.

4. Simplifying Political Parties

According to the New Order elite, the problem with Indonesian political parties arose because most of them were ideologically oriented, not program-oriented, and there were too many of them. The MPRS, which was formally the highest political institution, had determined that elections would be held in 1968. Suharto must pay attention to the MPRS stipulations on how to hold elections without compromising the Government's economic program. In other words, elections should give Government's mandates to the groups most committed to development.

Responding to the decision regarding the election, Soeharto's group came up with the following strategy:

1. Forming a new political grouping for the DPR consisting of non-party politicians who were tied to the Government's development program. Finally, the urgent need to have a representative group in the DPR and an election machine (both needed in carrying out the constitutional strategy) led the New Order leaders to use the *Golkar* Secretariat and put their own people in leadership positions for the organization. The decision to enter the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups was facilitated by the agreement reached with political parties about the postponement of the general election until 1971.
2. Encourage the creation of some kind of representation of corporate interests. The main purpose of corporatization was to control the representation of interest groups in such a way as to prevent social conflict or threaten government power. In addition, to complement the Government's strategy in controlling the bureaucracy and eliminating the influence of political parties in it, the main target of corporatization during the New Order was associations representing civil servants.
3. Simplifying political parties through grouping. The final strategy was the control of political parties in Indonesia. The first step towards simplification of political parties with Decree no. 22/1966 on the rearrangement of the political structure. On 27 February 1970, Soeharto met with party leaders to discuss the Government's plan to reduce the number of parties by dividing them into two groups. The meeting resulted in the formation of two coalition groups in the DPR in March 1970:
 - a. The Development Democracy Group, consisting of the PNI, IPKI, Murba, Partindo, and the Catholic Party.
 - b. The United Development Group, consisting of NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti.

On 5 January 1973, the United Development Group with Islamic aspirations became the United Development Party (PPP), while on 10 January 1973, the Development Democracy Group became the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).

“Although all policy makers in the New Order government were determined by the bureaucracy rather than by laws, elections, or parliament, the economic policies that were combined in the Pelita (Five-Year Development) program were able to make an incredibly fast economic recovery.”

The final step was taken after the 1971 general election. Following the heavy blow they received as a result of the election results and constant pressure from the Government, the nine political parties finally agreed to merge into two parties. On 5 January 1973, the United Development Group with Islamic aspirations became the United Development Party (PPP), while on 10 January 1973, the Development Democracy Group became the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Since then, Indonesia had a three-party system, namely Golkar, PPP, and PDI, and this continued until the 1997 general election.

In practice, Soeharto's broad and largely uncontrollable presidential power was used as a legal basis for selecting people of his choice to occupy strategic positions. It was not surprising that he succeeded in controlling the bureaucracy, the military, the legislature, and the judiciary at the same time. Not only that, because there was no limit to presidential term in the constitution, Soeharto could even be elected six times in a row as President of the Republic of Indonesia (1971-1998).

Although all policy makers in the New Order government were determined by the bureaucracy rather than by laws, elections, or parliament, the economic policies that were combined in the *Pelita* (Five-Year Development) program were able to make an incredibly fast economic recovery. What was manifested first was the sharp decline in inflation and an increase in economic growth.

THE ROLE OF THE DPR AND ARISING CRITICISM OF THE NEW ORDER 1977-1982

There seemed to be some kind of concern that if Golkar's did not win 100% of the votes in the general election then the policy program of Soeharto's government would be threatened.

IN the 1977 General Election, Golkar became the "least able" electoral participant to maintain or even increase their percentage of votes. Golkar experienced a 0.7 percent decrease in votes compared to the results of the 1971 general election.

Given Golkar's efforts in campaigning, the support it had, and its political strategy, losing 0.7 percent of Golkar's votes on a national scale was considered a defeat for this group and a victory for PPP. The strength of the PPP campaign and the number of people who attended the general meetings of the Islamic party showed the solidity of the PPP's mass base. In another sense, for many people the future of PPP was bright, while Golkar's was bleak.

The idea of controlling the ideological power that was concentrated within the political parties was later embodied in the party simplification program (the merger of political parties) carried out by the Soeharto government. The plan to simplify political parties was divided into three stages.

First, the identity grouping of political parties such as nationalist, spiritualist, and functional groups. Second, the formation of four factions in parliament, namely the faction of ABRI, *Golkar*, United Development, and Development Democracy. Third, the process of merger of various political parties into three parties.

The merger process required a legal basis, so parliament needed the bills (RUU) on political parties and *Golkar*. *Golkar* tried to draft the bill in accordance with Soeharto's wishes to further limit the parties' ability to



President Suharto gave a speech in front of DPR-GR's assembly.

compete with *Golkar*. They lobbied other factions to agree on the bill so that it would be passed as a law. The lobbying took four years until finally the Law Number 3 of 1975 concerning Political Parties and *Golkar* was passed on 15 August 1975.

The law prevented civil servants from joining the party, limited the choices of party ideological principles to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and prohibited party organization below the municipal level. The law also stipulated that there were only three election participants, namely the United Development Party (PPP), the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the Functional Groups, or *Golkar*.

Entering 1977-1978, university students began to make their moves again. The rising political climate in Indonesia, which began to be dynamic even before the 1977 general election and the 1978 presidential election, as well as the emergence of various socio-economic problems, made students feel called upon to act. In Jakarta there was an increase in city bus fares, in Surabaya there was an eviction of street vendors, and in Bogor there was a lot of control over community land by officials.

As was the case with the student movement of 1974, the 1977/1978 movement did not have a single organization as a forum for unifying students

throughout Indonesia. In addition to each Student Council moving to carry out their actions, they also held meetings in order to garner cohesiveness, which usually produced the formulations that were demanded by them in their actions.

Various demands were made by students in the 1977-1978 movement. Starting from local demands, such as solving the problem of hunger, to national demands, such as democratization in Indonesia and the holding of a Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to hold President Soeharto accountable, which was considered to have violated the implementation of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. However, the most prominent demand in the student movement of 1977-1978 reached its climax regarding their lawsuit against the national leadership. Students rejected Soeharto as president for the third time.

“As was the case with the student movement of 1974, the 1977/1978 movement did not have a single organization as a forum for unifying students throughout Indonesia.”



The Government's reaction to this student movement was quite strong, both through physical instruments and policies. On 21 January 1978, Admiral Sudomo through the Decree of the Operational Commander for the Restoration of Security and Order number SK19 EP/02/KOPKAMTIB/I/1978 suspended the activities of the entire Student Council (*Dema*) of universities/colleges/institutes. The next government's action against the campus was handed over from *Kopkamtib* Chief of Staff Sudomo to the Minister of Education and Culture Daoed Joesoef. On that occasion, Daoed Joesoef immediately issued a Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture No. 0156/U/1978 concerning the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK), which was officially enacted on 19 April 1978. The contents of this policy prohibited students from practicing politics on campus.

In addition to the arrests of student figures, during 1977-1978 the Government carried out repressive measures against a number of other important figures. Several scholars and retiring military figures who were critical towards the government were given warnings. Among them, Prof. Dr.

Speaker of the DPR-RI, Adam Malik, while welcoming the Student Council/Student Senate from Semarang, on 19 January 1978 at the DPR-RI Building.

The New Order Government's strong response towards its critics made the life of democracy in Indonesia highly dependent on the Government, in this case the President. The 1982 general election took place without too much tension.

Ismail Sunny, a University of Indonesia's lecturer and expert on constitutional law, was arrested for being vocal in supporting the student protest movement. A number of retired military figures were also warned because they were critical of and considered anti-Suharto. For example, General (Ret.) A.H. Nasution, Ali Sadikin, H.R. Dharsono, and Kemal Idris. In addition to arresting these figures, the Government had also banned mass media (newspapers) which were considered unbalanced in broadcasting student activities.

After that series of events, at the Meeting of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia in Pekanbaru, Riau, 27 March 1980, President Soeharto as the Supreme Commander of ABRI gave a speech and alluded to the single principle of Pancasila. According to him, in the past Pancasila was undermined by other ideologies and political parties. "I'm asking ABRI to support *Golkar* in the general election," Suharto said during an unscripted speech.

Three weeks later, at the *Kopassandha* Headquarters (now *Kopassus*, or the Special Forces Command), Cijantung, 16 April 1980, President Soeharto reiterated his statement. "It's better for us to kidnap one of the two-thirds of the MPR members who are going to amend the 1945 Constitution, so there won't be a quorum." He also stated that criticizing him meant criticizing Pancasila.

Soeharto's two statements made a number of military and political figures anxious. They then gathered at the Grahadi Building in the Semanggi area on 5 May 1980. They later concluded that Soeharto needed to provide an explanation for his two statements. The statement of concern for the figures was signed by 50 people. Later the name of this statement was referred to by the government as Petition 50.

The letter infuriated Soeharto for mentioning the change of national leadership. The Government then pressured the signatories of the letter with various measures, from banning them to complicating their social lives.

The New Order Government's strong response towards its critics made the life of democracy in Indonesia highly dependent on the Government, in this case the President. The 1982 general election took place without too much tension.

Like the DPR in the two previous periods, the DPR during the period of 1982-1987 was also produced through general elections, namely on Tuesday, 4 May 1982. A new development in the implementation of the general election at that time was the election in the province of East Timor, which in the 1977 general election had not been included because it had only been integrated with Indonesia on 17 July 1976.

In addition, on 12 August 1981 an institution known as the Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslak*) was formed. It was in charge of overseeing the elections and minimizing fraud during the election. *Panwaslak* was chaired by the Attorney General and supervised the elections for members of the DPR, Level I DPRD, and Level II DPRD in their respective working areas. The formation of the *Panwaslak* only accommodated problems raised by the public and electoral contestants instead of dealing with criminal and criminal issues related to elections. After the *Panwaslak* was formed, all political party protests could be resolved through a deliberative mechanism.

Elections are an important principle in the sustainability of the democratic system of a country. In a democratic country, elections are an important channel for the people's political sovereignty because the people can make their political decisions. Elections then began to become a periodical political agenda that had been routinely carried out in Indonesia since the New Order era. The 1987 general election was the 4th general election held at this time. Elections were held on 23 April 1987 simultaneously in all regions of Indonesia to elect members of the legislature for the period 1987-1992.

The institution authorized to hold general elections is the General Elections Institution. The membership structure of the General Elections Institution was mostly filled by individuals from the inner circles of the Government. The institution was headed by the Minister of Home Affairs who was appointed by the President.

“The stipulation of Pancasila as the sole principle caused fundamental changes in political parties which previously were identical with certain ideologies.”

The electoral system carried out in 1987 was the same as the 1982 election, which used a proportional representation system with a list system. In addition, the 1987 general election used a new law, namely Law Number 1 of 1985 concerning General Elections. In principle, the new law generally did not have any significant changes compared to the previous law, except regarding the equality of Pancasila principles and the addition of the number of members in the DPR, from 460 people in the 1971, 1977 and 1982 elections, to 500 people in the 1987 election.

In a controlled atmosphere due to the implementation of the Pancasila policy as the sole principle, the 1987 general election was held. *Golkar*, as the political engine of the New Order government, welcomed the 1987 general election with optimism. Meanwhile, PDI and PPP tended to be pessimistic because the single principle policy was certain to obscure their identity and became a challenge in itself to overcome it.

The stipulation of Pancasila as the sole principle caused fundamental changes in political parties which previously were identical with certain ideologies. In the 1987 general election, the organizations participating in the elections must be able to find and develop a new identity that no longer relied on ideological and primordial ties that previously became their identity. For PPP and PDI, the 1987 general election presented its own challenges.

DPR UNTIL THE END OF THE NEW ORDER IN 1992-1998:

A CHALLENGE TO THE RISE OF DEMOCRATIZATION?

It seemed that the government tended to place the DPR as subordinate to the state, or at least the Government's partner in achieving the dual targets of the New Order State: political stability and economic growth.

IN the New Order's political blueprint, the DPR was not an autonomous political institution. Through various instruments, the DPR was "regulated" and "controlled" by the State. In the terms of budget, for example, the DPR did not have autonomous financial rights. The Council's budget was subordinated to the State Secretariat, so there was very little opportunity for this people's representative institution to freely design the budget and finance its activities and needs. This meant that the political activity of the Council was highly dependent on the state, so there was relatively little chance of taking a different stance.

This tendency to place the DPR more as a "partner" of the state was also reflected in the membership structure and recruitment mechanism of the DPR members. Apart from the elected members, the President also had the authority to appoint 100 people (20 percent) as members of ABRI. Meanwhile the elected members of the Council were not representatives of the people in the true sense. Candidates were determined by the central board of socio-political organizations and controlled by elements of the state, bureaucracy, and military through the special research mechanism.

So, many DPR members were not critical of the government because they were being held hostage. However, for the period of 1992-1998, there began to be a bit of movement from critical members. This was due to several things. First, the breakdown of good relations between the President and the military, especially since a civilian figure was elected the first time as Chairman of Golkar, namely Harmoko, through the 1993 Functional Groups National Meeting. Second, internal divisions within



Inauguration of the Leaders
of the DPR-RI for the Period
of 1982-1987 by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.

the military, especially the Armed Forces. Third, there was a rift between the financiers (conglomerates) and the state.

The fifth general election in the New Order Government was held on 9 June 1992. The electoral system used was still the same as the 1987 general election, which adhered to proportional representation with a list system. In the 1992 elections, it appeared that there had been a shift in the consideration of the mass of voters, which was from the ties of cultural or primordial traditions to socio-economic considerations. Not only that, the behavior of the bureaucratic apparatus, especially those deemed detrimental to the community, was also a consideration in voting.

What's new from this general election was the consideration of giving the right to vote to Indonesian citizens who had been involved in the G30S-PKI. The plan was discussed by the consideration team from September 1990 to March 1991. This was part of the preparation to support operational activities for the 1992 General Election. The Minister of Home Affairs, Rudini, confirmed that the Draft Amendment to Presidential Decree No. 63 of 1985 concerning procedures for research and assessment of

Indonesian citizens involved in the G30S-PKI was currently prepared to consider their right to vote in the 1992 General Election.

There was another new feature in the 1992 election. This time, the government required candidates for DPR members to undergo special research to obtain a certificate of not being involved in any prohibited organization (SKTT). After the results were processed, a recommendation from *Bakorstanas* (National Stability Assistance Coordination Agency) would be issued to the police. Based on the recommendation, the police would issue a certificate of non-involvement (SKTT) to the legislative candidates.

No less interesting than this period was, at the suggestion of the ABRI faction itself, there was a reduction in the members of the DPR-RI who were appointed from ABRI from 100 to 75 people. Since the 1990s, there had indeed been an internal ABRI reform movement. This movement was also called the 'return to barracks' movement or the movement to change ABRI into a professional army, and the return of the Police to a civilian security agency. This movement was initiated by the intellectual generals in ABRI. The final formulation of the bill that regulated the number of ABRI members in the DPR was approved by the factions in Commission II of the DPR.

In fact, in 1992, when Indonesia started talking about minimizing the number of ABRI members in the DPR, Soeharto reacted strongly. It was impossible, he said, for ABRI to relinquish its political role and solely carry out its military function. By accusing the academics of being unable to understand the true meaning of dual function (*Dwi Fungsi*), Soeharto gave guarantees to the officers, whom he called fellow officers and who visited his farm in Tapos, West Java, that the presence of ABRI in the legislature did not only represent ABRI, but also carry out the tasks entrusted to ABRI by the people. He reiterated that the dual function of the Indonesian armed forces had a strong legal basis in addition to historical reasons based on the history of the national struggle.

Likewise, the Government of Soeharto was still trying to dictate political parties. In 1996, the capital city of Jakarta was rocked by the PDI-Megawati Incident in Gambir, Jakarta. Only one month later, another

“The presence of ABRI in the legislature did not only represent ABRI, but also carry out the tasks entrusted to ABRI by the people.”

*The New Order
Government's plot to
overthrow Megawati
Soekarnoputri
was opposed by its
supporters by holding
an open hearing at
the PDI Central Board
Office.*

incident happened – also in Jakarta. This incident was an attack on the PDI office on Jalan Diponegoro and known as the Gray Saturday. The incident on 27 July 1996 was also known as the *Kudatuli* Incident (an acronym for the July 27 Riots).

The incident began with Megawati Soekarnoputri's victory in the Extraordinary Congress of the Indonesian Democratic Party (KLB PDI) in Surabaya in 1993. Megawati's victory was a threat to the New Order regime. This happened because of a conflict within the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), between the support group for Soerjadi (the General Chairperson of the 1996 Medan Congress) and the Megawati support group (General Chairperson of the Jakarta National Conference 1993). It reached its peak after the IV PDI congress in Medan on 20 June 1996.

Meanwhile, the Third PDI Congress, which was held in Pondok Gede, Jakarta, on 15 April 1986, and was opened by President Soeharto, failed to elect a general chairperson at its last session on 18 April 1986. Participants in the congress handed over their mandate to the Government to draft a new Central Board. The government established a new Central Board for the period of 1986-1991, led by Soerjadi (General Chairman) and Nicolaus Daryanto (Secretary General).

This choice was not accepted by all PDI members and sympathizers, so a National Conference was held in Jakarta in 1993 where Megawati won. Since then, there had been divisions within the PDI, and efforts to end the dualism of its leadership had been unsuccessful.

When the PDI Congress was going to be held in Medan, Megawati's party then formed the Team of Defenders of the Indonesian Democracy (TPDI) led by Amertiwi Saleh, R.O. Tambunan, and Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, to demand the Government to cancel the PDI Congress in Medan. However, the Congress still went on. Soeharto and his military aides engineered the PDI congress in Medan and reinstated Soerjadi as General Chairman of the PDI.

The New Order Government's plot to overthrow Megawati Soekarnoputri was opposed by its supporters by holding an open hearing at the PDI Central Board Office. This hearing, which was joined by a number of figures and activists who were critical of and opposed the New Order, was able to raise critical awareness of the political behavior of the New Order. So, when there was forced retrieval, people's resistance occurred. It started with the takeover of the PDI Central Board (DPP) Office at Jalan Diponegoro 58, Central Jakarta, by the masses and was followed by mass riots in Jakarta.



Seeing the riots, the Government reacted strongly. ABRI Chief of Staff of Social and Political Affairs Syarwan Hamid and Director General of Social and Political Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs Sutoyo N.K. invited a number of mass organizations to the Ministry of Home Affairs. They stated that the riots that developed were no longer purely an internal PDI problem, but had expanded with the inclusion of various interests allied with the PDI leadership. A total of 240 people were arrested and 120 people were declared suspects. The incident continued with the pursuit and arrest of several PDI activists who were detained by the Attorney General.

July 27, 1996 Incident.

The political motive in this case was very clear. Even later in the confession of PDI Chairman Soerjadi, it was said that the raid was carried out by *Brimob* and TNI dressed as PDI. Apart from these leaders being detained, there were also possibilities that there would be victims as a result of this incident.

The efforts of the Government of Soeharto to regulate the management of PDI were to maintain control of the party, especially ahead of the 1997 general election, and at the same time the emergence of the Soekarno family in the PDI.



Students occupying the DPR-RI Building, 18 May 1998.

The 1997 general election or the sixth election, which later turned out to be the last election of the New Order era, was held on 29 May 1997. This was to elect members of the DPR-RI as well as members of the Level I Provincial DPRD and Level II Regency/Municipality DPRD throughout Indonesia for the 1997-2002 period.

The PDI internal conflict which caused the disappointment of residents and PDI sympathizers was responded tactically by the Surakarta PPP Branch Executive Board by raising the issue of "Mega-Star" (Mega-Bintang). The issue, which was a phenomenon of the joining of the PDI masses supporting Megawati in the PPP campaign (the star, the symbol of the PPP at the time) wearing the "Mega-Star" attribute, turned out to have received an enthusiastic response from the PDI mass supporters of

Megawati, not only in Surakarta but also in various cities in Java, such as Semarang, Malang, Surabaya, and Jakarta. Megawati's supporters joined the PPP campaign without losing their identity as Megawati's supporters.

The phenomenon of "Mega-Star" significantly became a widespread discourse during the campaign. When the PPP masses were campaigning, both the campaign participants and the public sympathizers always made codes (symbols) on their fingers with the numbers 1 and 3 as symbols of PPP and Megawati's PDI. Not to be missed, the red-green flag with the words "Mega-Star" was also raised and hoisted, such as during the PPP campaign in Jakarta on 8 May 1997. The crowd consisting of tens of thousands of PPP sympathizers was like drowning Jakarta in a sea of green, the color of the PPP uniform. The crowd also paraded Megawati's image. In fact, at that time, Megawati did not take part in the election because she was at odds with the PDI, which was led by Soerjadi.

Seeing the unfavorable development of the situation, the Government responded by issuing a ban on carrying "Mega-Star" banners and costumes in the campaign. The resistant masses instead came up with a political pun to get around the ban. As a result, there appeared banners that were written with the word "Megang-Bintang" (Touching the Star) and other idioms that wanted to show that Megawati's supporters were still able to express themselves in the election campaign.

The Mega-Star issue emerged as the antithesis of *Golkar's* hegemony which it always won since the 1971 general election. PPP and PDI residents wanted change, including the replacement of President Suharto. At that time, there was a discourse that supported Megawati as President of the Republic of Indonesia, and her deputy was Buya Ismail Hasan Metareum, General Chairman of PPP. This was one form of resistance from the election participants to not "become *Golkar*".

Two months after the 1997 general elections were held, the financial crisis or monetary crisis hit almost all of East Asia and Southeast Asia in July 1997, including Indonesia. For this reason, in October 1997, the Government invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assist in the crisis recovery program in Indonesia.

Seeing the unfavorable development of the situation, the Government responded by issuing a ban on carrying "Mega-Star" banners and costumes in the campaign.

On 31 October 1997, the first letter of intent (LoI) was approved, which was an IMF crisis recovery program with a standby loan facility of US\$ 38 billion. As a follow-up to the deal, 16 banks were liquidated on 1 November and the Government said it would guarantee the repayment of depositors' funds in those banks.

In the midst of the economic downturn, the 1998 MPR General Assembly was held on 1 to 11 March 1998. During the five-year national agenda, on 5 March, as many as 20 University of Indonesia students came to the DPR/MPR Building to express their rejection of the accountability speech of the President presented at the General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly and submit the national reform agenda. They were accepted by the ABRI Faction.



Speaker of the DPR-RI, Harmoko holding a Press Conference asking Soeharto to step down.

However, *Golkar*, with its majority in the MPR, re-nominated Soeharto as president. Soeharto, who seemed confident he could overcome the economic crisis, accepted the nomination for the seventh term. Soeharto's attitude triggered a strong reaction in society, especially among students, hence becoming the starting point for the birth of the reform movement to displace Soeharto's power.

The period of 1976-1988 could be said to be the golden period of the New Order. The various programs it created were successful. The Family Planning Program was implemented to suppress the very high population



growth. The population growth rate was reduced to 1.97 percent in the 1980s. Self-sufficiency in food and education was also a concern of the New Order regime.

In fact, in the early 1990s, success in spurring high economic growth, an average of 7 percent, made Indonesia classified among a group of developing countries that would soon become a newly industrialized country, following in the footsteps of other countries in Asia such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

However, 30 years later, the continuity of Indonesia's economic growth began to experience crisis and stagnation, even leading to bankruptcy. The initial explosion was the occurrence of depreciation, the decline in the Rupiah exchange rate against foreign currencies. In a short time, the political sector was also affected, which led to the "overthrow" of President Soeharto as the supreme ruler of the New Order regime by pro-democracy community groups led by students on 21 May 1998. Since then until now, in Indonesia, there is a new political order called the Reform Order.

**Soeharto declared his resignation
from his position as President,
21 May 1998.**

THE DYNAMICS AND ROLES OF DPR-RI IN IMPROVING THE LIFE OF THE NATION IN THE REFORMATION ERA (1998-2018)




*The leaders of the DPR/MPR
at the time finally decided
to ask President Soeharto to
step down.*



THE 1999 ELECTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POST-NEW ORDER DPR

The 1998 Reformation brought Indonesia into a new era when efforts to start a more democratic life of the nation and state found their momentum.



In the history of Indonesia, the birth of the reformation era could be traced back to the momentum of President Soeharto's fall from power in May 1998, after serving for 32 years. This did not happen out of nowhere. The emergence of reformation was an accumulation of a long series of events and popular discontent.

All this dissatisfaction began when, for years, the logic of the centralization of the state on a single actor had been so strong in all aspects of people's lives, including in political and economic matters. Soeharto, who was supported by the bureaucracy and the military, pushed his power to the largest extent. Starting from the prohibition of political parties during the New Order from campaigning in villages, the emergence of regulations to regulate and tame students' critical attitudes, such as the NKK/BKK (Normalization of Campus Life/Student Coordination Board), as well as various repressive actions.

The policies implemented by the New Order through the centralization of his power actually had the aim of making Indonesia a stable country. The stability promoted by the Government of President Soeharto had become an icon as well as a slogan, in addition to being a word of motivation, which was often mentioned in public speeches. This was a kind of antithesis of the era that made politics the commander-in-chief, and caused other aspects of the nation such as the economy to get less attention.



However, over time the concept of national stability promoted by the New Order moved away from the meaning of wanting Indonesia to become an advanced and prosperous democratic country. Gradually, the word was degraded into an anti critical logic.

This, coupled with the economic crisis that hit Indonesia, gave rise to a massive student demonstration movement. The movement that was consistently carried out by the students bore fruit when they pressured the leadership of the DPR/MPR to take a stance to reshuffle the national leadership.

The leaders of the DPR/MPR at the time finally decided to ask President Soeharto to step down. This was conveyed by the chairman of the DPR/MPR at that time, Harmoko, accompanied by other leaders, who were Ismail Hasan Metareum, Abdul Gafur, Fatimah Achmad, and Syarwan Hamid, on 18 May 1998.

Knowing that he was at the end of his power, Soeharto then announced his resignation on 21 May 1998. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who was then Vice President, was then lined up to become the third President of the Republic of Indonesia

Stop studying action at University of Indonesia to protest the New Order policies.

(Source: Suara Mahasiswa UI)



**BJ Habibie as the third President
of RI.**

(Source: Personal documentation)

Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, or better known as B.J. Habibie, was no stranger to Soeharto and most of the people at the time. He was a German graduate inventor and researcher specializing in aeronautical engineering. Habibie, before becoming Vice President, had been in Soeharto's Development Cabinet for several periods. He entered the first cabinet in 1978.

Immediately after becoming President, Habibie at the time carried out a series of populist policies to boost his popularity, because some considered him to be just a shadow of the previous president and had weak legitimacy in running the Government. For this purpose, he and representatives of the DPR/MPR at the time agreed to hold a Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly at the end of 1998.

The agenda of the Special Session was to revoke MPR RI Decree No. XIV/MPR/1998 concerning Amendments and Supplements to MPR RI Decree No. III/MPR/1988 concerning General Elections. In the decree, the next election was scheduled for 2002, then it was proposed that it could be held immediately no later than June 1999.

Immediately after that, there were preparatory steps taken to support the journey of the first general election during the reformation period. This included implementing several policies.

1. Revision of three Political Laws which resulted in Law no. 2 concerning Political Parties, Law no. 3 concerning General Elections, Law no. 4 concerning the Position/Composition of members of DPR/MPR, DPRD 1/11.
2. Selection of political parties.
3. Establishment of an organizing body to carry out the first general election of the reformation era, which in this case was the General Elections Commission (KPU).
4. Implementation of elections.

The three laws were an important part of the Government's commitment to reform. This was mainly with regard to the socio-political field which was considered incompatible with the principles of democracy. These three bills were then signed on 1 February 1999 by President B.J. Habibie and the then Minister of State Secretary Akbar Tanjung.

On the other hand, the reformation marked by the fall of Soeharto also launched a discourse on limiting the socio-political involvement of ABRI

(Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in the Government, which was better known as the Dual Function of ABRI. This was especially focused on reviewing the doctrine of national defense and security which was a core part of the ABRI concept.

During the New Order era, the military had a close connection to the political history in Indonesia. This was preceded by the Provisional MPR session on 12 March 1967, when Soeharto rose to replace Soekarno. It was as if there was a military victory over civilian politicians at the time. Soeharto with the support of the military then prepared an appropriate election law, centralized and strengthened the existing leadership, put political parties under tight control, and prepared and finalized *Golkar* (Functional Groups) to become a political vehicle to win elections.

Of course, there were significant results. In the 1971 general election, for example, and then in the subsequent elections, *Golkar*, which was backed by the military and bureaucrats, had always won and received more than 50 percent of the votes in every election.

These victories certainly confirmed the dominance of the military in the world of politics in Indonesia. This also had a significant impact on the concept of politics in Indonesia, when ABRI or the military at the time were also a political force to be reckoned with.

Finally, after conducting an in-depth study for approximately five months since Soeharto's fall from power, ABRI gave an answer by issuing a book entitled *ABRI XXI Century: Redefinition, Repositioning and Reactualization of the Role of the TNI in the Life of the Nation*. This book contained the main points of reformation that would be implemented within ABRI. Three things that later became the key elements of the changes that ABRI tried to make in response to these reformation were: (1) empowerment of functional institutions, (2) carrying out the role of the TNI as part of the national system, and (3) TNI's role in accordance with the national consensus.

“On the other hand, the reformation marked by the fall of Soeharto also launched a discourse on limiting the socio-political involvement of ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in the Government, which was better known as the Dual Function of ABRI.”



Soldier on armored fighting vehicles during the May 1998 riots.

(Source: AJI Documentation)

The four concepts of reformation that were later used to carry out internal changes were, first, changing positions and methods so that they did not always have to be at the forefront. Second, changing the concept from occupying to exerting influence. Third, changing the way of persuasion that was previously a direct influence to an indirect influence.

Then, fourth, always holding hearings in every important decision-making, such as in terms of the state and the Government with other national components, which in this case were referred to as civil society circles.

The reformation period was undeniably a time for Indonesia to start a new era. The period in which there was a change that could be directly felt and seen clearly at the time. This was no exception in the context of the first general election during the reformation period.

This general election was considered a benchmark for the success of reforming reforms in Indonesia. Moreover, previously, it was continuously constrained by the pressures and regulations of the New Order. At that time, political distribution to become representatives in the parliament was only allowed through the three official political parties that became

election participants, namely *Golkar* (Functional Groups), the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the United Development Party (PPP).

The KPU accommodated the political excitement and enthusiasm during this reformation period by issuing KPU Decree No. 63/1999 on the Number of Polling Places and the Estimated Number of Voters in the 1999 General Election, which was ratified on 4 May 1999.

In total, there were 250,000 polling stations that would serve as a medium for approximately 130 million Indonesians who wished to express their political aspirations in the celebration of democracy during the reformation period. Inevitably, these populist regulations made the public's enthusiasm so high. This could also be seen clearly in the socio-political euphoria that was so overwhelming. In a short period of time, there came up hundreds (approximately 141) of political parties that wanted to be contestants of the election. It was a free election after Indonesia's first general election in 1955.

However, the progress of these political parties ended badly. They lost when dealing with several things, such as political infrastructure and connections that had long been established and entrenched. This could be seen in the party contestants that existed during the previous Government, namely during the New Order, such as *Golkar*, PPP, and PDI--which later split into the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)--which still got a lot of, or even the most, votes.

New political parties without the support of major religious organizations in Indonesia, as could be seen in the National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), and one or two other parties, would take a long time to build their structure and connectivity with the public. Predictably, these political parties then fell one by one, and soon shrunk to only a total of 48 parties after going through KPU verification.

The first general election in the reformation era was held on 7 June 1999, and in the end resulted in 21 political parties that managed to fill the

“In a short period of time, there came up hundreds (approximately 141) of political parties that wanted to be contestants of the election. It was a free election after Indonesia’s first general election in 1955.”

The 1999 election also finally started the awakening of the old spirit after the 1955 general election, namely the emergence of political polarization that was based on religious and ethnic conditions.

seats in the DPR. Of the 21 political parties, there were six whose votes exceeded two percent of the electoral threshold. This was the

provision for political parties to be able to re-participate in the next general election, without having to change their name and re-register.

The six political parties were PDIP, which won 154 seats in the DPR or 30.80 percent of the total votes; *Golkar*, which won 120 seats or 24 percent of the total votes; PPP, which won 59 seats or 11.80 percent of the vote; The National Awakening Party (PKB), which won 51 seats or 10.20 percent; The National Mandate Party (PAN), which won 35 seats (7 percent); and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), with 13 seats or 2.60 percent.

The 1999 election also finally started the awakening of the old spirit after the 1955 general election, namely the emergence of political polarization that was based on religious and ethnic

conditions. One thing that was hidden during the New Order era through simplification of the party system.

In its implementation during the reformation period, the legislative body made progress, both from the level of criticality and its outputs, both the MPR and the DPR. The MPR's progress, for example, could be seen when amending the 1945 Constitution. It was undeniable that during the New Order era the Constitution was considered sacred and it was a taboo to challenge it. However, the MPR at the time issued two amendments to the contents of the body of the 1945 Constitution.

Not to be outdone by the work of the MPR, the DPR as a result of the 1999 General Election also had several significant progress and roles in the Indonesian political system. One of them was when they exercised their rights in the 1999-2004 period. These rights included the right to request information from the President regarding the case of the Sultan of Brunei's donation and the case of using the *Bulog* Administration Fund, which then initiated the formation of the Special Committee for the Brunei and *Bulog* Cases.

In addition, there was the right to conduct an investigation, which was then realized through a special committee formed by the DPR related to several cases, such as the case of BLBI, *Bulog* and Brunei, and Semanggi I and II. The right that was exercised by members of the DPR was to conduct investigations into these cases.

In terms of legislation, the DPR also proposed a Bill or commonly known as the right of DPR initiative. This was carried out by the DPR by submitting the Broadcasting Bill, the Banten Province Formation Bill, the Bangka Belitung Province Formation Bill, the Gorontalo Province Formation Bill, the Riau Archipelago Province Establishment Bill, and so on. There was also the right to make changes to the bill which was later realized through amendments to Law no. 7 concerning the State Budget for Fiscal Year 1999-2000.

The DPR as a result of the 1999 General Election also had several significant progress and roles in the Indonesian political system. One of them was when they exercised their rights in the 1999-2004 period.

DPR RI in 1999-2004:

PROGRESS AND EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE LIFE OF DEMOCRACY

The 1999 election was the most democratic after the 1955 election. Some of the indicators were the number of parties participating in the election, the enthusiasm of the people in distributing their right to vote, and the results were fairly competitive where no single party won more than 50 percent.

THE implementation of the 1999 general election not only showed the format of the party system but also became one of the conditions that fulfill the prerequisites of democracy. First, there was accountability in which the elected representatives of the people must be accountable to their voters. Second, there was a rotation of power in which power was not only monopolized by one particular group for a long time. Third, there was an open political recruitment. Fourth, there was an existence of democratic and competitive elections. And fifth, there was a guarantee for the public to enjoy basic rights such as freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.

After the 1999 general election was held, from 1 to 21 October 1999, the General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was held as a result of the election. The inauguration of 700 members of the DPR/MPR for the 1999-2004 period was held on 1 October 1999. Amien Rais from the National Mandate Party and Akbar Tanjung from the Functional Groups Party were elected as Speaker of the MPR and Speaker of the DPR through a voting mechanism. The General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly also presented the accountability speech of President B.J. Habibie on 14 October 1999.

A total of 11 factions expressed their general views on Habibie's accountability speech, and four factions firmly refused. Meanwhile, the seven factions did not expressly refuse and only provided a number of notes and counter-questions. Some members of the public and students who



also did not accept President Habibie's accountability speech held a demonstration.

The MPR finally rejected President Habibie's accountability through a voting process. With this refusal, Habibie refused to run for president. At that time, two presidential candidates had actually emerged, who were Habibie and Megawati Soekarnoputri.

However, both of them received rejection, especially from Islamic parties. Megawati Soekarnoputri was considered not to represent Muslims, while B.J. Habibie was considered a product of the New Order that was nominated by the *Golkar* Party. Out of this situation emerged what was known as the Central Axis.

The Central Axis was a political alliance of Islamic parties in the 1999 Presidential Election which aimed to place alternative presidential candidates with presidential candidates from the PDIP and the *Golkar* Party. This term was introduced by Amien Rais, who was Speaker of the MPR for the 1999-2004 period. It was from this axis that the name Abdurrahman Wahid emerged as a presidential candidate.

**Megawati Soekarno Putri, General
Chairperson of the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle,
the Republic of Indonesia's
presidential candidate.**

(source: Dimas Ardian/Getty Images)



**The atmosphere of the 2004
General Election voting.**

(source: Paula Bronstein/Getty
Images)

In the presidential election conducted by voting in the MPR, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia thanks to the full support of the Central Axis on 20 October 1999. After winning the Presidential seat, Abdurrahman Wahid supported the PDIP in nominating Megawati as Vice President.

This was the last presidential election through the election mechanism in the MPR. The next presidential election was conducted through direct voting by the people in the voting booth. This included the results of the amendments to the 1945 Constitution.

In the course of Indonesian history, amendments to the 1945 Constitution had never been carried out, although Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution provided an opportunity to do so. During the New Order regime for approximately 30 years, the possibility of making amendments to the 1945 Constitution could be said to have been ruled out. It seemed like the New Order Government made the 1945 Constitution a sacred constitution and various attempts to make changes to the Constitution were considered taboo.

Efforts to amend several articles of the 1945 Constitution came to light during the Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly on 10-13 November 1998 after the reformation began. The rationale for the amendment was that the 1945 Constitution formed a state administrative structure that rested on the highest power in the hands of the MPR, which fully implemented the sovereignty of the people. This resulted in the absence of checks and balances in state administrative institutions.

The control of the MPR was the key word for the power of the state government which seemed to have no relationship with the people anymore. So far, the 1945 Constitution had also given so much power to the executive, including various prerogatives such as pardon, amnesty, abolition, and rehabilitation.

Such great executive power in the 1945 Constitution was not the only weakness in implementing the checks and balances system. The 1945 Constitution contained a number of articles with multiple interpretations, especially those concerning the top executive leadership, namely the president, who generally had very large powers. The article provided an opportunity for a person to be re-elected as president because it only explained that the president and vice president held office for a term of five years and thereafter could be re-elected. In addition, there were articles with potentially multiple interpretations because of the concept of Indonesians. The article that stated "The President is a native Indonesian" had various interpretations.

From 1999 to 2002, the sessions of the MPR resulted in four amendments to the 1945 Constitution. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution not only made changes to a number of articles but also clarified and emphasized several things that were previously considered weaknesses. For example, regarding the position of the DPR. A number of fundamental changes related to the authority and duties of the DPR included:

“From 1999 to 2002, the sessions of the MPR resulted in four amendments to the 1945 Constitution. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution not only made changes to a number of articles but also clarified and emphasized several things that were previously considered weaknesses.”

“The relationship between the DPR and the executive institution, especially the president, in Indonesia’s history had been through ups and downs and sometimes tinged with tension.”

1. Separation of the leadership of the DPR and the leadership of the MPR with the aim that the DPR would be independent in every decision making.
2. Elimination of Recall institutions. The abolition of this institution made it impossible for members of the DPR to be dismissed for political reasons.
3. Legislative institutions could carry out their functions, namely legislation, supervision and budget determination optimally. In addition, the DPR also got two new rights, namely to propose or recommend someone to fill a certain position if determined by a statutory regulation and to determine the DPR’s budget.

Furthermore, to optimize the rights of the DPR, amendments to the DPR Rules of Procedure were made with the aim of simplifying the procedures for implementing the rights of the DPR. One of the significant changes was, if in the previous order there must be at least 20 signatures representing more than one faction to apply for the right to ask for information from the Government, in the new order, 10 signatures were sufficient without having to consider the number of factions.

With all its authority, the DPR after the reformation began to show its role again in the Indonesian political system. The relationship between the DPR and the executive institution, especially the president, in Indonesia’s history had been through ups and downs and sometimes tinged with tension. During the reformation period, the tension between the DPR and the Government was evident during the reign of President Abdurrahman Wahid.

Concrete tensions between the President and the DPR which later affected political issues were the dismissal of Admiral Sukardi as Minister of Investment and Jusuf Kalla as Minister of Industry and Trade. The dismissal triggered a strong reaction from several political parties in the DPR, especially the party that recommended the two figures as ministers. The reaction then led to the use of interpellation right.



Tensions between the President and the DPR reached its peak when it was alleged that President Abdurrahman Wahid was involved in the disbursement and use of *Bulog* Employees' Welfare Foundation (Yanatera) funds amounting to Rp 35 billion and aid funds from the Sultan of Brunei Darussalam amounting to US\$ 2 million. This case prompted the DPR to form a special committee to investigate the case.

The DPR's response towards the case that befell President Abdurrahman Wahid referred to the DPR's awareness of its function, namely supervision. To carry out the control or supervisory function, the DPR had the right to ask questions, the right to interpellate, the right to question, and the motion in the parliamentary system. In the process, the DPR continued to follow the procedures for handling the police, especially the evidence for the case.

As if returning to the era of the parliamentary system, the conflict between the President and the DPR finally led to the Special Session of the MPR. The situation that led to the President's resignation from office prompted President Abdurrahman Wahid to issue the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia dated 23 July 2001.

This decree was then referred to as the Presidential Decree, which contained the President's desire to save the country and the nation by taking a number of steps, including freezing the MPR and DPR, returning sovereignty to the people, as well as taking action and compiling the necessary bodies to hold general elections within one year.



President Abdurrahman Wahid's action in issuing a decree instead of complying with the MPR's invitation led to the holding of the MPR Special Session, which was held on 23 July 2001. The Special Session which was attended by 601 MPR members and 599 members from 9 factions rejected the Presidential Decree. The MPR firmly stated that the Decree of 23 July 2001 was invalid because it was against the law and had no legal force.

The MPR Special Session continued with a vote and ended with the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid. The MPR in the same session then appointed the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia Megawati Soekarnoputri as President of the Republic of Indonesia.

INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT IN 2004-2014:

CONFIRMING THE LIFE OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

The 2004 election was the second general election in the reformation era as well as a breakthrough in the democratic system of the Republic of Indonesia. For the first time, the Indonesian people simultaneously elected members of the DPR, DPD, Provincial DPRD (Regional House of Representatives), and Regency/ Municipal DPRD. In the same year, the people also directly elected the president and vice president.

CHANGES in the political system in the reformation era put forward a more democratic electoral system and administration. Unlike the 1999 elections, where the election management body at that time consisted of partisan members from political party representatives, in the 2004 elections it was managed by the General Elections Commission (KPU), which was professional and independent, whose members were elected by the DPR.

In addition, openness in broad public political participation and role was the foundation of democratization in this new electoral system. Although public participation in establishing political parties and freely choosing election participants was not as high as in the previous elections, enthusiasm was still quite high.

Another difference was that the previous election used a closed registration system, while in the 2004 election the process of selecting members of the DPR and DPRD was carried out through a proportional system with an open list of candidates. Another change was the disappearance of the TNI-Polri elements in parliament. In the 1999 election, there were still members of the DPR and DPRD who came from elements of ABRI based on a closed proportional system.



The 2004 Legislative Election was the most complicated election in Indonesia's history because the Indonesian population had to elect people's representatives in the DPR, DPD, and DPRD. These factors made Indonesia's electoral system unique when compared to other countries.

In addition, in the 2004 general election, the presidential and vice-presidential elections were not conducted separately as was the case in the 1999 general election. In the 2004 general election, pairs of candidates (presidential and vice-presidential candidates) were chosen, not the presidential and vice-presidential candidates separately.

The 2004 general election was held simultaneously on 5 April 2004 to elect 550 members of the DPR-RI, 128 members of the DPD, and members of the Provincial and Regency/Municipal DPRD for the period of 2004-2009. Meanwhile, the presidential and vice presidential election was held on 5 July 2004.

The participants in the 2004 general election consisted of 24 political parties, 6 of which were old political parties that met the electoral threshold in the 1999 election, while the other political parties participating in the general election were new parties that were declared to have passed the KPU verification.

The 2004 election was divided into a maximum of three stages or a minimum of two stages. The first stage was the legislative election. A legislative election was an election to elect political parties, which was for the requirement for presidential election, and their members were nominated to become members of the DPR and DPRD. At this stage the election for DPD members was also carried out. This stage was carried out on 5 April 2004.

The second stage was the presidential election. The second stage was held on 5 July 2004. The third stage was the second round of presidential elections. This was done if in the first round there was no pair of candidates who got at least 50 plus one percent of the votes. If this was the case, the two pairs of candidates who got the most votes would be included in the second round of the presidential election. However, if in the first round there were already pairs of candidates who got more than 50 percent of the votes, the candidate pairs would be immediately appointed as president and vice president. This third stage, if any, would be carried out on 20 September 2004.

president would have a much stronger legitimacy of power than the previous president. Third, the political authority of a president no longer depended on the legislature, which in the old system rested with the MPR, but directly on the Indonesian people.

The beginning of the 2005-2006 session year was marked by the emergence of problems in institutional relations between the DPR-DPD-President regarding the plan to discuss the 2006 State Budget bill. It had become a convention every 16 August or the beginning of the session of the DPR-RI which was marked by a state speech by the president at the



plenary session of the DPR. DPD-RI as a new state institution that was present on the mandate of Amendment III of the constitution and whose position was equal to the DPR-RI, apparently wanted a state speech by the president to be carried out in front of the DPD.

In its development, as was usually done by the DPR and had become a constitutional convention, the DPD also intended to invite the President to give a state speech before the DPD. After a long debate, finally after 16 August 2005, the President was willing to give his state speech before

the DPR. On Tuesday, 23 August 2005, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the winner of the 2004 Presidential Election, gave a state speech at the Plenary Session of the DPD. It was a small thing but had an impact on inter-institutional relations.

The term of service for members of the DPR for the 2004-2009 period as a result of the 2004 General Election ended on 30 September 2009. Since 1 October 2009, members of the legislature from the 2009 Legislative Elections had begun to replace the positions of old DPR members, although some of them were still familiar faces.

The 2009 election, which was the third general election in the reformation era, took place with a number of improvements. The organizers of this election had determined 34 political parties to be participants in the national election. The number of participants in the legislative elections decided by the KPU was higher than the 2004 general election.

The addition of participants in the 2004 General Election due to the determination of election participation was contested by a number of parties which were declared not to have passed the verification. Through a lawsuit in the Administrative Court, four political parties were finally decided as participants in the 2009 Legislative Election, namely the Freedom Party, the Indonesian Nahdlatul Ummah Community Party, the Indonesian Unity Party, and the Labor Party.

There were still six local political parties participating in the 2009 general election that were taking part in the special elections for the Special Region of Aceh. The election for Aceh was a consequence of the reconciliation of armed conflict in the area.

The 2009 election became the most complicated election in the history of celebration of democracy in Indonesia. The method of voting by piercing the ballot paper which had been carried out during the period before 2009 was changed to ticking the paper. This model required socialization that was not easy.

“Another thing that marked the 2009 election was the determination of the members of the DPR as the result of the election with a threshold or a parliamentary threshold.”

The idea of holding elections with a parliamentary threshold system was an effort to strengthen the party system by simplifying the number of parties through democratic systems and regulations.

The 2009 election had also given new nuances to the candidates for members of the DPR who were participating in the contest. The most prominent thing was the increasingly long list of legislative candidates from among celebrities.

Another thing that marked the 2009 election was the determination of the members of the DPR as the result of the election with a threshold or a parliamentary threshold. A total of 560 members of the DPR were elected from nine parties who managed to pass the minimum threshold of 2.5 percent of the vote.

This was the first time that Indonesia held a general election with a voter threshold system, so that parties that failed to reach the threshold could not pass their members to Senayan as representatives of the people, even though individually they were able to obtain sufficient votes in their constituencies.

The idea of holding elections with a parliamentary threshold system was an effort to strengthen the party system by simplifying the number of parties through democratic systems and regulations. This regulation was contained in Law Number 10 of 2008 concerning General Elections for Members of the House of Representatives, Regional Representative Council, and Regional People's Representative Council.

Regarding the parliamentary threshold, regulations in Indonesia provided equal opportunities in the political field for men and women. The implementation of the regulations was guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution as stipulated in Article 27 paragraph 1.

Reflecting on the 2004 general election, which showed that of the 14 political parties that had more than 30 percent of women legislative candidates, only three political parties received more than 3 percent of the votes, namely PKS, PKB, and PAN. For the other 11 political parties, they were new parties with small votes, so they did not automatically become participants in the 2009 General Election in relation to the electoral threshold (ET) stipulation.

As a result, the 2004 general election was not a satisfying one for women's groups and had shown that it was difficult for women candidates to obtain 30 percent of the voter distribution number (BPP). The majority of legislative candidates in the 2004 General Election (87.5 percent) only managed to get no more than 10 percent of the votes. For candidates who did not reach the BPP number, a serial number mechanism was applied. This applied to all candidates for members of the DPR and DPRD.



In fact, since 2003, a 30 percent quota had been regulated for women, which was accommodated in Law Number 12 of 2003 concerning General Elections. The law stated, "Every political party participating in the general election may nominate candidates for members of DPR, Provincial DPRD, and Regency/Municipal DPRD for each electoral district by taking into account the representation of women of at least 30 percent."

The representation of women significantly increased after the enactment of the provisions for their representation through the 2009 Election Law. Even though the representation rules were not taken seriously by parties, indications of representation had shown an increase in the number. Women's representation only reached 9 percent in the 1999 election and 11.09 percent in the 2004 election, while it had increased by 7 percent

“On 30 August 2012, the Plenary Session of the DPR enacted Law Number 13 of 2012 concerning the Privileges of DIY. The law ultimately regulated the position of Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Paku Alam as Governor and Deputy Governor of DIY.”

in the 2009 election compared to the 2004 representation of all political parties participating in the election. Membership in the DPR was also varied by the increasing number of voices and aspirations from women.

At the end of 2010, public discourse was enlivened by the preparation of the Bill on the Privileges of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). The most crucial issue in this bill was whether a Sultan Hamengku Buwono (Sultan of Yogyakarta) automatically became the Governor of DIY or whether the Governor of DIY must be directly elected through regional head elections (*pilkada*) as in other provinces.

The appointment of Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Paku Alam to automatically become Governors and Deputy Governors of DIY was then deemed not in accordance with democratic principles. Article 18 paragraph 4 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as a result of the 4th amendment in 2002 clearly stated that: “The governors, regents, and mayors of each province, as heads of provinces, regencies, and cities, are elected democratically.”

The words “democratic” were then interpreted to mean that the position of Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Paku Alam as heirs of the monarchy in Yogyakarta could not automatically become the pairing of the Governor and Deputy Governor of Yogyakarta. Because, it was considered to violate the principles of democracy. Because of this, the DIY Privileges Bill then offered the idea of a direct regional head election to elect the Governor and Deputy Governor of DIY.

Two years later, on 30 August 2012, the Plenary Session of the DPR enacted Law Number 13 of 2012 concerning the Privileges of DIY. The law ultimately regulated the position of Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Paku Alam as Governor and Deputy Governor of DIY.

DPR RI 2014-2019:

DPR IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The 2014 election was attended by 12 parties. Even so, there were two parties that did not qualify for the DPR because their votes were less than 3.5 percent, namely the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). Meanwhile, 10 other parties passed the KPU's verification.

THE 2014 Legislative Elections were held on 9 April 2014, and the 2014 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections were held on 9 July 2014. The 2014 Legislative Elections succeeded in increasing voter turnout which reached 75.11 percent, exceeding the 2009 election participation rate of 70.9 percent.

Meanwhile, the legal umbrella for the 2014 Presidential Election was Law No. 42/2007 concerning the General Election of the President and Vice President. The new thing about this law was that pairs of presidential and vice president candidates must have the support of at least 20 percent of the seats in the DPR. This number could be from one party or a combination of several parties. Another requirement for the presidential and vice president candidate pairs was to obtain 25 percent of the national valid vote in the legislative election in the same year.

The 2014 election for the legislature practically went smoothly, although there were one or two shortcomings here and there. However, this was not the case with the presidential election. In this presidential election, there were two presidential and vice president candidates, namely the Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa pair and the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla pair. The pair of Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla later became the winners and were elected as President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2014-2019 period.

This was the era of the general election that was marked by a battle for public communication strategies through social media, both by the winning team of each pair of candidates and by their supporters. The

dynamics were very fast, even at the time of determining the winner. Such dynamics also took place during the election of the DPR leadership.

After the 2014-2019 DPR members were appointed, one of their initial tasks was to form the factions and the Board Fittings (AKD), namely leaders, commissions, agencies, and others. From the parties that won the election, 10 factions were formed. The impact of the presidential election was seen during the preparation of the Board Fittings.



President Joko Widodo accompanied by former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the leaders of the MPR-RI.

(Parliamentaria: Edition 118 TH. XLIV, 2014)

From these 10 factions, two large groups or coalitions were formed. The coalition was called the Red and White Coalition (KMP), which was a coalition of factions that previously supported presidential and vice president candidates Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa. Then there was the Great Indonesia Coalition (KIH), which contained factions that previously supported presidential and vice president candidates Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla.

There was one party that chose not to be part of the two coalitions, namely the Democratic Party. They claimed their non-participation in the coalition was a counterbalance.

The two coalitions of parties in the DPR, KMP, and KIH, in fact, did not last long. After the 2014 Presidential Election was over, there was a shift in support from parties that were previously in the KMP to KIH. PPP since October 2014 had shifted its support to the elected President, Joko Widodo. Less than a year after the transfer of PPP support, in September 2015, it was PAN's turn to declare its support for the Government. This of course began to shake the strength of the KMP, because previously this coalition could control the parliament.

The faltering power of the KMP was really felt in January 2016. At that time the *Golkar* Party declared its support for the Government and then joined the KIH. KIH and the Government previously only had a minority vote in parliament (37.14 percent), when compared to the majority KMP (47.56 percent). With these transfers, KIH became the majority with 66.01 percent of the votes in parliament. This is of course very beneficial for the Government because ongoing Government programs would be more easily approved by the DPR.

The dynamics of political power in the DPR could not help but slow down the implementation of the supervisory function. This was due to the absence of an agreement in the national interest between the two coalitions in the DPR at that time. This, for example, occurred during the absence of ministers and echelon I officials when the Board Fittings invited meetings in the DPR. In addition, the DPR also had to make adjustments to partners in several commissions due to changes in the nomenclature of ministries in the Working Cabinet.

After the dynamics in the parliament subsided, the performance of the DPR in carrying out its supervisory function began to be seen. This was reflected in the involvement of the DPR in the selection process for the appointment of public officials. Such a selection model was also combined with democratic political considerations regarding developing aspirations. This selection process put forward the principle of openness, among others, by announcing the names of candidates for public officials through the mass media to obtain public responses.

“The dynamics of political power in the DPR could not help but slow down the implementation of the supervisory function. This was due to the absence of an agreement in the national interest between the two coalitions in the DPR at that time.”

This, for example, was carried out at the suggestion of the appointment of public officials, namely the TNI Commander, Head of the State Intelligence Agency, members of the Film Censorship Institute (LSF), Supreme Court Justices, leaders of the Corruption Eradication Commission, and the National Police Chief. The DPR through the commission had also given consideration to the nomination of the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors of 29 (twenty nine) countries to the Republic of Indonesia.

No less important in carrying out its legislative function, since the beginning of its inauguration, the 2014-2019 DPR-RI had prepared itself if the DPR's activities in making laws were brought to justice in the Constitutional Court. In the 2014-2015 session year, for example, the cases decided by the Constitutional Court amounted to 32 cases, including cases that were rejected, could not be accepted, or were granted.

The Council had a view that the handling of cases in the judiciary, particularly in the handling of judicial review cases at the Constitutional Court, was a logical consequence of the position of the DPR, in its position as a people's representative council which constitutionally had legislative power. This was a kind of response or clarifying objections to the legislative products of the DPR together with the President that were proposed by the public. The handling of cases at the Constitutional Court for the DPR was a continuous effort to strengthen democratic values in Indonesia.

Another dynamic that occurred in the 2014-2019 DPR was the change in the Speaker of the DPR RI. This was the period with the highest number of changes of the DPR Speaker ever. During this period, there were three changes to the Speaker of the DPR. The replacement of the Speaker of the House of Representatives occurred due to several things.

As previously mentioned, after passing the period of appointment of DPR members for the 2014-2019 period, an election for the Speaker of the DPR was held through a package mechanism. This meant that the speaker and his four deputies were proposed.

On this occasion, Setya Novanto from the *Golkar* faction succeeded in becoming the Speaker of the DPR for the 2014-2019 period. He was supported by factions who were members of the Red and White Coalition.

The election process for the 2014-2019 DPR leadership was different from the previous period. In the previous period, the five factions that

received the most votes were automatically assigned to the leadership of the DPR. However, after the Laws on MPR, DPR, DPD, DPRD (UU MD3) were revised, the pattern of election for DPR leadership changed. These changes made the five DPR leaders elected directly by members of the DPR. In the process of electing the leadership of the DPR, there were also dynamics of its own. The Great Indonesia Coalition, namely PDIP, Hanura Party, PKB, and NasDem, chose to walk out. Later, in 2018, Utut Adianto from the PDIP Faction also became the Deputy Speaker of the DPR for State Financial Accountability and the Household Affairs.



The position of speaker of Setya Novanto lasted for approximately one year and two months, from 2 October 2014 to 16 December 2015. Novanto submitted a letter of resignation as Speaker of the DPR for the 2014-2019 period to the Ethics Council (MKD). This was the aftermath of the "Papa Asks for Shares" (*Papa Minta Saham*) scandal.

After Setya Novanto resigned, there was a vacancy in the position of the Speaker of the DPR. Fadli Zon later became the acting Speaker of the DPR RI from 18 December 2015 to 11 January 2016. However, it turned out that the process of resignation from the position of the Speaker of the DPR had to go through a lengthy mechanism. There were separate regulations regarding the resignation of the Speaker of the DPR, which was a fairly long process.

When Novanto resigned, there was a dynamic in the *Golkar* Party regarding leadership. At that time, there was a dualism in the management of the *Golkar* Central Board, namely the result of the Bali National Meeting led by Aburizal Bakrie and the Jakarta National Meeting that was chaired by Agung Laksono. This also led to differences in the nomination of a candidate to replace Novanto from the *Golkar* Party faction. Two letters appeared in the name of the *Golkar* Faction. The Aburizal camp proposed Ade Komarudin and the Agung camp proposed Agus Gumiwang. In the end, it was Aburizal Bakrie's camp that was chosen. Ade Komarudin on 11 January 2016 became the Speaker of the DPR.



The friendly atmosphere of the consultation between the DPR-RI Leadership with the President and Vice President in discussing the 2015 Revised State Budget.

(Parliamentaria Edition: 121 TH. XLV, 2015)

During Ade Komarudin's tenure, Novanto also tried to fight the allegations of his involvement in the "Papa Asks for Shares" case through the Constitutional Court. Regarding the wiretapping or recording that happened to him, he submitted a judicial review of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law regarding evidence in investigation, prosecution, and examination. The recording of his conversation with Riza Chalid and Maroef Sjamsoeddin which was used as evidence to arrest him could not be used as evidence.

In response to this, the Ethics Council then held a hearing on 27 December 2016 and decided to restore the dignity and prestige, as well as the good name of Setya Novanto. On the other hand, Ade Komaruddin's leadership did not last long. He only led until 30 November 2016.

Ade's tenure was short because of ethical violations. During his tenure, Ade Komarudin was accused of transferring a number of state-owned enterprises that received state equity participation (PMN) to become working partners of Commission XI. Previously, a number of SOEs that received state equity participation were partners of Commission VI. Apart from that, he was also accused of slowing down the process of discussing the Tobacco Bill.

The violations committed by Ade Komarudin as the head of the Board Findings resulted in his dismissal by the Ethics Council from his position as Speaker of the DPR. On the same occasion, Setya Novanto was re-appointed as Speaker of the DPR. The proposal was made by the Golkar Faction after Novanto became the General Chairman of *Golkar* according to the results of the Golkar National Deliberation in May 2016. The *Golkar* Party's Board of Trustees approved the re-nomination of Setya Novanto as Speaker of the DPR.

However, Setya Novanto's second term as Speaker of the DPR did not last long. This time he was caught in the alleged corruption case of the e-KTP project. He was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). While in KPK detention room, Setya Novanto submitted a letter of resignation. He also appointed Aziz Syamsuddin as his successor as Speaker of the DPR from the *Golkar* faction. However, this was not approved by the DPR. Novanto's resignation resulted in the return of Fadli Zon as acting Speaker of the DPR.

The arrest of Setya Novanto also made *Golkar* replace its General Chairman. Airlangga Hartarto was later elected as General Chairman of *Golkar* replacing Novanto. Furthermore, after the internal affairs of the *Golkar* Party were resolved, *Golkar* made a decision regarding the position of the Speaker of the DPR. One of *Golkar* cadres, Bambang Soesatyo, was proposed to be the Speaker of the DPR replacing Novanto. This was approved by members of the DPR. As of 15 January 2018, Fadli Zon's duty as the acting Speaker of the DPR for the second time had been completed. On that date, Bambang Soesatyo was appointed by the DPR to become the new Speaker of the DPR.

AFTERWORD


When all of them were in the process of becoming Indonesia, Indonesian people also tried to have a parliamentary life.



***The period of a century of
parliamentary life in Indonesia
was taken from 1918-2018. It
was a long learning journey for
Indonesian people to have their
representatives.***



Even until Indonesia has reached a century of parliamentary life, perhaps Indonesian people are still in the process of learning, adapting, and trying to implement various political systems that they feel are appropriate. Although it doesn't always work, it doesn't mean it's a complete failure.



Indonesia has more than 300 ethnic groups, to be precise there are 1,340 ethnicities in the country, according to the 2010 census of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS). They are separated and live together on more than 17,000 islands. They also use different languages and dialects, apart from the unified Indonesian language. According to data from the Ministry of Education and Culture in 2019, there are 801 languages throughout Indonesia.

When all of them were in the process of becoming Indonesia, Indonesian people also tried to have a parliamentary life. It was at the stage when even Indonesia had not been formed as a state. Our parliamentary life is carried out while experiencing the learning process as a nation.

Throughout the history of the parliamentary journey, every change of the Government had always had its implications for the role and position of the people's representative institution, or currently called the House of Representatives (DPR), whether when it was still in the form of or called the Volksraad during the Dutch colonial era, when Japan colonized Indonesia, or even when Indonesia became independent.

Changes experienced by the parliament due to the changes in the Government or its system were not always bad. The change of Government from the Old Order to the New Order, for example, had implications for the role and position of the people's representative institution, which at the time was called the People's Representative Council of Mutual Assistance (DPR-GR). The change in the Government brought positive changes, because the DPR-GR as a legislative body was no longer part of or under the president (executive) as in the previous Guided Democracy era.

But, once again, a change in the Government's interests may change the situation from what was considered a positive one to going backward. When the DPR-GR finished its term of office and the parliament became the DPR as a result of the 1971 general election, the New Order apparently changed its political format.

Along with the political format that was later built by the New Order Government, which was oriented to support its policies that focused on economic development, hopes for the presence of a parliament with an ideal role and function were dashed. Economic development required the support of guarantees of political stability and national security, so the DPR-RI eventually became an institution and political force designed and directed to fully support the implementation of such economic development.

In order to more effectively control the DPR/MPR, the administration of the New Order under President Soeharto always underpinned all his actions constitutionally. This could be seen from a series of Provisional MPR decrees that were born under his control, including making a strategy through general elections.

Therefore, the existence of the DPR in that era was intended to show evidence that the New Order Government was democratic, with elections held every five years. The DPR seemed to be used as a source of legitimacy for all Government actions and policies.

“The existence of the DPR in that era was intended to show evidence that the New Order Government was democratic, with elections held every five years.”

A century of parliamentary life in Indonesia should have been completed in 2018, which was exactly 100 years since the Volksraad was born in the country which was later named Indonesia.

However, during this long period of time, more or less during the 30 years of the New Order Government, the DPR as a legislative body had not always fully served as an instrument of Government legitimacy. There were times when, especially in the early 1990s, the DPR also played an active role in carrying out its duty as an institution that supervised and criticized Government policies. Looking at the dynamics as described in the five history books of the DPR, the description of the DPR as a Government policy stamper is not entirely correct.

When the New Order ended and Indonesia entered the reformation era, or sometimes referred to as the Reformation Order, the DPR that resulted from the elections in this era was a different legislative body from the DPR in the previous administrations.

The beginning of reformation could be said to be a period of strengthening the DPR as a legislative body. It has transformed into a legislative institution that is quite articulate in conveying the aspirations of the people. The pressures and restraints that the Indonesian people felt during the New Order found their way to be released.

In the process, the DPR in the reformation era faced quite a number of problems, both internal and external. A number of notes that must be considered was the relationship of this institution with the executive which was sometimes inconsistent in looking at a number of problems. At a certain point, this showed the DPR's efforts to optimize its supervisory function, something that was clearly not done optimally by the DPR during the New Order administration.

On the other hand, sometimes, the supervisory function was also not optimal, in which the majority of members of the DPR came from the same party as the elected president. Especially if the president at the same time served as chairman or other important position in a political party. The culture of some Indonesians who are very reluctant to criticize influential figures was very difficult to distinguish from how they should behave in every activity within the Council. The atmosphere of the political party that supposedly should not be carried away when members of

the Council carried out their duties actually became an obstacle to the creation of checks and balances mechanism.

Likewise, reading the long journey of parliamentary life in Indonesia, we can understand that it is not easy to be the representative of millions of people. The struggle to voice the people's voice does not end when a politician is elected and enters parliament as a representative of the people. Instead, it is when the real work of bringing people's aspirations has actually just begun.

There are political forces in parliament that must be balanced. There are socio-political-economic-cultural issues in society that must be reconciled. There are technological advances that need to be adapted. All of these are done so that the voices brought from the voting booths appear in debates and discussions in parliamentary meeting rooms. Whether the voices are realized or not, that is another matter.

A century of parliamentary life in Indonesia should have been completed in 2018, which was exactly 100 years since the Volksraad was born in the country which was later named Indonesia. However, that year was only a year away from the end of the term of office of the DPR as a result of the 2014 election. There were no significant events during that one year period, so the period of a century of parliamentary life in Indonesia was taken from 1918-2018. It was a long learning journey for Indonesian people to have their representatives.

A CENTURY OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN INDONESIA HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

All these times, we have been familiar with the saying or expression of President Soekarno that “a great nation is a nation that respects its history”. One of the requirements to become a great nation is the ability to understand that history is a lesson learned.

As a parliamentary institution of a nation that gained its independence through a long struggle to free itself from colonialism, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) has a long history that can be traced back at least to the early 20th century. However, until the end of 2018, there has not been a single book that can comprehensively reveal the history of the representative council in Indonesia. Even if there are, they are generally in the form of chronicles, episodic stories, or fragments of stories.

In 2017-2018, the Secretariat General of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia initiated the writing of five books about the History of the DPR RI in the context of a century of parliamentary life in Indonesia. It was a long process of writing a book.

The five books were compiled to describe the experiences of the Indonesian people in parliamentary life throughout the course of history. In their discussion, the five books try to show the “common thread” of the nation’s struggle through the role of figures, organizations, and movement activists in parliamentary institutions from the colonial period to independence, and the period after.

The preparation of this book of summary was an effort to make it easier to understand the five books. Indonesian people, especially the younger generation, may have a reluctance to learn about their nation’s long journey in political life through an esteemed representative body, which comes in a comprehensive format in the five main books.

In the end, this book was compiled to facilitate and attract readers to understand the history of the parliamentary life journey in Indonesia. There are obviously parts or details that were not written in this book. Details of the history can still be read in the five main books. It is hoped that this book can be the starting point for people to learn about parliament in Indonesia, about our identity as a nation. About Indonesia.

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